Modeling Decision Making In Trauma Centers From The Standpoint Of   Complex Adaptive Systems by Policarpo, Castanon de
North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University 
Aggie Digital Collections and Scholarship 
Dissertations Electronic Theses and Dissertations 
2013 
Modeling Decision Making In Trauma Centers From The 
Standpoint Of Complex Adaptive Systems 
Castanon de Policarpo 
North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.library.ncat.edu/dissertations 
 Part of the Other Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Policarpo, Castanon de, "Modeling Decision Making In Trauma Centers From The Standpoint Of Complex 
Adaptive Systems" (2013). Dissertations. 130. 
https://digital.library.ncat.edu/dissertations/130 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at Aggie 
Digital Collections and Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized 





Modeling Decision Making in Trauma Centers from the Standpoint of  
Complex Adaptive Systems 
Policarpo Castanon de Mattos 







A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Department: Industrial and Systems Engineering 
Major: Industrial and Systems Engineering 
Major Professor: Prof. Eui H. Park 





School of Graduate Studies 
North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University 
This is to certify that the Doctoral Dissertation of 
 
Policarpo Castanon de Mattos 
 
has met the doctorial requirements of  
North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University 
 








              
Dr. Eui H. Park      Dr. Daniel M. Miller  
Major Professor      Committee Member 
 
 
              
Dr. Daniel N. Mountjoy     Dr. Younho Seong 
Committee Member      Committee Member 
 
 
              
Dr. Tonya L. Smith-Jackson     Dr. Sanjiv Sarin  








































© Copyright by 





Policarpo Castanon de Mattos was born on December 23, 1947, in the city of Guarani, in 
the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil. He received the Bachelor of Business Administration degree 
from Pace University of New York in 1982 and a Master of Science degree in Industrial 
Engineering from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in 2007.  He is a 
candidate for the Ph.D. degree in Industrial and Systems Engineering from North Carolina 
Agricultural and Technical State University in Greensboro, NC.  
iv 
Dedication 
I dedicate this dissertation to my loving and supportive parents, Annette Castanon 
deMattos and Dolirio Martins deMattos; my children, Anastasia, David John, and Edward 




I wish to express my irrepressible gratitude to the many students and colleagues with 
whom I have shared the battlefield of intellectual discovery.  Through their own efforts to shine 
through the darkness and unearth the most valuable jewels that the realm of scientific research 
holds within its mines, they have each in their own way molded parts of the milieu which have 
come together to weave the world that we all strive to study, understand, and improve.   
Among the list of professors, classmates, and friends from whom I have drawn 
inspiration and guidance, I wish especially to thank Dr. Eui H. Park, my advisor and Graduate 
Students‘ Coordinator and formerly Chairperson of the Department of Industrial and Systems 
Engineering here at the North Carolina A&T State University whose life sense of scientific 
inquiry and deep humanism have taught me much, who was a constant source of support, advice, 
and wisdom; Dr. Daniel M. Miller of the Department of Leadership Studies and a member of my 
doctoral committee whose critical reading of my entire manuscript were very helpful and for his 
support, help, and contributions – both direct and indirect, explicit and tacit – that inspired me; 
Dr. Younho Seong who is a member of my doctoral committee for his contributions both central 
and peripheral; Dr. Daniel Mountjoy also a member of my doctoral committee who earned my 
respect and gratitude.  
I wish also to acknowledge my son David John deMattos who proved a constant help as I 
often used him as a springboard to bounce ideas and for proof reading early versions of my work. 
I owe a debt of gratitude and a heartfelt thanks to Dr. James E. Winslow, III, MD at the Wake 
Forest Health Science for his guidance and many conversations about trauma centers and 
emergency medicine. Thanks are also due to Dr. Celestine Ntuen, who planted the seeds for the 
vi 
use of the concepts of Complex Adaptive Systems. I gratefully acknowledge the Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation and thank them sincerely for partially supporting the research.  
I owe a heartfelt thanks to all the professors of the Department of Industrial and Systems 
Engineering for their unwavering support without which this dissertation would not have been 
possible. I want to express my appreciation to Elaine Vinson and Elizabeth Brooks whose 
imagination, sensitivity, and willingness to help the students of the department made this journey 
so much more pleasant and fruitful.  
Finally, I would like express my gratitude for my children and grandchildren for the 
patience and understanding during my almost total absence that lasted almost five years. They 
knew what was in store for them when I started my doctoral degree, yet, they afforded me love 
and affection during this journey. For their tireless support and for always coming through when 
needed, much thanks.  
 
vii 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................................x 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. xi 
List of Symbols or Nomenclature ................................................................................................. xii 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................2 
CHAPTER 1.  Introduction..............................................................................................................3 
1.2 Background ............................................................................................................................8 
1.3 Trauma Centers as Complex Adaptive Systems ..................................................................13 
1.4 Problem Statement and Research Questions........................................................................17 
1.5  Summary .............................................................................................................................20 
CHAPTER 2.  21A Review of the Contributing Literature ...........................................................21 
2.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................21 
2.2 Interest in Complex Systems ...............................................................................................24 
2.3 Basic Concepts of Complex Adaptive Systems ...................................................................26 
2.4 Medical Judgment in Clinical Decision Making .................................................................29 
2.4.1  A case of intuition ....................................................................................................... 31 
CHAPTER 3.  Conceptual Framework ..........................................................................................39 
3.1 Modes of Decision-Making .................................................................................................39 
3.1.1  Rational ....................................................................................................................... 40 
3.1.2  Political ....................................................................................................................... 41 
3.1.3  Judgmen. ..................................................................................................................... 42 
3.1.4  Intuition ....................................................................................................................... 43 
3.2 The Framework ....................................................................................................................44 
viii 
3.3 Process Map of Trauma Center Decision-Making...............................................................49 
CHAPTER 4.  Methodology ..........................................................................................................51 
4.1 Research Design and Procedure ...........................................................................................51 
4.2 The Decision Making Model ...............................................................................................52 
4.2.1  Bayesian classifier ...................................................................................................... 55 
4.2.2  Convolution................................................................................................................. 58 
4.2.3  Deconvolution ............................................................................................................. 60 
4.2.4  The Matlab® program ................................................................................................ 61 
4.3 Data ......................................................................................................................................62 
4.3.1  Method for data collection .......................................................................................... 64 
4.3.2  Procedure .................................................................................................................... 65 
4.3.3  Study design ................................................................................................................ 66 
4.4 Summary ..............................................................................................................................67 
CHAPTER 5.  Trauma Center Physicians: The Adaptive Decision Maker ..................................68 
5.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................68 
5.2 Predicting Outcomes ............................................................................................................70 
5.3 Physicians and Pattern Recognition .....................................................................................74 
5.4 Physician Decision Making .................................................................................................80 
5.5 Unfamiliarity of Task Content: Analysis versus Intuition ...................................................85 
5.6 Information Overload...........................................................................................................93 
5.7 Cognitive Demands ..............................................................................................................98 
5.8 Trauma Complexity ...........................................................................................................103 
5.9 Determining Patients‘ Priorities .........................................................................................108 
ix 
5.10 Trauma Gestalt .................................................................................................................111 
5.11 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................................115 
CHAPTER 6.  Results and Discussion ........................................................................................117 
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................117 
6.2 Results ................................................................................................................................122 
6.2.1  Trauma Case 1 – Study Condition 1 ......................................................................... 123 
6.2.2  Trauma Case 1 – Study Condition 2 ......................................................................... 129 
6.2.3  Trauma Case 2 – Study Condition 1 ......................................................................... 134 
6.2.4  Trauma Case 2 – Study Condition 2 ......................................................................... 137 
6.3 Discussion ..........................................................................................................................141 
CHAPTER 7.  Contributions and Future Work ...........................................................................146 
7.1 Research Summary ............................................................................................................146 
7.2 Contributions......................................................................................................................149 
7.3 Research Limitations .........................................................................................................151 
7.4 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................152 
7.5 Implications for Future Research Studies ..........................................................................154 
References ....................................................................................................................................156 
Appendix A  Level 1 and Level 2 Trauma Code Criteria .............................................................165 
Appendix B  Physicians Specialties..............................................................................................167 
Appendix C  Details of Trauma Cases .........................................................................................168 
x 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1.  Level 1 trauma center bay (Walleigh, 2011). .............................................................. 5 
Figure 1.2.  Depth of trauma care systems. ................................................................................... 10 
Figure 1.3.  Conceptual framework for diagnostic course of action. ............................................ 15 
Figure 2.1.  Age distribution of global injury. Source: (Peden, McGee, & Sharma, 2002) ......... 23 
Figure 3.1.  Concepts and fields of complexity. ........................................................................... 40 
Figure 3.2.  Framework for clinical decision making. .................................................................. 45 
Figure 3.3.  Process map of trauma center decision making ........................................................ 50 
Figure 4.1.  Data deconvolution model ......................................................................................... 53 
Figure 6.1.  Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 1 ........................................ 124 
Figure 6.2.  Deconvolution graphs, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 2 .................................... 126 
Figure 6.3.  Summary of confusion matrices, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 1 .................... 128 
Figure 6.4.  Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 2 ........................................ 129 
Figure 6.5.  Deconvolution graphs, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 2. ................................... 130 
Figure 6.6.  Summary of confusion matrices, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 2. ................... 131 
Figure 6.7.  Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 1. ....................................... 135 
Figure 6.8.  Summary of Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 1. .................. 135 
Figure 6.9.  Deconvolution graphs, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 1 .................................... 136 
Figure 6.10. Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 2 ....................................... 138 
Figure 6.11. Summary confusion matrices, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 2 ........................ 139 
Figure 6.12. Deconvolution graphs, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 2 ................................... 140 
xi 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1  Trauma Center Resources Needed to Reflect Maximum Commitment ...................... 12 
Table 4.1  Trauma Cases Observed in the Trauma Center ........................................................... 63 
Table 4.2  Sample of Data Collection Form ................................................................................. 65 
Table 6.1  Sequence of Events of Trauma Cases 1 and 2 ........................................................... 123 
 
xii 
List of Symbols or Nomenclature  
ABC: Airway, Breathing, Circulation  
ABCDE: Airway, Breathing, Circulation, Disability, Exposure/Environment 
ACS-COT: American College of Surgeons – Committee on Trauma 
ACS: American College of Surgeons 
AMD: Attending Medical Doctor or Attending Physician 
ATLS: Advanced Trauma Life Support for Doctors 
BP: Blood Pressure 
CAS: Complex Adaptive System 
CDC: Center for Disease Control 
CM: Confusion Matrix 
CMs: Confusion Matrices 
CPR: Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation  
CT Scan: Computerized Tomography Scan 
DMPUS: Decision Making Process under Stress 
DTI: Decision Time Interval 
ED: Emergency Department (formerly known as ―Emergency Room‖) 
EKG: Electrocardiography 
EM: Emergency Medicine 
EMAP: Emergency Medicine Attending Physician  
EMS: Emergency Medical Services 
EP: Emergency Physician 
HR: Heart Rate (Pulse) 
ICU: Intensive Care Unit  
xiii 
IV: Intravenous 
IRB: Institutional Review Board  
L1TRU: Level 1 Trauma Resuscitation Unit 
MD: Medical Doctor or Physician 
mmHg: Millimeters of Mercury 
OR: Operating Room 
RDMP: Rational Decision Making Process 
RN: Registered Nurses 
RR: Respiratory Rate 
TC: Trauma Center 
WFU: Wake Forest University 





This research examines complex clinical decision-making processes in trauma center units of 
hospitals in terms of the impact of complexity on the medical team involved in the trauma event. 
The science of complex adaptive systems together with human judgment theories provide 
important concepts and tools for responding to health care challenges in this century and beyond. 
Clinical decision-makers in trauma centers are placed in urgent and anxious situations that are 
increasingly complex, making decision-making and problem-solving processes multifaceted. 
Under stressful circumstances, physicians must derive their decision-making schemas (―internal 
models‖ or ―mental models‖) without the benefits of judicious identification, evaluation, and/or 
application of relevant medical information, and always using fragmentary data. This research 
developed a model of decision-making processes in trauma events that uses a Bayesian Classifier 
model jointly with Convolution and Deconvolution operators to study real-time observed trauma 
data for decision-making processes under stress. The objective was to explore and explain 
physicians‘ decision-making processes during actual trauma events while under the stress of time 
constraints and lack of data. The research addresses important operations that describe the 
behavior of a dynamic system resulting from stress placed on the physician‘s rational decision-
making processes by the conditions of the environment. Deconvolution, that is, determining the 
impulse response of the system, is used to understand how physicians clear out extraneous 
environmental noise in order to have a clearer picture of their mental models and reach a 




This dissertation explores clinical decision-making processes under stress (DMPUS) at 
trauma centers from the perspective of complex adaptive system (CAS) theory, including its 
approach to managing complex, collaborative work.  It is an attempt to provide an understanding 
of the work of trauma physicians while in the act of saving a human life during a distressing 
trauma situation. Trauma is defined as a major threat to the immediate and often long-term health 
of individuals. Complex adaptive systems are dynamically evolving situations involving multiple 
operations. Everyone—physicists, mathematicians, psychologists, engineers, business leaders, 
trauma physicians, other medical personnel, artists, and even politicians—deals with this kind of 
complexity (Suh, 2005).  The theory of CAS as applied to clinical decision-making is a way to 
manage the complex, dynamic, unpredictable work of trauma centers. This exploration into 
complex clinical decision-making processes has revealed how health care workers in trauma 
centers self-adjust and survive despite uncertainty, change, and constant interaction with the 
environment. It includes both participant observation and interviews with medical doctors which 
combine to provide a complex, rich portrait of trauma centers.   
This research focuses on the complexity of decision-making processes that exists in 
hospitals‘ trauma center systems, with their rapidly changing environments. The scenario at 
trauma centers is completely unpredictable from hour to hour, and decisions are constantly made 
in the face of complex situations with ill-defined, fuzzy, and uncertain goals. One issue of 
particular interest is the role of the physician in reducing the complexity of the milieu and 
anchoring a robust medical team. Trauma physicians need to ‗keep afloat in a turbulent sea of 
unexpected demands, unfunded mandates, and diminishing recourses‖ (Kenagy, 2009). This 
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implies that physicians as decision-makers should learn and adapt and have the ability to make 
responsive adjustments to changes in the environment by finding clear and unambiguous way to 
problem-solve—all within a real-world time. To facilitate the effort to study a suitable cross 
section of different patients, as well as a suitable cross section of varied treatment instances, this 
research was done in real-time at a Level 1 trauma resuscitation center. However, we have had 
the opportunity to analyze our data and make judgments based upon it at considerably more 
leisure than is usually afforded to doctors at trauma centers.  
1.1 The Practice of Emergency Medicine: Dilemmas of an Emergency Department  
In today‘s hospital Emergency Departments (ED), patients present via walk-in as well as 
via emergency transport services.  Upon arrival, patients are triaged and assigned acuity levels, 
which are generally accomplished with the use of an Emergency Severity Index (ESI). ESIs are a 
series of triage algorithms that yield rapid, reproducible, and clinically relevant stratification of 
patients into five groups from Level 1 (most urgent) to Level 5 (least urgent). The ED stands 
alone as the only area of the hospital in which patients can be expected to present with chief 
complaints of such variance, which run the gamut from toothache to myocardial infarction; from 
ambiguous unspecified ―pain‖ to severe burns or trauma; and even psychological issues, such as 
substance dependency and suicidal thoughts. EDs are outfitted with differing levels of treatment 
rooms to accommodate the differing acuity levels of the patients, an example of which can be 
seen in Figure 1.1.  One hospital in North Carolina, in particular, boasts an ED divided into both 
major care and minor care areas, with 41 double-bed treatment rooms and with the major care 
area further equipped with six ―Level 1‖ trauma resuscitation treatment rooms.  
In such an environment, the attending physicians present will find themselves faced with 
incidences which call for rational decision-making but which may also come with an enormous 
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number of stressors. Sometimes those stressors are directly related to the urgency of the 
situation; other times, they are not. At an ED in today‘s hospital, one can expect to be presented 
with patients who have neither insurance nor the ability to pay for routine medical procedures.  
For this reason, they utilize the ED (which by law must provide them with care) for their routine 
needs, such as acquisition of prescription medications, treatment of aches and pains, even kidney 
dialysis.  In these situations, it is likely that the patient will present to the physician with a 
routine chief complaint, as well as a series of familiar symptoms and other medical parameters.  
It is almost a certainty that these patient cases will not contain an element of urgency due to time, 
thereby allowing the physician to employ a rational decision-making process (RDMP) without 
convolutions and reach an accurate diagnosis.   
 
Figure 1.1.  Level 1 trauma center bay (Walleigh, 2011). 
Other patients may present regularly for amorphous conditions.  These ―frequent flyers‖ 
might be homeless, drug-seekers, hypochondriacs, or merely those desiring attention.  In these 
situations, physicians are presented with a series of familiar symptoms (albeit less specific, e.g., 
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―abdominal pain‖), which in turn translate into batteries of tests which fit with the chief 
complaint.  A patient presenting routinely with unspecific abdominal pain might receive, as a 
matter of course, a urine test, blood screen, and abdominal CT scan—computerized tomography 
scan.  The physician then interprets the results of these tests and provides diagnosis based on his 
knowledge of the original symptom parameters and the new information provided by the test 
results and again, the element of time does not play a significant role. This is because decision 
analysis techniques have been developed to assist physicians in making rational decisions that 
reflect the best available evidence for each patient‘s individual needs.  
However, in a given shift at an ED, physicians will also be faced with a variety of bona 
fide emergent situations, which introduce various stressors into the clinical decision-making 
process. These stressors (noises) are the ―convolutions‖ which alter the physician‘s interpretation 
of the scenario, as well as his/her response to it. The most pertinent of these stressors is the 
element of time constraint, which is one of the characteristic of emergency medicine. A patient 
who presents with acute myocardial infarction may need immediate transport to a cardiac 
catheterization lab. In this particular scenario, there is a controllable variable of time as well as 
an uncontrollable variable of time. The elapsed time from onset of symptoms to the moment 
when the patient presents at the ED trauma center is an uncontrollable variable of time.  The 
medical staff has had no control over how long the individual has waited before seeking medical 
attention.  However, once the patient presents with these symptoms, the element of time then 
becomes a variable completely under the control of the medical staff.  Upon presenting to an ED, 
the patient will be registered, triaged, evaluated, examined, and treated.  Each of these stages 
takes a measure of time, and the decision-making process of the members of the medical staff 
determine how great or small that measure of time is. Because of the critical nature of emergent 
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medical situations, the decision-making process will be different from routine or rational 
decision making, due to the introduction of the convolution of time constraint as well as the 
introduction of another convolution: resource management. 
Emergency Departments operate with finite staff, finite materials, and finite resources of 
all types. In most scenarios, the levels of staffing and material are non-factors, as they prove 
more than sufficient to meet the level of need.  Even when supply exceeds the demand, the level 
of supply does not play a role in decision-making. In emergency medicine, it is not uncommon to 
have several emergent situations arise and require attention within moments of one another.  A 
vehicle crash with multiple occupants, an assault with multiple victims, or even a spill of some 
type of hazardous material might bring multiple patients in need of emergency care to the doors 
of an ED without warning—or more often, a combination of singular events can do the same. In 
one scenario during this study, there was a victim of severe burns in one room, an assault victim 
and recipient of multiple stab wounds in another, a severe head trauma resulting from a 30 foot 
fall in a third, and acute respiratory distress in a fourth.  Each of these patients presented at 
nearly the same time, and while these treatments were being attended to, a fifth patient presented 
with symptoms of a myocardial infarction.  In each of these cases, the element of time constraint 
plays a strong role, exacerbated by the fact that now the physician is required to divide his time, 
attention, and decision-making acumen between multiple cases (each case having its own case-
specific convolutions).  Furthermore, the physician must divide the time of others, as qualified 
staff is a finite resource.  Qualified respiratory specialists, EKG technicians, registered nurses 
(RN), nursing assistants, radiology technicians and others all play a role as valuable resources 
and must be managed accordingly. Beyond human resources, the material resources must be 
divided and dispensed.  Units of blood for transfusion must be acquired and dispensed, IV 
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pumps, EKG monitors, portable x-ray machines—all of these items must be requested, acquired, 
transported to rooms, and operated by qualified staff.  The convolution of time comes into play at 
all levels, from the moment a patient comes through the doors, and then the convolution of 
resource management rears its head as well. Seamlessly, those convolutions come together and 
are must be resolved as the physician makes treatment decisions.  The risk/benefit ratio must be 
weighed at every moment: Is the risk of taking the time to perform this task outweighed by the 
benefit of the task to the patient?   
1.2 Background 
The Newtonian worldview has been the dominant approach to science for more than 
three centuries in almost all areas of physics, social sciences, engineering design, and in the 
biological sciences. It is based in an attempt to see things at their most fundamental level and has 
been referred to as ―the machine metaphor‖ in which any entity could be studied and fully 
understood by reducing it to its smallest parts, or in which one event is understood as the 
consequence of another (Hoffman, 2000). Once each of its separate parts (or each discrete event) 
was understood, the entity‘s current state outlined, and the rules that made it functional were 
understood, its future behavior (or the outcome of the events) could be predicted without much 
difficulty. This, in essence, defines a deterministic system. This reductionistic conceptual 
framework worked well during the Industrial Revolution, promoting both the capacity for mass 
production and a dependency upon predictable environments. Its science is simple and strongly 
reflects a view of causality that assumes the ability to understand systems in the simple terms of 
the processes from which these systems have been created or structured.  
This Newtonian conceptual framework is not sufficient for many other things. It does not 
allow understanding of the complexity of dynamic systems in which there are a myriad of small 
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parts (agents), all interacting with each other. A trauma center is a dynamic, highly complex 
adaptive system which is itself dealing with other dynamic systems in the form of living 
organisms wherein the source of the problem is not self-evident and decisions at all times 
involve a complex set of choices.  As such, a trauma center does not well fit the machine 
metaphor of science.   
The word ―trauma‖ is of Greek origin, signifying wound. The American College of 
Surgeons (ACS) uses the word ―trauma‖ interchangeably with ―injury‖ to mean damage to 
human tissue and/or organs resulting from the transfer of some form of energy from the 
environment to a human host. Injury occurs when the impact of this energy is beyond the body‘s 
resilience in absorbing it (Jacobs, & Hoyt, 2000).  In this research, it is important to differentiate 
between a trauma system and a trauma center.  Therefore, the next two subsequent subsections 
describe these differences. 
1.2.1 Trauma system.  A trauma system, shown in Figure 1.2, is a coordinated set of 
procedures and programs that address the continuum of care from prevention to acute care, 
through rehabilitation and the integration of the sick or injured individual back into society. 
Trauma systems, in this sense, may vary from country to country. In the United States, trauma 
systems change from state to state to accommodate the needs of the communities and the regions 
they serve. Despite their diversity, all trauma systems are designed and intended to reduce the 
rate of deaths and permanent disability in trauma patients (Maier, 2003). As Figure 1.2 indicates, 
a trauma system involves the integration of many services, including but not limited to 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS), rehabilitation facilities, and many types of trauma 
prevention organizations. In essence, a trauma system analyzes the causes and medical 
consequences of serious trauma, while promoting the continuum of care that provides timely and 
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appropriate delivery of medical care for the rehabilitation and reintegration into society of 
patients with acute traumatic injuries and illnesses. 
 
Figure 1.2.  Depth of trauma care systems. 
Because of the benefits a trauma system brings to a region, local governments create task 
forces whose job are to license healthcare facilities with trauma systems, to evaluate and 
recommend criteria concerning the development of trauma systems, and to operate trauma 
centers within its region. The systems thus created must be grounded in legislation, with policies 
and procedures to ensure that they continue to meet regional needs. Thus, there must be a means 
to ensure adequate funds and personnel to support operations, as well as continuing quality 
improvement. These trauma systems are built with flexibility to provide the best possible care 
even in the most remote circumstances.    
1.2.2 Trauma center.   A trauma center is located in a hospital that is designated as such 
by a state or local authority or is verified by the American College of Surgeons. Trauma centers 
are spread throughout the United States, distinguishing them by a strong commitment to provide 
24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week availability of dedicated medical resources for the care of the 
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injured. Medical personnel, from trauma surgeons and nurses to technologists and clerical staff—
all with specialized knowledge in trauma care—must be immediately available at the trauma 
center for achieving the purpose of caring for sick and injured patients. 
Trauma centers are designated according to the level of care each is capable of providing. 
Levels of care are construed to mean the type of trauma services provided by the healthcare 
organization, as shown by the degree of commitment in personnel and facilities made to the 
delivery of care to the sick and injured. In the United States, the number of levels of care 
depends upon the region, local governments, and healthcare systems.  Some trauma systems have 
four types of trauma centers, varying in their specific capabilities. Trauma centers throughout the 
country are identified by acuity ―level‖ designations that have the following requirements (refer 
to Appendix A for detailed criteria for Levels 1 and 2 trauma code): 
 Level 1 trauma centers provide multidisciplinary treatment and specialized resources for 
trauma patients and require trauma research, a surgical residency program and an annual 
volume of 600 major trauma patients per year.  
 Level 2 trauma centers provide similarly experienced medical services and resources but 
do not require the research and residency components.  Volume requirements are 350 
major trauma patients per year.  
 Level 3 trauma centers are smaller community hospitals that have services to care for 
patients with moderate injuries and the ability to stabilize the severe trauma patient in 
preparation for transport to a higher-level trauma center.  Level 3 trauma centers also do 
not require neurosurgical resources.  
 Level 4 trauma centers are able to provide initial care and stabilization of traumatic injury 
while arranging transfer to a higher level of trauma care.  
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Table 1.1  
Trauma Center Resources Needed to Reflect Maximum Commitment 
Trauma Center Medical Specialists 
Trauma Surgery Emergency Medicine 
Anesthesiology Neurosurgery 
Orthopedic Surgery Ophthalmology 
Plastic Surgery Micro Surgery 
Hand Surgery Cardiac Surgery 
Thoracic Surgery Critical Care Medicine 
Oral Surgery Radiology 
Pediatric Surgery OB/GYN Surgery 
 
Levels 1 and 2 trauma centers can also be categorized as either ―Adult Trauma Centers‖ 
or ―Pediatric Trauma Centers.‖  In many healthcare systems, the adult and pediatric TCs are 
physically separated by location in a totally different building or in a different ward in the same 
building complex.  
To be considered a ―Level 1‖ trauma center, a facility must have up to 16 physicians in 
specialties ranging from neurosurgery to OB/GYN who are available in-house or on-call at all 
times. These specialties are defined in Table 1.1 and all the medical specialties in the United 
States are outlined in Appendix B.  
1.2.3 Trauma care.  Trauma centers, which are part of local and regional trauma 
systems, must prioritize their treatment of the patients who come to them.  They are usually 
triaged into five ―levels of care,‖ reflecting the large variety of medical problems potentially 
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resulting from illness or injury. These levels are labeled ―Level 1‖ for the most serious injuries 
and illnesses, to ―Level 5‖ for the less severely involved patients.  Patients are evaluated by 
acuity by either the charge nurse or the attending physician or by either of these care providers in 
conjunction with EMS providers who are in the field with the patient.  Patients who present with 
Level 1 and Level 2 conditions are also evaluated by resource needs. Patients who are triaged at 
Levels 3, 4, and 5 are considered to have less pressing needs both in terms of acuity and in terms 
of resources. For these less acute cases, experienced RNs and nurses who have attended 
comprehensive triage educational program assess each patient to determine triage level based on 
the number of resources needed.   
1.3 Trauma Centers as Complex Adaptive Systems 
This research is based on the premise that many social systems are too complex to 
accurately predict their futures and that, nevertheless, such systems exhibit patterns that can help 
humankind cope with an increasingly complex and unpredictable future (Gell-Mann, 1996, 1999; 
Janssen, 1998; Levin, 1998; Yolles, 2006; Miller and Page, 2007).  These systems may be 
understood by Complex Adaptive System (CAS) theory. Complexity science has proved to be 
the birthing ground of computational techniques which allow for exploration of models far 
beyond that of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" economic model. Adam Smith in 1776 described 
the benefits to society of this ―invisible hand‖ leading groups of people (agents) who are working 
and behaving in their own self interests; yet, unknowingly and unintentionally creating well-
formed structures that today‘s scientists label as complex adaptive systems (Smith, 1776). These 
techniques include and provide for the emergent and self-organized behaviors of Complex 
Adaptive Systems. 
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The science of CAS provides important concepts and tools for responding to the 
challenges of health care during this century and beyond. Today‘s trauma physicians face fuzzier 
boundaries due to substantial changes in the social, economic, and cultural environmental 
contexts within which they work.  In addition, a changing range of lifestyle choices provide 
people with the ability to make decisions that can affect their risk for developing disease or 
having serious accidents. Clinical decision-makers are placed in situations that are increasingly 
complex, in which they must cope effectively with the inter-relationships, inter-actions, and 
inter-connectivity of these elements (Chan, 2001, Gell-Mann, 1996). Figure 1.3 provides a visual 
conceptual framework for a trauma event‘s diagnostic course of action that takes into account its 
complexity, represented by the intertwining helical strands some of the types of decisions the 
medical team faces.  
The complexity of trauma center care is most directly demonstrated by the large numbers 
of individuals of all ages who are daily brought in to trauma centers with complex 
pathophysiological conditions and difficult problems that need immediate solutions. Despite 
constantly dealing with variables that seem to be too many to count, too uncertain to express, 
and, at times, too difficult even to understand, physicians still make life-and-death decisions that 
generate predictable outcomes by adjusting continuously in real time toward a diagnosis and 
treatment. When confronted with a massive amount of information and cues originating from the 
trauma event, retrospective experience and real-time speed are the major physician-linked 
variables in making sound medical diagnosis and treatment decisions.  Another key variable in 
such dynamic and uncertain situations is communication skills.  All communications are 
centrally concerned with the accurate processing of information. In the TC setting, 
communication is complicated by its need to be interdisciplinary, drawing on the knowledge and 
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skills of health care specialists from a variety of fields. All these agents are interacting so as to 
make sense of the situation that confronts them, and their interactions must be coordinated and 
consistent with one another. This communication task may become even more convoluted at 
times because of the patients‘ physiological conditions, which may include multiple interacting 
injuries that complicate each other. In this setting, the amount of total information conveyed 
about the patient and the situation during team interactions may be drastically reduced. 
Depending on who is directing the interaction, however, higher information content may be 
achieved. Thus, information acquisition dynamics also play a central role in attempts to manage 
complexity.  
 
Figure 1.3. Conceptual framework for diagnostic course of action. 
Trauma centers exhibit the important characteristics of complex adaptive systems (CAS), 
which are composed of several relatively independent agents (Paley, & Eva 2010), which in this 
case are the many different medical disciplines.  Some of the most important features of CAS 
are: (1) sensitivity to small perturbations, (2) difficulty in performing as predicted, (3) difficulty 
in developing any type of experience, (4) inability to expect what worked last time to work this 
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time, and (5) a tendency to undergo rapid adaptations, changing behaviors to improve the 
chances of success and creating novelty in the process. Probably the most salient of these 
features for trauma centers is the inability to predict outcomes.  Dr. Thomas Scalea, a trauma 
physician, discusses the research findings of Dr. Claudia Goettler.  Dr. Scalea raises the 
following questions: ―Why are we so bad in predicting outcome? Is it inherently that difficult? 
Are the scoring systems and predictive models just that bad, or are we simply incapable of being 
objective? Are families unrealistic?‖ Replying to these questions, Dr. Goettler said: ―In regards 
to our inability to correctly predict outcome, we are still hampered by too little data, the inherent 
differences in physiology between individuals, which likely will require genetic profiles to assess 
in the future, and our own individual biases regarding reasonable error and quality of life to be 
successful in prediction‖ (Goettler, 2010, pp. 1279-1288).  
Decision-making studies, which vary according to the dynamic complexity of the system, 
often focus on the applications of agent-based modeling to investigate how decision-makers 
understand non-linear relationships within complex systems. In the framework of agent-based 
modeling, decision-makers (agents) scan their environments and develop schema (interpretive 
and action rules) to help them distinguish what is essential before engaging in decisive action. 
The unfolding of trauma centers‘ events requires an ability to create mental models that are 
―holistic‖—that sufficiently account for high complexity and uncertainty (Coffey, 2010). 
Understanding a trauma center‘s turbulent and rapidly changing context requires appreciating 
each of its components and being able to visualize how each part is integrated into the whole 
framework.  Because trauma centers are highly variable medical domains, it is necessary to have 
an excellent diagnosis and treatment protocol in place and a superior leader in charge who will 
prioritize with a genuine and sustained interest in organizational performance and who is capable 
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of integrating, over time, all events faced by the medical team. One attending trauma physician 
described his working location as a ―strategically positioned command center, as in a naval war 
ship,‖ from which every decision-making event is orchestrated both with electronic technology 
and with his medical team. The fundamental characteristics of CAS, therefore, provide trauma 
team members (i.e., physicians, nurses, and staff) with multiple and creative paths for learning 
and collaboration. 
For these physicians, the trauma center medical team‘s strategies and practices, together 
with the tools from CAS theories, help them form the mental models that affect the success or 
failure of the team as measured by the outcome of the life or death of the sick or injured patient. 
However, the current state of a trauma patient (living system) is no predictor of what that patient 
will be in any given time in the future, because small disturbances in complex systems can 
produce exponentially different outcomes—in other words, the ―Butterfly Effect‖ (Lorenz, 1972) 
is exactly the reason as to why it is difficult to define failure. The intricate interrelationships of 
elements within a trauma center give rise to multiple chains of dependencies. Changes happen in 
the context of this intricate intertwining chain of inter-relationships and inter-actions at all levels, 
and medical judgment in the clinical decision-making process is necessary to recognize and work 
with all of these interactions.  
1.4 Problem Statement and Research Questions 
―A major part of the problem is the inherent obscurity, complexity, and irreducible 
uncertainty associated with human illness‖ (Croskerry, 2012, pp. 50-56). Trauma code is 
obviously an uncontrolled environment for at least a few minutes when any patient with highly 
varied medical conditions arrives in a Level 1 trauma center resuscitation unit. Under such 
circumstances, the clinical decision-making process in an uncontrolled environment is 
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overwhelming (Gawande, 2002). Often trauma physicians have to make multiple decisions under 
extreme uncertainty and in real time, while the situation is rapidly changing and evolving. The 
timing of these clinical decisions helps to determine their value. Another factor in their value is 
their suitability to the situation at hand, given that the relationships upon which they are based 
may have more or less relevance to situation.   
Medical schools, major academic centers, and medical practices provide physicians with 
the needed training in diagnostic reasoning, which helps physicians gather and group assessment 
data into meaningful sets in order to generate hypothesis about a patient.  A major factor in this 
training, however, is that physicians for the most part tend to assume the presence of linear 
relationships between data and patients‘ disease. However, while these relationships are 
generally reliable, they will not help in determining the degree to which these relationships are 
able to explain the reported association when addressing the patient‘s unique problem. The 
reason is not because of problems with the accuracy or completeness of the data, but ―because 
they are derived from the study of large and diverse populations‖ (Marinker, 2004, pp. v-vi). In 
particular, the inability to assimilate or incorporate subsequent or evolving data about that 
particular patient may be troublesome.  In essence, ―what can be claimed to be generally true for 
such researched populations cannot simultaneously be true for each of the individual patients 
included in these populations‖ (Marinker, 2004, pp. v-vi).  Therefore, when physicians are 
confronted by actual patients, evidence derived from the study of populations can be less 
reliable, and the path between general medical facts garnered through large clinical studies and 
the specific application of those facts in individual cases becomes blurred. The rapid expansion 
of medical knowledge has lead to the daunting but crucial need for the physician to distill which 
information is valid and applicable to their particular individual patients, and how it is to be best 
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applied in order to avoid active failures and latent conditions. Medical decision-making 
techniques help in deciding whether and how the results of a study apply to a physician‘s 
patients.   A better understanding of diagnostic reasoning should enhance patient care outcomes.   
Medical knowledge is expanding rapidly. For many professionals, learning to access, 
interpret, and apply this knowledge appropriately is a daunting but crucial task, and physicians 
are not immune to this problem. Under the pressures and stresses of the moment, this task can 
become very complex. For example, in one situation observed during this study the attending 
physician supervisor at a trauma center was required to attend to four incoming matters almost 
simultaneously: (1) an internal resident physician asking for instructions on how to proceed with 
a patient, (2) another attending physician reporting on a serious situation with a second patient 
that required the supervisor‘s immediate attention, (3) a telephone call from the EMS on an 
incoming patient, and (4) a radio call from another unit of the EMS system on a seriously injured 
patient on the way to the trauma center. This required four decisions about medical interventions 
that had to be made in less than two minutes. The overarching physician‘s approach was a 
decision model based on prioritization by concentrating on the radio and telephone calls first and 
then handling the in-house physicians expeditiously.    
The research design of this study took into consideration the need to set boundaries and 
study only a few questions in depth. Based on the research methodology of real-time 
observations of trauma cases, boundaries were further limited by available resources, time 
constraints, and ―limits in the human ability to grasp the complex nature of social reality‖ 
(Patton, 1987, p. 45). This research explored the following questions: 
1. How do physicians make decisions when confronted with complex, stressful, and 
changing situations of trauma events?   
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2. Is it the physician‘s level of expertise that determines whether an intuitive judgment or an 
analytical approach should be taken to the various components of the clinical decision-
making task while in the critical moments of the ―golden hour‖? 
3. To develop an approach to understanding how physicians think while caring for a 
stressful trauma situation.  
1.5  Summary  
This chapter summarized and brought to light the importance an emergency physician 
play in trauma centers everyday situations. It covered in detail the important aspects of a trauma 
system versus a trauma center and the roles each play in our society. The major objective of this 
dissertation is to use complex adaptive systems ideas to provide an understanding of how 
physicians think when stressed by fragmentary data, multiple injured or very sick patients, and 







A Review of the Contributing Literature 
2.1 Introduction   
This chapter presents an introduction to the material to be given detailed treatment in 
later chapters, that is, the application of the theories of complex adaptive systems and human 
judgment in hospital trauma centers, which receive a large number of trauma injuries. Trauma 
patients are those who have sustained a physical injury. Surgeons, in particular, use the term 
―trauma‖ to refer to the physical injury, whereas other medical providers prefer the term 
―injury.‖ These injuries may be broadly categorized as penetration trauma (e.g., gunshot, knife 
wound) and multisystem trauma, such as car crashes, falls, and other events.  
Trauma injury can be serious. Injury deaths worldwide place a significant burden on the 
world‘s work force. As shown in Figure 2.1, almost 50% of the worlds‘ trauma-related mortality 
occurs in young people aged 15 to 44 years old, the potentially most economically productive 
members of the global population. The World Health Organization estimates that trauma injury 
constitutes 12% of the world‘s burden of disease. Injuries have a substantial impact on American 
residents, their families, communities, and society. According to the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC), during the year of 2005 a total of 173,753 injury-related deaths occurred (Besser, 2009). 
It is the leading cause of death in trauma patients in Western countries (Spijkers, Meylaerts, & 
Leenen, 2010). By 2020 it is estimated that more than 1 in 10 people will die from injuries 
(Fildes, 2008).  
 However, trauma is not always fatal. In 2006 an estimated 29,821,159 persons with 
nonfatal injuries were treated in United States hospital emergency departments (Besser, 2009). 
Severely injured patients can be expected to be at high risk for developing complications. The 
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―reasons for this include the physiologic and immunologic impact of trauma (e.g., coagulation 
disorders, hyperthermia) and the frequent necessity of mechanical ventilation, immobilization, 
etc.‖ (Saltzherr, Visser, Ponsen, Luitse, & Goslings, 2010). The consequences of traumatic 
injuries can be extensive and wide-ranging. They can be physically, emotionally, and financially 
crippling, and in the case of disabling injuries, the consequences are enduring. For instance, as 
reported by the CDC in 2012 in the United States alone, more than 1.7 million individuals 
sustain intentional and unintentional traumatic brain injury annually, which typically entails 
long-term changes in functioning. Such complications are at the very least inconvenient for the 
patient, and they can lead to more severe negative consequences such as prolonged hospital 
stays, increased costs of medical care, and mortality. Almost 90% of pre-hospital trauma-related 
deaths involve brain injury. Global trauma-related costs are estimated to exceed $500 billion 
annually, not including costs related to lost wages, medical expenses, property damage, fire loss, 
and employer costs, among others (Fildes, 2008).  The importance of research in efficiently 
generating medical evidence and diminishing the problem of injuries has been well described. In 
1985 the Institute of Medicine report, ―Injury in America: A Continuing Public Health Problem,‖ 
concluded that supporting injury research is necessary to substantially reduce injury rates. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) feels that organizations and groups involved in the care of 
trauma need to become more united and develop common messages with which they could 
collectively advocate. The WHO‘s report emphasized a preliminary set of key resources that 
every injured person should have: (i) basic lifesaving care in the field and rapid transport to a site 
of definitive care; (ii) access to adequate, timely, essential care that is life- or limb-saving at 
hospitals and clinics; and (iii) access to adequate, essential rehabilitation services for those with 
disabilities resulting from their injuries (Shiffman, 2009). In essence, the report seeks ways to 
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increase the political profile of trauma care by developing ways to utilize the determinants of 
political priority in order to position trauma on the global health agenda.  
 
Figure 2.1. Age distribution of global injury. Source: (Peden, McGee, & Sharma, 2002). 
Because of the diverse health effects associated with injuries, positive outcomes are often 
dependent on the availability of a continuum of providers from a multitude of health disciplines 
to provide patients with quality care, better life expectancy, functional status, and greater 
satisfaction. Patients arriving at trauma centers are placed in the hands of highly specialized 
teams comprised of 15 to 20 medical personnel, including surgeons, residents, registered nurses, 
medical students, and technicians. Most hospital providers of trauma centers have three separate 
teams to ensure 24-hour coverage. Studies have shown that the risk of death for patients cared 
for at a trauma center becomes significantly lower than when care is provided in a non-trauma 
center facility (MacKenzie, Rivara, Jurkovich, Nathens, Frey, Egleston, Salkever, & Scharfstein, 
2006). This has been the fundamental belief and impetus that led the American College of 
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Surgeons Committee on Trauma (ACS-COT) to move forward its ―Advanced Trauma Life 
Support for Doctors‖ (ATLS) program throughout the world to establish trauma center criteria 
for the care of the injured (Fildes, 2008).  To be maximally effective, trauma center teams need 
not only to articulate their needs clearly, but also need to discover their members‘ unarticulated 
needs, innovate, and develop frequent, timely, and accurate problem-solving communication 
skills to effectively translate and disseminate information.  
2.2 Interest in Complex Systems 
The study of complex adaptive systems (CAS) these last few years has fascinated 
scientists from every corner of the world and across many disciplines in the physical and natural 
sciences, such as evolutionary biology, genetics, artificial intelligence, psychology, and 
mathematics. The New York Times on May 6, 1997, brought complexity theory to center stage 
when it carried an article by George Johnson entitled, ―Researchers on Complexity Ponder What 
It‘s All About‖ (Johnson, 1997). In this article, the writer stated, ―Some of the grandest 
phenomena, like the coursing of comets around the Sun, are marvelously predictable. But some 
of the most mundane, like weather, are so convoluted that they continue to elude the most 
diligent forecasters. They are what scientists call complex adaptive systems. Though made up of 
relatively simple units—like the molecules in the atmosphere—the pieces interact to yield 
behavior that is full of surprise[s].‖   
There are number of contemporary trends that are contributing to the growth of interest in 
complex systems theories and have been attracting a great deal of attention. One researcher of 
the complexity theory, Michael Cohen, (Cohen, 1999), provided at least three instances of this 
recent interest in complexity science. The first is that there are dramatic changes occurring in the 
structure and operational scope of business and government, and the list of challenges is long: 
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globalization, intensive local and global competition, process re-engineering, workforce 
diversity, quality improvement, and continual innovation are but a few. Second, it is common 
knowledge that we are in the midst of an information revolution, with the internet compressing 
space and time. There is awareness of the fact that prices for sensing, processing, transmitting, 
storing, and retrieving information are constantly declining at incredible rates. These changes 
allow for the exploitation of technology to couple activities that were previously disconnected in 
space and time, creating unlimited opportunities for the use of these new technologies to increase 
the sensitivity and inter-connectivity of one process to another. Finally, organizational entities 
are being created and dissolved at increased rates. It is noticeable from macro-level events such 
as the fall of the Soviet Union, the integration of the European countries, and the mergers of 
mega-size corporations, to micro-level events such as the rise of increasing numbers of 
temporary employees, outsourcing manufacturing and services, and virtual organizations that are 
here today and gone tomorrow. All these complex changes experienced daily ―direct our 
attention to the formation and dissolution of an organization‘s boundaries and to the forces that 
allow an organization to have value greater than the sum of its parts‖ (Cohen, 1999), that is 
complex adaptive system.  
It is easy to confuse complexity with chaos; actually, it is even tempting to use the 
expression interchangeably in informal conversation to refer to a ―chaotic situation‖ as being a 
―complex situation.‖ The management of traumatic injuries is such a complex, chaotic situation, 
involving interactions among hosts, agents, and environments, which together have lasting 
physical and psychological impacts. It is a science and an art that, like forecasting the weather, is 
always full of surprises. It is also full of potential.  Murray Gell-Mann, the 1969 Nobel laureate 
in physics, is among those scientists who have become fascinated with CAS.  He sees the 
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potential for a much broader impact of complexity theory to all aspects of human endeavors: 
―Even more exciting is the possibility of useful contributions to the life sciences, the social and 
behavioral sciences, and even matters of policy for human society‖ (Gell-Mann, 1995a, pp. 316-
312).  
2.3 Basic Concepts of Complex Adaptive Systems 
The changes occurring in many processes can be explained in terms of how complex 
adaptive systems organize, develop, and evolve. Levin (1998) has observed that it is easy to find 
books that discuss with varying degrees the specifics of certain systems as CAS. For instance, 
one author attempted a fairly general definition by stating that a complex adaptive system is an 
ordered state of the elements that make up an environment, exemplifying it with the state of 
liquid water, which is created by combining two molecules of hydrogen and with one molecule 
of oxygen (Miller, 1999). But it is another matter, said Levin, to find a formal definition, ―as if 
investigators fear that by defining CAS they will somehow limit a concept that is meant to apply 
to everything‖ (Levin, 1998, pp. 431-436). Several researchers have nevertheless tackled the 
complex task of attempting to describe complex systems. Gell-Mann explains that ―Complexity, 
however defined, is not entirely an intrinsic property of the entity described,‖ as it depends to 
some extent on who and what is doing the describing (Gell-Mann, 1996, pp. 2-12). Thus, each 
proposed definition is somewhat unique, yet all contain overlapping features.  
Broadly speaking, complexity results from the inter-relationship, inter-action, and inter-
connectivity of elements within a system and between a system and its environment. Complex 
systems are systems that are comprised of many interacting parts that together have the ability to 
generate a new quality of macroscopic collective behavior, the manifestations of which are the 
spontaneous formation of distinctive temporal, spatial, or functioning structures (Qudrat-Ullah, 
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& Spector, 2008).  Levin has offered a fairly general and flexible definition of complexity using 
three properties: ―(1) diversity and individuality of components, (2) localized interactions among 
those components, and (3) an autonomous process that uses the outcomes of those interactions to 
select a subset of those components for replication or enhancement‖ (Levin, 2002). A more 
comprehensive definition of CAS can be stated as a collection of individual agents with freedom 
to act in ways that are not always predictable, and whose actions are interconnected so that one 
agent‘s actions changes the context for other agents (Plsek, & Greenhalgh, 2001).  
In each of these definitions, the form of a complex adaptive system is understood to 
reflect the ways in which its elements interact with one another. Some researchers of CAS 
(Chan, 2001; Gell-Mann, 1994; Holland, 1992; Mitchell, 2009; Nugus, Carroll, Hewett, Short, 
Forero, & Braithwaite, 2010) have begun to extract a common kernel from all of these 
definitions, that is, each one recognizes there is a similar ―evolving structure‖ in complex 
systems, that these evolving organizations have certain design requirements and, furthermore, in 
seeking to adapt to changing circumstances, these evolving systems have demonstrated that their 
parts can be thought of as developing rules that anticipate the consequences of certain responses. 
 To say that such systems adapt is to suggest that they have the capacity to alter or 
change—the ability to learn from their experience. Gell-Mann points out that complex adaptive 
system actively search for regularities. They acquire information about their environment and 
their interaction with that environment, identify regularities in that information, then compress 
the acquired information into an organized collection of schemata or models and take actions 
based on those models (Gell-Mann, 1995b). Examples of CAS include trade balances, acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), genetic defects, ant colonies, human bodies, hospitals, 
trauma centers, and so on.  
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J. H. Holland, a professor of psychology and computer science at the Santa Fe Institute 
for Complexity Science and also the creator of the Genetic Algorithm, stated that the ability of 
the elements in CAS to adapt or learn is the pivotal characteristic of complex adaptive systems.  
More than this, they are adaptive not only because they respond to changes in their surroundings 
(learn) but also because they influence their environments to conform to their current 
organizational state (Holland, 1992). This is the evolutionary aspect of complex systems. Besides 
evolution, complex systems seem to share two other characteristics: aggregate behavior and 
anticipation. It is the aggregate behavior that researchers seek to understand and modify. Though 
to fully understand all of its ramifications, there is a need to understand how the aggregate 
behavior emerges from the interactions of the parts of the system (Holland, 1992).  
A complex environment arises when situations or events occur that offer little or no 
predictable information, at which point learning and communication are required to fill the 
information gap in order to sustain the system. The assertion is made here that a trauma center 
should be dealt with as complex adaptive system because it is one in which low-information 
situations that require rapid learning and communication regularly arise. A trauma center is 
comprised of a set of elements that are interconnected and inter-related such that changes in 
some of its elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system. Moreover, 
the trauma center system, as a whole, exhibits behaviors that are different from those of the parts. 
The fundamental unit of the trauma center system is the patient. Each trauma case arrives with 
information limited to that which was communicated through radio or telephone by the EMS to 
the medical team at the trauma center. Considering each of these trauma cases as a sub-system of 
the trauma center, this information for the most part consists of the functional requirements that 
capture the intended behavioral parameters of the sub-system. These behaviors have been spelled 
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out by the American College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma as the ABCDEs of trauma 
care—the services and functions (behaviors) to be performed, in the form of an algorithm that 
provides for a rapid survey and resuscitation of vital functions before the initiation of definitive 
care by the activated trauma team.  
The job of the trauma team is one of securing these functional requirements of the patient 
sub-system in such a way that the information derived in doing so can drive architectural 
decision-making processes that create relevant mental schemas, which, in turn, translate into the 
formation of goals and their analysis and development during stressful moments. The structural 
design of the trauma case sub-system is created by the actions and interrelations of the team in 
using the information acquired from both the EMS and its own set of observations. These 
minimum functional requirements (the ABCDEs) serve to delineate the intended behavior of the 
sub-system (the patient) and allow for responding to changes that emerge from it, providing a 
basic frame of reference on which the entire team reacts. However, it is not unusual for lack of 
clarity surrounding these functional requirements to preclude the team from developing explicit 
goals. At these times, the trauma team must also draw upon intuition and judgment.   
2.4 Medical Judgment in Clinical Decision Making  
The literature of intuition and judgment in decision-making has grown immensely these 
last few years, covering both theoretical issues and interdisciplinary applications. A review of the 
literature shows that the clinical decision-making process for most specific medical procedures 
has been extensively and frequently described. However, it is hard to find studies covering 
decision-making processes for a trauma center medical team operating under the stressful 
conditions of caring for multi-trauma-injury patients. The medical team‘s pre-established 
protocols and algorithms may not factor in the element of human judgment in the clinical 
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decision-making processes. This is because these algorithms are developed based on the 
procedural domain of medical expertise. Complex situations, however, bring massive amounts of 
challenging, problematic, and testing information that decision-makers come across, or even 
stumble upon, that helps them make their decisions.  These decisions are ―decisions typically 
made through gut feeling or intuition‖ (Yolles, 2006, pp. 237).  Intuition and judgment have 
being around since the dawn of ages, as far back as Socrates (470-399 BC), Plato (427-347 BC), 
and Aristotle (384-322 BC). However, it has been only recently that researchers on decision-
making methodologies have decided to study these most enduring disciplines in a formal manner 
and incorporate them in their processes as critical developments occur in this important 
competency area of decision making (Connolly, Arkes, & Hammond, 2000). 
Classic models of decision-making generally assume static problem domains, rational 
analysis, and suboptimal human decision-making. The land of intuition is not one many scholars 
write about. ―They prefer to describe a land where the sun of enlightenment shines down in 
beams of logic and probability, whereas the land [of intuition] we are visiting is shrouded in a 
mist of dim uncertainty‖ (Gigerenzer, 2007). However, intuitive judgment is bounded by ―gut 
feelings‖ that arise during attempts to avoid misses and false alarms. This, undisputedly, is ―the 
intelligence of the unconscious‖ turned loose on practical, real-time issues of interdisciplinary 
decision making. This intelligence comes strongly into play in trauma centers.   
When an injured patient arrives in a trauma center, protocols to obey and algorithms to be 
followed generally take precedence in the process of caring for and even resuscitating the injured 
patient. These rules and procedures are starting points that are in effect long before the injured 
patient even arrives at the trauma center. Through radio communications, EMS and trauma 
center medical personnel are making two key decisions on how to bring a trauma event to a safe 
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conclusion. First, there are decision-making events to get the patient alive into the trauma center. 
Second, there are decision-making events (based on certain pre-determined criteria) for deciding 
whether to code the case as either a Level 1 or a Level 2 trauma. Either of these two decision 
points will activate an appropriate medical team to be on standby for the incoming patient.  
While in the midst of the trauma situation, the logic of mathematical models, a myriad of 
engineering technologies, and even the knowledge of evolutionary biology help trauma teams 
find a plausible solution for saving the patient‘s life. However, what is rarely observed are the 
repeated judgments, intuitions, and gut feelings of the leading medical team that bring about the 
successful outcome of the event. Logical scientific reasoning helps to bring success to fruition; 
but, not always is it solely because of the logic of scientific knowledge and the technology that is 
applied. Often it is the medical team‘s unconscious choices and decisions, not just their 
deliberate reasoning that makes it all possible. Everyone has such unconscious processes.  
Sometimes we are not even aware of making these kinds of choices or decisions. ―The 
unconscious parts of our mind can decide without us—the conscious self—knowing its reasons, 
without being aware that a decision has been made in the first place‖ (Gigerenzer, 2007). The 
fundamental characteristics of medical decision-making while providing the best patient care 
seem to go beyond the technical, as if expert clinical judgment is generally of an intuitive nature. 
It is irrefutable that science makes up a great part of medical decision-making processes; but as 
the famous physician Atul Gawande pointed out, it is ―also habit, intuition, and sometimes plain 
old guessing‖ (Gawande, 2002).  
2.4.1  A case of intuition.    The following case exemplifies intuition in trauma episodes 
and a surgeon‘s abilities to recognize patterns within a complex event. This case helps illustrate 
how intuitive decision-making works in the clinical setting, as well as showing methods to 
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reduce complexity in the decision-making process by taking an incremental approach to the 
problem at hand. It is ―The Case of the Red Leg‖ (Gawande, 2002). The case is one of those 
situations in which the absence of algorithms and protocols about what do drive physicians to 
make gut feeling, intuitive- medical-judgment decision-making.  This is the story of one very 
complex decision-making event under extraordinarily uncertainty.   
A 23-year old woman presented in the emergency department of the hospital with a red 
and swollen leg. The resident physician at the scene in the emergency department thought that it 
was probably only a bad case of cellulitis, a simple skin infection, and started the patient on 
intravenous antibiotic. However, because of the severity of the rash, he called on another 
physician, a surgeon, for a second opinion (perhaps due to intuition kicking in). The surgeon 
looked at the young woman. She looked fit, athletic, and almost young enough to be a teenager. 
There did not seem anything seriously ill about her, as she watched television. The young 
woman again told the surgeon the same story that she had already told the resident trauma 
physician, which was the same story she had a few days before also told to her private attending 
physician. It was a grand wedding she attended where she kicked off her shoes and went dancing 
barefooted all night. A tiny blister developed, which afterwards became an infection, and now 
she was in the trauma center in a lot of pain. Initially, the surgeon was about to concur with the 
resident trauma physician‘s diagnosis. But for unknown reasons, something popped up in the 
surgeon‘s mind (intuition, again): the possibility of one of the most horrendous diseases ever to 
befall a human being, a horrendously lethal type of infection known as necrotizing fasciitis. The 
tabloid media has called it a disease of ―flesh-eating bacteria‖ and the term is not an 
exaggeration. Very little is known about the disease, except that it is highly aggressive and 
rapidly invasive. This disease has been associated with significant morbidity and mortality, 
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rapidly killing up to 70% of the people who get it, with significant morbidity if an operation to 
remove the decaying and infected area is delayed even as little as 12 to 24 hours (Sudarsky, 
1987; Wong, Chang, Shanker, Khin, Tan, & Low, 2003).There is no less invasive antibiotic or 
other treatment that can stop it.  
Only about 500 to 1000 cases of necrotizing fasciitis occur in the entire United States 
each year, mainly in the elderly and the chronically ill (Gawande, 2002; Wong et al., 2003). How 
do you tell a young woman, full of life, just beginning her adult existence, that she possibly has 
this horrendous disease? It would be a hard sell, since, her fever had all but gone and the only 
signs of the infection were the red rash and the pain in her leg. The surgeon, however, had a gut 
feeling that told him to search deeper and, as he recognized the pattern, he ―gained a sense of the 
situation‖ (Klein, 2004). He excused himself from the room, spoke with other physicians. Most 
physicians do not see this disease often, because it is not common; actually, some physicians fail 
to see it at all throughout their entire careers. And there is no test whatsoever short of a biopsy 
that will tell the two diagnoses, cellulitis or necrotizing fasciitis, apart. The scenario is thus 
completely unpredictable from patient to patient. The only way to know with any certainty is to 
go into the operating room, cut the patient open, and look inside (Gawande, 2002; Sudarsky, 
1987; Wong et al., 2003).  If it is necrotizing fasciitis, the medical team sees the destruction 
caused by the bacteria. If it is not too late, they must remove the affected area—including 
amputating limbs, if necessary—and hope to stop the bacteria from spreading to the rest of the 
body.  
Within an hour, the surgeon had obtained the young woman‘s consent for a biopsy of the 
affected tissue followed possibly by amputation of the affected leg. In the operating room, the 
biopsy revealed that indeed her condition was flesh-eating bacteria. To address this potential 
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diagnosis, the surgeon had pre-assembled an impressive multidisciplinary team composed of 
surgeons, pathologists, radiologists, dermatologists, and the technological facilities only 
available in another hospital, all working in synchrony to save her life.  The surgeon opted to try 
to save the leg via debridement of the infected tissue coupled with thoroughly washing out the 
entire area. For recovery, her doctors recommended hyperbaric oxygen treatments, which 
required transport to a nearby hospital for a two hour therapy, two times daily. After four similar 
operations to remove infected tissue, the leg seemed to be growing new tissue and healing.  
Researchers of intuition and human judgment, such as Gary Klein, might say that the 
surgeon ―had stumbled onto the phenomena of intuition‖ (Klein, 2004). To illustrate the 
importance of intuition, Klein uses a story he calls ―A Baby in Crisis.‖ The nurse in an intensive 
care unit was caring for an infant but ―had missed the classic symptoms of sepsis, which seemed 
so obvious‖ (Klein, 2004). The supervising nurse, however, despite not having hands-on care of 
the infant, noticed the signs of the problem at a routine inspection, and her ―intuition‖ told her 
that a more serious danger was facing the infant. Immediately, the supervisor sought help and 
information, which was met with the approval of the attending physician who agreed with the 
supervisor‘s diagnosis, decision, and treatment, therefore saving the infant‘s life.  
Similarly, the surgeon in the necrotizing fasciitis case did not have any of the ―classic 
symptoms‖ that could guide his decision-making process, because there are no such symptoms 
that will enable physicians to decide positively on the diagnosis of the disease. The pieces of the 
diagnostic puzzle were put together in the mind of the surgeon, who developed those pieces into 
a story that revealed the larger pattern. The ability to recognize visual patterns (i.e., the red leg) 
and auditory patterns (i.e., the young woman‘s account), and form them into a larger, 
recognizable, meaningful pattern are evidence of the great adaptive abilities of the human brain 
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(Gluskov, 1966). Because of his ability to recognize an obscure pattern by combining disparate 
sets of observations and information, the surgeon was able to create an image (a schema) of the 
disease that allowed him to assemble the multidisciplinary surgical team and to translate his 
―experience into action‖ (Klein, 2004). In addition to the limited information acquired from the 
trauma event environment, the surgeon had previously had an experience with another patient 
with the same disease.  
The disease in this other patient had started with a scratch on the patient‘s chest and 
escalated to the rest of the body, despite all the efforts of the medical team to eradicate the 
bacteria in an attempt to save the patient. The recognition of patterns helped the surgeon to 
capitalize on his stored representations of disease, by way of constructing mental algorithms for 
learning the pattern of various diseases.  This, in turn, offered him direct access to the judgment 
and decision-making process. His judgment could not benefit from the system‘s accurate 
description of the properties characterizing the trauma in order to arrive at a decision. Only his 
intuitive thoughts and gut feelings about the whole thing allowed him to make a judgment about 
what was going on under the skin of the young woman‘s leg.  
This series of events seriously contrasts with statistical approaches to events, where 
probabilities and likelihood ratios may provide some guidance in the diagnosis. But, as John Fox 
puts it, statistical numbers represent ―a relationship between symptoms and diseases, but in 
abstract form.‖ They say nothing about the symptoms or the disease—whether it is just a 
symptom or a distinct disease, or whether the symptom is caused by a disease or just statistically 
associated with it. ―Each number records the scale of a relationship but not its sense‖ (Fox, 
1984). Intuition, however, can provide the sense of experiences. ―Intuition is holistic and can 
reveal a remarkable degree of accuracy if the learning context has provided representative and 
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valid feedback‖ (Plessner, Betsch, & Betsch, 2008). ―The output of intuition,‖ observes Betsch, 
―is a feeling, for instance, the feeling of liking the entity or a feeling of risk‖ (Betsch, 2009). 
These amazingly accurate gut feelings or intuitions are often based on surprisingly little 
information. Researchers have shown that decision making can actually be improved despite 
severe time constraints and little available information (Gigerenzer, 2007).   
Gut feelings are powerful means of communication of important pre-rational information 
and Gigerenzer (2007) uses this term to refer to judgment that promptly pops up in our minds, 
sometimes for no apparent reason, but with so much impetus that the decision maker feels 
compelled to act upon. Trauma systems, which are amalgams of medical personnel from 
different specialties who have learned unique formal algorithms (procedural domain of expertise) 
for diagnosis and treatment, rely on a combination of gut feelings buttressed by solid information 
from the medical team to produce positive outcomes for patients. Expert medical personnel are 
capable of attending to and extracting the most relevant cues in the trauma environment and can 
avoid attending to distracting or irrelevant cues that the learning context may also provide as 
feedback.  If the initial gut feeling is proven correct, the physician‘s expectancies should match 
the events with the solid knowledge-base of the assembled multidisciplinary team. Conversely, if 
intuition fails the surgeon, the surgeon can quickly use the team‘s vast stored knowledge to 
notice the problem, take corrective action, and provide representative and valid feedback on the 
event.  
 In ―The Case of the Red Leg,‖ a year after the young woman‘s necrotizing fasciitis has 
been treated; the surgeon visited her family to check on her progress.  He noted with satisfaction 
that the patient had recovered full use of her leg. His intuition, in short, had paid off not only in 
saving the young woman‘s life, but also in saving her leg. The perceptual skills he had used to 
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accomplish this feat included many of the intuitive decision-making processes: visual search 
strategies, signal detection, extraction of cues, and pattern recognition. This significant way of 
viewing a patient, who presented with what seemed at first to be a fairly straightforward and 
uncomplicated problem, made it possible to recognize the lethal disease.  
For many complex clinical decisions such as the one just discussed, all the hard data in 
the world cannot surpass a lifetime‘s worth of experience that informs one‘s gut feeling, instinct, 
or intuition (Matzler, Bailom, & Mooradian, 2007).  Researchers have struggled to understand 
human judgment and intuition by building mathematical models of how each item of information 
contributed to influence clinical decision-makers overall judgments. The consistent and amazing 
finding of these researchers has been that ridiculously simple mathematical models of disease did 
as well in study after study as sophisticated, experienced clinicians. The explanation for and 
implications of these results are still hotly debated (Connolly et al., 2000). In the trauma center 
as it is in life, ―intuition is an essential, powerful, and practical tool,‖ that we all use to ―translate 
our experience into action‖ (Klein, 2004 pp. HIV).  
2.5 Summary of Literature Review and Implication to this Research 
The interest of this research lies in examining the complexity of decision-making 
processes in emergency medicine, and physicians‘ decision-making process under stress at all 
levels of trauma center units in hospitals. One way of exploring this is through theories of 
complex adaptive systems together with human judgment theories, which provide important 
concepts and tools for elucidating decisions that often seem ill-defined, fuzzy, and uncertain. In 
complex situations such as those of trauma events, the information that decision-makers have to 
help them make their decisions is often massive and difficult to handle. In the face of such 
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complexity, it is often the case that decisions ―are typically made through gut feeling or 
intuition‖ (Yolles, 2006).  
The problem of decision making under stress has not been solved yet and more research 
is needed in the area of accurate description of physicians decision-making processes; however, 
researchers have developed theories that have greatly benefited those whose jobs are to operate 
in complex and challenging environments (Cannon-Bowers, 1998; Schraagen, & Schaafstal, 
1999; Hamm, Scheid, Smith, & Tape, 2000). This study used Bayesian Classifier with 
Convolution and Deconvolution operators to study real-time, observed trauma events data to 
explain decision-making processes under tremendous stress. These topics are being introduced 
here but they will be fully discussed in chapter four.  ―Convolution is by far the most important 
operation that describes the behavior of a dynamical system‖ (Mendel, 1990). It ―may be viewed 
as a self-organized learning process‖ (Haykin, 1994). Because physicians have blurred 
information and cues that are tainted by random environmental noise during injury-related 
events, making their information convoluted, they must de-blur (de-convolute) the observed data 
to find a best approximation of the real situation. Convolution is what causes the stress on the 
physicians‘ rational decision-making processes. Deconvolution is the process of clearing out the 
extraneous noises of the physicians‘ immediate environment to allow them to gain a clearer 




The American College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma (ACS-COT) has for over three 
decades published guidelines for trauma care. Books from the ACS-COT such as the Advanced 
Trauma Life Support for Doctors (ATLS) have outlined the general context and background for 
most particular actions and trauma events. In the following paragraphs, a general framework will 
be developed that distinguishes causes, sources, contents, and consequences of complexity in 
trauma centers, as well as different actors involved in the clinical decision-making processes. 
Decision makers in a trauma center (TC) know what they are trying to achieve but there are 
many unknown variables that make it unclear how to do so, in which case comes the need to 
judgmental or intuitive modes for making a decision. Patients in TCs present themselves with 
undifferentiated problems and symptoms hard to diagnose that require reasoning by analogy, 
intuition, judgment, and trial-and-error decision-making processes that poses real challenges.    
3.1 Modes of Decision-Making 
In this study, an attempt is made to operationalize complex clinical decision-making in 
trauma center units of hospitals in terms of the immediate impact of complexity on both the tasks 
and the actors involved in the trauma event.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the nature of complex systems 
along three axes.  The first, the x-axis, represents the continuum between facts and actions that 
are clearly defined or lend themselves to linear conceptualization and those that are more non-
linear and conceptually fuzzy.  The y-axis represents the continuum between situations and facts 
in which all are in agreement, to those in which various stakeholders may be in frank 
disagreement.  Finally, the z-axis represents the continuum between extreme certainty and 
extreme uncertainty as complexity increases.  These three dimensions of complex situations are 
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at work in four identified domains: Rational (R), Political (P), Judgment or Discernment (J), 
Intuition (I). Each of these four domains of Figure 3.1 shall be discussed next.   
 
Figure 3.1. Concepts and fields of complexity. 
3.1.1  Rational.   Rational is decision making based upon facts regarding the object of 
focus (i.e., the patient), which specify what people ideally should do during a decision process. 
―Rational approaches are conscious, logical and planned, testable, and traditionally related to 
clear and quantifiable situations‖ (Yoles, 2006, p. 37).  The rational domain of Figure 3.1 has the 
embedded notion of order that induces creation and systemization of information. This is the 
domain where decision makers do not raise questions of uncertainty or difficulty and there is no 
confusion whether they are dealing with the symptoms of a hidden problem or the problem itself. 
However, decision makers have to keep in mind that these decisions are taking place in dynamic 
and changing environments, requiring full information and knowledge. Rational approaches are 
sometimes inadequate for uncertain or ambiguous situations that cannot be rationalized as 
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common pattern knowledge. The medical team‘s interactions provide common grounds for 
linking feedback and observations that is enhanced through rationalization. 
The rational decision making process (RDMP) considers three characteristics: (i) 
descriptive, how people actually make decisions; (ii) normative, the process that would constitute 
rational decision making; (ii) prescriptive, tools that will encourage rational action in real life; in 
other words, moving the descriptive towards the normative (Robinson, 2004). There is strong 
desire to base decisions on rational grounds, which is corroborated by Paul Robinson that the 
desire for objectivity and rationality pervades the study of medical decision making (Robinson, 
2004). Physicians go through the rational process to match the parameters acquired through 
experience, research, body of literature, schools, and so on. It means, in RDMP the decision 
maker has a value for the decision making process. If the parameters are known, everyone should 
reach the same conclusions.  
3.1.2 Political.   Political is decision making based upon intangible outside influences 
such as the perception of others and instructions of those in superior station or standing. Decision 
makers in most pivotal crossroad situations are burdened with conflicting objectives and must be 
cognizant of the constraints presented by the finite nature of human and material resources. The 
political process in trauma centers is ethical but normally exerts a determining or guiding 
influence on the behavior of the medical team. This is the domain of Figure 3.1 in which 
physicians believe that information matters in order to advance models to explain how their 
preferences are turned toward immediate evaluation of one procedure versus another.  It is the 
domain for the evaluation and the structuring of cognition that result in a heuristic mechanism 
for evaluating new information.  When new information is encountered, it interacts with relevant 
existing knowledge to form a virtually instantaneous assessment of the new information. And, 
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this is a continuous and immediate process which occurs upon acquisition of the new information 
for which the decision maker will argue in favor and make an effort to fit it into the existing 
trauma case.  It is the decision maker‘s prerogative to argue and make it fit to the situation; thus, 
the political decision-making process. The onus then falls upon the physician to determine how 
newly discovered data fits in to the developing scenario.   
3.1.3 Judgment.   Judgment (Discernment) is decision making based upon similarities 
observed between the current object of focus and previous scenarios with comparable 
circumstances while being aware of the subjective nature of judgment. It assumes that 
commonalities in decisions-making are perceived by all members of the team. The trauma 
situation can become difficult because it is not repetitive, outcomes are generally unknown for a 
few hours at least, and results are complex to measure. However, the objectives are clear, 
requiring subjective judgment. In this domain of judgment of Figure 3.1, the decision maker 
develops a view of the problem and proceeds to the modeling of it because how one sees the 
problem is individual and personal. The modeling of the problem allows others to visualize what 
happen in the decision-making process of someone making a judgment. This knowledge of 
judgment as modeling of decision-making process can be used to further understand how a 
decision maker under stress arrives at solutions to problems which prove themselves difficult to 
solve. In this domain, physicians rely on their library of pattern recognition in order to guide his 
or her actions to somewhat reduce the complexity of the task to arrive at a reasonable predictive 
probability. Judgment has associated with it the notion that situations can be intentionally 
molded to maintain an environment conducive to unconscious gathering of information and 
potentially revealing cues to a particular recognizable pattern.  This approach of deliberate effort 
to manage the developing situation allows for adaptability to a changing environment. 
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Judgmental decision-making can then be conscious, unconscious, or subconscious through the 
projection of cultural attributes that are connected to emotions, experience, and knowledge. The 
physician‘s task is to be able to mentally read all cues and clues and make reasonable 
assumptions. The articulated judgments about some environmental state derived from 
physicians‘ perceptions, instincts, and interactions with emotions that eventually create 
transformation in that state. It is these organizations of perceptions, instincts, and interactions 
that convey to someone else what the physician has seen. And, it is the articulation of his/her 
judgments that makes problem‘s solutions available for discussion and reflection because 
perceptions, instincts, and interactions are organized in the context of immediate purposes and 
relationships. As seen in Figure 3.1, Judgment domain moves away from certainty and 
agreement (rational) to conditions of uncertainty and conflict, represented by the fuzzy or blurred 
area encroaching chaos.         
3.1.4 Intuition.   Trauma physicians are making intuitive decisions in every trauma case. 
In this intuition domain of Figure 3.1, physicians are using ad hoc mental models developed 
through years of experience and it occurs through physicians‘ pattern recognition and inductive 
reasoning. This is also the domain that shows that physicians do not know all the alternatives and 
all possible outcomes of the trauma case. However, through a quick and limited search to 
discover a few alternatives and the use of their own subjective intuition, a decision is made that 
satisfies the problem presented by the system. Physicians‘ knowledge and experience is clearly 
seen as playing a role of central importance in avoiding a chaotic situation. Isenberg (1985, 
1986) suggested that decision makers‘ time and resources are limited and that even when 
computerized theories are available, they rely on subjective mode to make decisions. The use of 
this type of decision making by physicians happens because each trauma case is different, human 
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beings react unpredictably and there is little direct access to knowledge about and control of the 
attributes endangering the patient. The principles that drive this domain are ―why?‖ ―what?‖ 
and‖ how? respectively, followed by pattern recognition and mental model simulation, which 
garner the internal power to exploit the opportunity. Intuitive processes help decision makers in 
their decision-making performance and their abilities to reflect on actions while performing them 
(Isenberg, 1985, 1986). 
3.2 The Framework 
In Figure 3.1, the relation between the states and the transformation is assumed to be 
continuous where the set of states may lie in a connected region. Thus, the region within the 
boundaries of Discernment (D), Intuition (I), Political (P), and Rational (R) are stable, though 
with each region showing a different landscape. However, the place where these three regions 
intersect gives rise to a complex region. Trauma centers operate at all times within this matrix of 
complexity, with each trauma case having a value that lies somewhere on each of the three axes 
and impacting each of the four domains.  Given such complexity, clinical decision-making can 
be anything but a straightforward process. In Figure 3.2, ―Framework for Clinical Decision 
Making,‖ the Diagnostic Course of Action appears at the end of the mapping, but diagnosis and 
treatment actually occurs iteratively throughout the process, relying on representations of 
potential solutions. The framework in its simplicity suggests flexibility and transparency; but it is 
the evolution of the trauma event that fills in the details within that framework and creates 
complexity. That is, at each step of the trauma case, which is from the onset of the EMS critical 
report to the first assessment on to the second assessment, the team is intervening through 
interactions and interrelations among medical team members and the patient. These interventions 
are in the form of experts in airways, breathing, circulation, cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
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(CPR), and many other medical experts‘ actions.  Therefore, this complexity occurs throughout 
these interventions or these constants in the framework in a fashion that may be imagined as a 
sort of helix.  This helix has been drawn as a quadruple helix consisting of medical judgment, 
political and rational considerations, and treatment decisions, all leading to a final diagnostic 
course of action. One could imagine that the helix represents an ongoing mental process, and as 
one moves from the initial and secondary assessments to the diagnostic course of action, the 
combined factors create a complex, curved-yet-linear, three-dimensional structure of the helix.  
 
Figure 3.2. Framework for clinical decision making. 
Ultimately, this is all about perception. This is about perception, data collection, and how 
people perceive the ongoing event. Simultaneously, it is about how they process this information. 
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At this level, data is a critical component.  There is an initial contact with data that involves 
political, rational, and judgment decision-making.  This contact includes the people handling the 
data as well as those perceiving it. There are three ways in which the data are treated and 
handled, which introduces an interesting form of uncertainty. At this point, complex decision-
making is to be operationalized as a combination of all four aspects of decisions, such that it can 
be measured or expressed quantitatively. It can be stated that complex decision-making includes 
rational, intuitional, and political decision-making as the event unfolds. The medical team 
navigates the environment and how the team interacts with that trauma environment causes the 
team to decide its next move, which is supported by the feedback the team gets from the 
anticipatory tactile and auditory cues that in turn help the team move next, and so on.  
In one sense, the trauma forces one to embrace a form of randomness due to the intricate 
folding of the state-space of the trauma system over the time of the event. The physician‘s task is 
to be able to mentally read all cues and clues and make reasonable assumptions. When 
physicians make judgments about some environmental state, transformations in that state must 
occur. A very basic example of how judgments change states occurs when one tries to navigate 
from one side of a dark room to the other.  That individual is going to adjust in order to get their 
bearings. Throughout the process, the individual gets tactile and auditory cues, which are being 
fed into their sensory system. Intrinsically, there are different points in the diagnostic process: 
There is the initial assessment, and there is the secondary assessment, both of which work like 
gates in the information processing and decision-making system that eventuates in a diagnosis 
and a treatment plan. As gateways or transition points in the decision process, they get initial 
input followed by an initial vigorous push, and then a rapid increase in stimulus as the situation 
evolves.   
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Following this reasoning, at the intersections of the three steps in Table 1.1 (initial and 
secondary assessments and the diagnostic course of action) is an actual treatment, in which the 
arrows might be spaces where there is an activity that may lead to some type of decision making.  
Because a patent feedback loop creates the system that is out in the environment, and the 
environment gives it some sort of feedback, the system, when it is functioning properly, self-
corrects. The trauma center operating as a system that is constantly getting information, reaches 
these points, these markers, these gates—and it changes.  It can correct, but it can also over-
correct. The medical team is always treating, never stopping, such that the conceptualized gates 
or markers get the system in motion. This treatment motion is symbolized by the arrows. The 
treatment motion is important in this model, and all decision cues along the way are qualified at 
every step. At the end of the decision making-process a cure or solution is found, or the patient 
dies. 
There are at least three things that are simultaneously going on in the framework, which, 
along with some randomness or chaotic inputs, characterize the unknown. Because there are 
always chance factors, variation will occur regardless of the approaches taken by the medical 
team.  If one thinks of the four domains shown in Figure 3.2 (political, rational, medical 
discernment, and intuition) dynamic factors in decision-making that are intricately tied, the 
complexity really shows. In that complexity a truth is revealed: There is no such thing as purely 
rational decision-making. One can always aspire to it, but there is no such thing as purely 
rational because no decision can be free of subjectivity or bias. Even if one attends to one‘s own 
subjectivity and potential biases the questions asked as a researcher are inherently biased because 
they are formed by interest.  For example, the things someone else sees walking down the street 
versus what I see or what a third person sees might have something to do with what catches our 
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eyes, which in turn is dependent on a range of factors from differing visual fields to differing 
stimulus thresholds.  The concept of ―bounded rationality‖ is used to designate rational choice 
that takes into account the cognitive limitations of the decision-maker (Simon, 1972). Decision 
makers in any specialty or profession try to do it, but it is often the case that it does not happen.   
The next step may be to operationalize complex decision-making by either designing a 
construct that says ―This is what complex decision-making means‖ or by searching the literature 
for an existing definition. An operationalized definition of complex decision-making is needed 
because chaos encroaches on decision-making and causes complexity. A search of the literature 
on this aspect of clinical decision-making has not yet turned out any work from other 
researchers. It is thus an interesting study because it can reveal how social, political, and even 
economic pressure can become centers of power from interested stakeholders.  These factors 
combined in to the mix make rational decision-making straightforward, but then judgment and 
political decision-making variables also need to be factored in. It may be assumed that by this 
conceptualization of the model, rather than complex decision-making being somewhere in 
between, that complex decision-making is inherently a combination of the political, the rational, 
judgment, and intuition. Chaos is included because trauma centers are, or it can be at times, 
unpredictable and chaotic, in which the very uncertainty, unpredictability, uncontrollability, and 
dynamism of the environment reify the idea of adaptive capability of complex systems. Because 
of their adaptability in and evolvement with a changing environment, these dynamic networks 
that are of interest are often described as complex adaptive systems (Goldstein, Hazy, & 
Lichtenstein, 2010). 
At this point in the research, it is not a matter of being right or wrong; instead, it is a 
search for a way to develop a theory such that the framework can be thoroughly analyzed. In 
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order to achieve this, the goal is to define a construct of interest that will allow the development 
of ways to measure and observe the decision-making process. Therefore, the strands that go like 
a double helix, a triple helix, or even a quadruple helix as in a deoxyribonucleic acid 
macromolecule (DNA) strand such that political, rational, medical judgment and treatment 
decisions are each represented by one strand. We now add the unpredictable. Referring to Figure 
3.2, it is when the three or four of these ongoing actions (the helix) hit the edges of chaos that 
they become complex. There is then this threshold of uncertainty where these edges come in and 
become complex, which generates disagreement.  
3.3 Process Map of Trauma Center Decision-Making  
Many of the issues confronting physicians during a trauma case require the ability to 
articulate thoughts and ideas concisely during stress. Figure 3.3 illustrates how a trauma center 
(TC) and its medical team engages in decision-making under stress that originates with the 
Emergency Medical Service (EMS) arriving at the trauma scene and transporting patients to the 
hospital, through the time that the trauma center medical team takes over the patient, and to the 
point where a proper diagnosis is reached.   
Figure 3.3 shows the mapping of a complete trauma case event, which starts with the 
EMS personnel arriving at the scene of the event. During this period of time, communications 
between EMS and the TC is a constant. These are two-way communications as represented by 
the arrow until the injured or sick patient is delivered to the TC with an EMS critical report. At 
the time the patient is taken over by the L1TRU team, it is assumed to be a moment all 
convoluted or blurred by the physical condition of the patient, lack of historical information, the 
physicians‘ mindset, and the constraints imposed by the environment. It is the physicians‘ job 
according to experience and knowledge to de-blur his/her mental models. It is a monumental and 
50 
an almost impossible task to understand and capture the process of what physicians are doing, 
saying, or thinking in the context of a healthcare trauma case.  
 
Figure 3.3. Process map of trauma center decision making. 
This is a process in which physicians with a lot of experience go through the process 
more expediently compared to a novice physician. Once the mentally collected data are 
organized (de-blurred) and made sense of, physicians are able to return an approximation of the 
rational decision making process (RDMP) under stress, and have an initial diagnosis for the 
patient. Treatment then is outlined and the team works towards this common objective. 
Throughout the process, physicians work relentlessly and persistently with time-critical nature of 
certain injuries while continuously drawing upon their experience to provide optimal care to the 
severely injured patient.  The successful outcome of the trauma event then becomes directly 




4.1 Research Design and Procedure 
This chapter presents the methodology, including the research design and the procedures 
by which data is collected and analyzed for this study. The study is a combination of shadowing 
emergency medicine attending physicians (EMAP) during their daily shifts, observing 
emergency physicians in real-time trauma cases (referred to as ―trauma code‖ by physicians) 
while situations are developing, reviewing transport emergency medical services (EMS) 
audiotapes of actual trauma cases in progress, and interviewing EMAPs during the shadowing 
observation period in the trauma center. The study site is a designated Level 1 trauma center 
based at an academic medical facility that treats approximately 3,600 trauma patients yearly. 
This healthcare institution has a multistate referral base and an air medical unit facility. The 
hospital‘s emergency department (ED) has an annual census exceeding 100,000 patients. The 
research and its data collection procedures were reviewed and approved by the Institutional 
Review Boards (IRB). 
The model was designed on an X, Y, and Z-axis to allow for mapping decision-making 
processes and to look at the processes as medical team members reach certain benchmarks, or 
simply markers of decision-making. Every marker is somewhat alike in that the decision maker 
goes through a stage, which is a decision-making marker that records passing through a threshold 
such as the initial assessment, secondary assessment, blood pressure (BP), heart rate (HR), 
respiratory rate (RR), and so on. Lack of understanding of the challenges of these thresholds in 
the environment of acute care by non-medical researchers of decision making may lead to poor 
guessing of care givers‘ mental processes. Trauma centers medical teams are dealing with living 
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systems that are complex with emergent characteristics that analytical models, attending only to 
local interactions and relationships of the system, fail to capture.  As it was designed, the model 
may enable researchers to gain an insight into the well orchestrated cognitive processes of these 
practicing physicians while working with and treating living systems.  The study attempts to 
explain the physicians thinking process while attempting to answer the questions of ―How do 
physicians make decisions when confronted with complex, stressful, and changing situations of 
trauma events?  Is it the physician‘s level of expertise that determines whether an intuitive 
judgment or an analytical approach should be taken to various components of the clinical 
decision-making task while in the critical moments of the golden hour? Thus, the nature and 
development of the model is an attempt to answer these questions. Further details about the 
model are outlined in the following section.  
4.2 The Decision Making Model     
The model designed for this study uses Bayesian classifier, convolution, and 
deconvolution operators. This model is designed to explain physicians‘ thinking processes while 
making decisions under stress during a trauma situation. This is shown in Figure 4.1, which is a 
model explicating physicians thinking process. Instead of just seeking statistical inferences, 
solutions are continuously sought until a familiar pattern emerges. Physicians want to achieve an 
approximation to a rational decision making while under the stress of a trauma code. In this 
model (1) data mentally collected is assumed convoluted; (2) Bayesian classifier generates a 
confusion matrix; (3) when accuracy is less than threshold, data is to be de-convoluted; and (4) 
physicians achieve decision-making under stress (DMUS). These decision makers in healthcare 
not only are faced with the stress of human beings body functions that need to be restored to their 
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proper functional requirements, but they are also faced with many possible latent dilemmas (i.e., 
patients with AIDS, tuberculosis, hepatitis) that exerts tremendous pressure in the process. 
 
Figure 4.1. Data deconvolution model. 
The environment of a trauma center is one in which physicians are constantly dealing 
with individual team members‘ cognitive processes and personal task work skills as well as 
information exchange and team leadership. The quantity and type of knowledge acquired by 
team members may influence decision processes. The structure of the physicians‘ cognitive 
processes during a trauma case, as shown diagrammatically in Figure 4.1, requires a strong 
knowledge base and experience for selecting the appropriate set of knowledge patterns to be 
activated in any given trauma situation. These decision-making processes are also influenced by 
variables beyond physicians‘ control, such as equipment failures, the surrounding environment, 
and material resources that may move physicians unsteadily to the edge of chaos (see Figure 3.1) 
or it may stimulate enough diversity to adapt to environmental demands in innovative ways. The 
EMAPs in trauma centers are constantly compelled to adapt in and evolve with a fast changing 
environment. It is in this state, the edge of chaos, where these physicians are most productive, in 
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which their works result in maximum creativity that leads to innovations and new possibilities. 
In this model, the trauma team mental processes proceed through the actions of and interactions 
among its members‘ experiences, knowledge based medicine and the team‘s goals at hand as it 
reaches the edge of chaos.    
Physicians are bombarded with a multiplicity of scoring systems that supposedly produce 
thresholds (see Figure 4.1) of decision making that might be used as predictors of potential 
mortality. As example, the Glasgow Coma Scale (simply known as GCS) purports to facilitate 
detection of early changes and trends in the neurologic status of patients. GCS is a simple 
method for determining the level of consciousness that is predictive of patient outcome (ATLS, 
2008). Another example is the blood pressure (BP) scale for determining blood volume and 
cardiac output. As BP reaches low levels in addition to a patient having abdominal pain, 
physician‘s decision is to initiate surgery procedures. All these human and non-human variables 
create convolution in the mind of the physician‘s decision-making process. Therefore, on the 
onset of the trauma, the data mentally collected by these individuals are blurred or convoluted by 
many known and unknown variables while decisions are made at every fraction of a second of 
the process. The Bayesian classifier then is used to classify these decisions made during stress 
into the types of decisions occurring during the trauma. It allows for recognition of the number 
of decisions correctly made. Subsequently, BC originates a confusion matrix which determines 
the percentage of accuracy of the physicians‘ analysis. This percentage of accuracy is compared 
to the thresholds for that particular procedure or decision-making action. Accuracy percentage 
that is greater than the physician‘s threshold takes the process to the DMUS final result (see 
Figure 4.1). At this conjecture, novice versus expert physicians are different in their abilities to 
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make decisions because the experts generally generate less mental iterations for each decision 
made during a trauma case.  
Deconvolution operators are applied to these convoluted data to de-blur or de-convolute 
the data and to act as simulator of physicians‘ mental processes of arriving to a decision, and it 
can be viewed as an optimization of the process. It attempts to remove the distortion of the 
mentally collected data in the presence of noise by recovering a sharp version of the blurry input 
data, leading to the true diagnosis. Deconvolution doesn‘t act as crystal ball; and in decision 
making, it depends on the estimating abilities of the decision maker. Physicians still have to 
decide whether the de-blurred data is right or wrong and either perform other mental iterations 
for more solutions or act on the initial de-blurred data based on observations that suggest it is a 
correct decision. In essence, the de-blurred data become an approximation of the physician‘s 
rational decision making process, in which the output is a confusion matrix that offers the 
percentage of accuracy of the decision. Therefore, these results may explain the processes by 
which physicians make decisions under stress. Deconvolution then becomes the sorting out, the 
unscrambling of convolution that exists in the minds of physicians during those initial moments 
of trauma events.  
4.2.1 Bayesian classifier.   Classification is the problem of identifying or mapping to 
which group of categories an observation belongs, generally accomplished through the use of a 
training set of data containing observations whose features are known to the researcher. There 
are many classification algorithms in use by individual and organizational researchers, of which 
Naïve Bayesian classifier is one of them. For years researchers have been aware of the 
importance of statistical validation of published results, which have influenced the conception of 
an ever increasing number of classifiers. Today‘s computing power has facilitated the 
56 
development of both new and hybrid algorithms. Here for example are some of the most 
commonly used classification algorithms:   
 Naïve Bayesian classifier 
 C4.5 statistical classifier 
 CN2 induction algorithm 
 Neural Networks 
 Logistic regression 
 Decision trees 
 Bayesian networks 
 Markov models 
The details on these classifiers can easily be found throughout the literature of published journal 
articles and many books and textbooks.     
Naïve Bayesian Classifier (BC) is a probabilistic classifier model based on Bayes‘ 
Theorem. The Naïve Bayes classifier greatly simplifies classification by assuming that 
characteristics are independent from each other given the value of a class variable. Therefore, it 
yields good performance in classifications, making it one of the most efficient and effective 
learning algorithm. One important function of BC is that of probability revision of the initial 
physician‘s guess (prior probability) based on new information from either research or 
experimentation to achieve a new revised probability (posterior probability) of the diagnosis. In 
essence, Bayesian classifier provides an effective way to approach many problems which 
decision makers need to identify solutions to problems that are not initially clear or logic but are 
solvable probabilistically. More important is that it allows researchers to come up with results 
without having to go through massive amounts of data that grows with the model. 
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The Naïve Bayesian Classifier (BC) model classifies the decisions made during the 
trauma case and provides the general framework to describe decisions that are made in the 
uncertain environment of trauma centers. BC operates by simply considering all of the 
characteristics of the variables being classified independent of each other, using information that 
is insufficient to completely determine the correct answer. In spite of its simple design and 
apparently over-simplified assumptions, BC has worked well in a multitude of complex real 
world situations (Charniak, 1991).   
For the most part in statistical works, investigators use the classical methods of 
estimation that are based solely on information provided by random variables, focusing on how 
to extract information from available data. These methods essentially interpret probabilities as 
relative frequencies. Bayesian statistics represents statistical estimation as the conditional 
distribution of parameters and unobserved data, given observed data. An important difference is 
that in Bayesian theory, the parameters are viewed as random variables. The foundation of the 
Bayesian theory rests on subjective probability. From basic statistics, one learns two approaches 
of probability: relative frequency and indifference approaches. But, in many studies of 
probability, these two approaches are not applicable. In medicine where Bayes‘ theory is 
extensively used, physicians need to consider questions such as ―What is the probability of this 
patient having cancer?‖ How likely is it that a patient has the flu?‖ ―What is the likelihood of 
survival for this patient?‖ ―What is the possible outcome for after surgery?‖ These are questions 
that can only be answered subjectively, always reflecting one‘s subjective opinion. Experienced 
physicians mentally review large amounts of clinical information about a patient to arrive at 
these clinical judgment points where these probabilistic questions arise to form predictive 
models. Questions of when, why, what, and how then permeate the analysis and are dependent 
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upon four factors: (1) changes in the condition of the patient, (2) changes in the collected data, 
(3) scoring systems producing thresholds of decision making, and (4) organizational 
requirements. These factors influence the formation of subjective probabilities, which 
distribution then can be specified as prior probability distribution and reflects the researchers‘ 
prior assumptions about the parameter.  
Once the prior probability distribution is specified (through experimentation and/or 
research), the posterior probability can be mathematically computed, and the investigator then 
can easily use it to make inferences about the population of the parameters. Posterior 
probabilities are nothing more than prior probabilities estimates of specific events of interest 
which were revised with the help of additional information obtained from sources such as 
samples, tests, laboratory reports, patient‘s conditions, communication among medical personnel, 
and clues from the environment. Given this new indicative sample information, posterior 
probability values are then mathematically calculated with equations provided by the Bayes‘ 
theorem to denote the outcomes of the trauma. In summary, the subjective prior probability is to 
be the inextricable partner of posterior probability in the Bayes‘ classifier approach to building 
models that combines prior knowledge with new information extracted from the experiment.   
4.2.2  Convolution.     In applied mathematics, convolution is a mathematical operation 
on two functions, say f and g, producing a third function that is deemed as a modified version of 
one of the two original functions. The convolution problem refers to the computation of the 
output signal y(n) given the knowledge of both the input x(n) and impulse response h(n).  
Convolution is one of the most widely used operations in mathematics with applications in many 
fields, including medicine, bioengineering, electrical engineering, imaging, seismology, digital 
signal processing, probability, statistics, and many other fields. It complements well the Bayesian 
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classifier model in that it satisfies each of the characteristics of the input of a system 
independently of each other. The fundamental assumption about the convolution input is that it is 
random and the values of the input are completely independent from one value of time to the 
next value (Mendel, 1990).  Because of these features, convolution became a popular tool with 
scientists and it is used here in this research in combination with deconvolution operator for 
explaining decision making processes under stress. To this end, Matlab
®
 software with its 
convolution and deconvolution functions is used in the model.  Figure 3.3 shows a map for 
prototypical task situations in trauma centers and illustrates the complexity of the physicians‘ 
repertoire of mental models relevant to situation analysis that may easily become convoluted in 
their minds. Thus, the figure illustrates the potential for knowing how the physician mindset, the 
patient‘s physical conditions, and the environmental constraints affect the outcome of decisions. 
And, by understanding the way in which input factors are comprised of large numbers of 
tangible, intangible, known, and unknown variables‖ (EMAP-1), it seems reasonable to think 
that it should be possible to emulate physicians‘ decision making processes regardless of 
convolution in the first few minutes of the trauma code. 
 Under the stress of a trauma event, physicians have the challenge of time constraint, 
environmental noise, and other disturbances, causing their mental models to be blurred 
(convoluted).  In the model, convolution is the actual data for the physicians‘ decision-making 
process under stress (DMUS), in which the function f is stressed. Stressing the function f is the 
convolution operation.  For example, it is like adding lines to an image. It really blurs the image 
through the convolution function. However, physicians don‘t make decisions on blurred models. 
It has to be mentally de-blurred because physicians under stress have to make swift judgments 
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because of time constraint to create a quick model which identifies what has been observed while 
the cognitive processes are blurred.  
Experts in convolution (Sheth, & Rossi, 2010) argue that convolution based approach 
may permit a more efficient selection of the objects for which unbiased reconstruction and 
calibration are required. Convolution then becomes a formidable tool in determining a system‘s 
output from knowledge of a subjective and uninformed input and the system‘s impulse response. 
Because physicians know how patient (a system) injuries affect organ systems and understand 
that human physiology is comprised of balanced functions, it is possible for them to analyze 
treatment responses of the system.  Thus, it is possible to determine what output results from a 
particular treatment action. In this case, convolution determines a system output from knowledge 
of its input. In convolution, investigators find it to be a tool to obtain a statistical picture of an 
overall situation. 
4.2.3  Deconvolution.   Deconvolution is a filtering process used to remove the 
extraneous noises to allow for understanding and visualization of physicians‘ decision processes, 
which should be an approximation of the rational decision making process under stress (RDMP). 
Deconvolution then becomes the unraveling of convolution (Mendel, 1990). The importance of 
deconvolution in this study can be thought of as similar as a telephone communication system. 
Peoples‘ voices can be easily distorted by the telephone system that exists between the mouth 
pieces at both ends. The telephone system smears out the voice sounds, resulting in interferences. 
Unless smearing is undone, these interferences make it difficult to understand the spoken words.  
Deconvolution (and convolution) is used in real-time to invert the effect of the telephone 
system, allowing for clear, undistorted messages to flow from transmitting to receiving ends. It 
has to be accomplished in real-time to avoid unpleasant delays in the conversation. The 
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deconvolution process in communication systems uses the same convolution and deconvolution 
equations called equalization. Physicians in trauma centers are continuously deconvoluting the 
real-time acquired data to make decisions about the system (patient).  
In mathematics, deconvolution is an algorithm-based process used to reverse the effects 
of convolution on recorded data. The literature of deconvolution is extensive, which gives 
evidence of its importance in many disciplines such as in medicine, image de-blurring, seismic 
data deconvolution, communications, and so on.  
4.2.4 The Matlab® program.   A Matlab® program was created to run the data that 
explains the thinking process by which physicians make decisions. Deconvolution (referred to in 
Matlab® as de-noise function), convolution, and Naïve Bayesian classifier functions were 
utilized in order to achieve the results for this work. The program was created with objective of 
helping in the explanation of physicians‘ mental processes while under the stress of a trauma 
event. Naïve Bayes classifier classifies data in two steps, which are training step and prediction 
step. In the training step, using the training samples, the method estimates the parameters of a 
probability distribution, assuming features are conditionally independent. In the prediction step, 
the method computes the posterior probability of that sample belonging to each class. The 
method then classifies the test sample according to the largest posterior probability. Naïve Bayes 
function operates based on estimating P(X∣Y), which is, probability of features X given that 
class Y is known. This Matlab® function provides for the use of many distributions, including 
the normal and multivariate distributions. It uses less data than the other classifiers for accurate 
classifications, making it particularly effective.   Deconvolution, or de-blurring, which Matlab® 
refers to as de-noise, is a mathematical operator greatly used by researchers of imaging, 
seismology, petroleum excavation, and many other disciplines. The objective is to take an event 
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that is blurred or degraded by environment noises, such as physicians under the stress of a 
trauma patient, to capture and describe the distortions. Throughout the process, the decision 
maker really doesn‘t have a vision of what is in reality happening. What the decision maker has 
is vision as an image that represents what he/she would have if they had a perfect understanding 
of the event before them. In Matlab®, the functions include:  
deconvwnr: Implements deblurring using the Wiener filter 
deconvreg: Implement deblurring using regularized filter 
deconvlucy: Implement deblurring using the Lucy-Richardson algorithm 
deconvblind: Implement deblurring using the maximum likelihood algorithm 
These functions can all be used to provide information about the noise to reduce the existing 
noise that blurs the decision maker‘s action. 
4.3 Data  
For the most part, data collection was based on site visits, individual interviews, and 
medical charts concerning trauma cases. The data were obtained from a Level 1 trauma center of 
a medical school in a major healthcare system. This data was a collection of 14 trauma cases, 
which are outlined in Appendix C. Of these data, two of the cases were not included in the study 
due to insufficient information; thus, twelve cases were identified that met the study criteria.  
The researchers followed the plan to go into the trauma center as the events were occurring and 
got the data first hand, real-time data collection of actual trauma events. It was all accomplished 
using the methods described in Section 4.1 (Research Design and Procedure). It included many 
days of shadowing attending physicians during a period span of two months (2012) in order for 
the researcher to familiarize with procedures and processes of caring for the seriously ill or 
injured patient in a trauma center. During this period of time, it was observed how physicians 
organized and made medical decisions in fourteen trauma cases and the identification of the 
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variables needed for the decision making model. The second step of this data collection was to 
review EMS transport audiotapes. It was reviewed 51 days of audiotapes of communications 
with the trauma center from ground EMS and Helicopters EMS for Level 1 and Level 2 trauma 
codes for the mentioned period.  
Table 4.1 
Trauma Cases Observed in the Trauma Center 
Patients Observed During Shadowing of Physicians 
 Mechanism of Injury Duration in Trauma Center 
1 Motorcycle Crash 06 minutes 
2 Gunshot Wound to Lower Extremity 58 minutes 
3 Multiple Gunshot Wounds 1 hour 11 minutes 
4 Vehicle Crash 3 hours 47 minutes 
5 Severe Knife Stab 29 minutes 
6 Blunt Knife Stabs to Chest 18 minutes 
7 Vehicle Crash 1 hour 08 minutes 
8 Vehicle Crash 1 hour 31 minutes 
9 Gunshot Wound 1 hour 23 minutes 
10 Severely Burned 28 minutes 
11 Blunt Chest Wounds 41 minutes 
12 Vehicle Crash 28 minutes 
13 Vehicle Crash 1 hour 14 minutes 
14 Vehicle Crash 10 minutes 
 
The final step on this data collection procedure was to review the medical records of 14 
Level 1 and Level 2 trauma cases in order to gather the final data for the variables used in the 
model. Table 4.1 summarizes 14 of the trauma cases that occurred during shadowing and 
observation in the trauma center. This procedure, reviewing the medical cases, was also covered 
by the IRB, which authorized and approved the retrieval of 12-15 de-identified trauma encounter 
records. The request was approved, along with a data collection form onto which the information 
was recorded.  However, the medical records contained all of the patients‘ identifiers. To bypass 
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the problem, the IRB committee authorized EMAP-1, a physician, to extract these data and then 
destroy the medical records with any linking information, thereby, permanently de-identifying 
the data.         
4.3.1 Method for data collection.   The process of getting the observations was 
accomplished by observing and taking notes of the trauma event cases brought in to the trauma 
center. Each trauma (patient) event was considered an observation, one cycle, and each cycle 
representing one person as being input (arrival) and output (discharge from the trauma center). 
For this decision-making model experiment, it was recorded 14 (fourteen) of these trauma events 
in order to have a workable sample of how decisions are made in real time within the trauma 
center environment. Each trauma code was  observed from the moment the trauma patient 
arrived at the trauma center (EMS hands off) until the time the patient left the care of the trauma 
medical team or to a maximum of 60 (sixty) minutes, whichever came first. The 60-minute mark 
was where a decision was made to stop observing and the trauma event was considered over for 
study purposes.  Data were gathered on all these different events. The investigator looked at 
those different gates of the framework or those points of decision-making, whether it was the 
triage, the initial assessment, the secondary assessment, diagnostic course of action, and so on. 
Those gates or markers constituted the decision-making thresholds. In cases of potentially fatal 
trauma, exacting numeric values sometimes were discussed by the trauma team as the threshold 
and target for the posterior probability, once a test was recommended. These thresholds were 
determined based on benefit-risk analysis associated with each patient or treatment, and each 
threshold is individualized to each patient and according to the experience and knowledge of the 
physician.  The data recorded for each cycle (patient) helped find out where the input was, with 
its starting and finishing points.  
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4.3.2 Procedure.   There were many patients who arrived at the hospital and were either 
triaged as Level 1 or Level 2 trauma cases during shadowing of those physicians in the period of 
this study, from which events were observed as they unfolded and the data were collected.  Table 
4.2 is a sample of the data collection instrument. 
Table 4.2  
Sample of Data Collection Form 








































































































22:32 134/102 102 19 1 94 3/3 8 4 Patient arrived by 
EMS. 
Vehicle Crash. 
Trauma team in 






22:37 140/83 103 16 1 96 3/3 8 1 
22:43 140/90 102 14 1 96 3/3 9 1 
22:48 138/87 92 13 1 98 3/3 9 1 
22:53 140/83 98 19 1 97 3/3 10 1 
22:56 132/84 95 20 1 98 3/3 12 1 
22:59 142/92 106 16 1 98 3/3 12 2 
23:01 130/100 98 18 1 95 3/3 12 2 
23:10 124/79 94 15 1 95 3/3 12 2 
23:20 133/76 89 13 1 96 3/3 12 2 
23:25 135/89 93 20 1 95 3/3 13 1 
23:30 111/89 93 22 1 94 3/3 15 1 
23:40 122/81 93 18 1 95 3/3 15 1 
23:46 130/77 80 22 1 97 3/3 15 1 
 
Additionally, while observing the events unfolding, the entire scenario was mapped out 
from the verbal standpoint. Hence, the data was transcribed, encoded, and analyzed to observe 
how it fit in different scenarios, in real time as those scenarios were played out. It was real data 
that got transcribed. Table 4.1 shows an example of the data collection form in which the 
physicians‘ decisions were recorded with the patient‘s vital sign, as the trauma case progressed. 
For trauma cases of greater complexity, it was expected to see more of each of the four 
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parameters of decision making going on because people are using their medical judgments or 
their intuition in the decision-making process as to whether to deal with the problem rationally, 
politically, or intuitively. The coding of those medical decisions was be accomplished by the 
physicians who handled the trauma case and immediately after the event took place. However, to 
get physicians at the moment the trauma case was over or as the case developed from arrival to 
discharge from the trauma center, while being the best approach, was not feasible.  The 
alternative was to get a physician to review the medical files for the cases. This physician then 
assigned to each moment of the trauma event a number that related to the type of decision-
making that, in his opinion, took place during the trauma situation, as follows: 1 (one) for 
rational, 2 (two) for political, 3 (three) for judgment, 4 (four) for intuition. These medical files 
were reviewed and judgments were used to make informed decision about what decision-making 
process was taking place at every moment of the trauma case.  
4.3.3 Study design.   The data consisted of eight attributes as shown in Table 4.2. The 
data for the fourteen trauma cases were entered into an Excel spread sheet, where two of the 
cases were determined to have insufficient information and subsequently eliminated from the 
analysis. Out of the twelve remaining trauma cases, eleven cases were chosen at random to be 
used for training of the data for the Bayes‘ classifier. One trauma case was used for testing. 
Referring to Table 4.2, one can easily notice that for each patient the time for the event was 
recorded as it evolved. After the training, the data was run in the program where de-convolution 
of the noisy data took place and it was performed according to the following procedure.  
1. First, each line of data as those of Table 4.2 was considered one set of observation, which 
was tested individually against the trained data. Each line represents the data mentally 
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collected by the physician at a moment in time in which the patient is under the care of 
the trauma team.  
2. Second, the first line of data with the second line of data was tested together, then the 
first, second, and third lines were tested together, and so on until the end of the trauma 
case. Each line is representing the collected information; hence, each of the next line 
builds upon the previous gathered information. Therefore, the last line represents both the 
final thinking process and final action of the decision maker.  
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, it has been described the research design and its procedures. The site of 
the research for collection of data was a trauma center of one of the hospitals of the Wake Forest 
University Health Sciences organization. It was discussed the decision-making model and the 
approach that uses Bayesian classifier, Convolution, and Deconvolution operators to explain 
physicians‘ decision-making processes. Convolution is one of the most important operations 
describing a dynamical system. And Deconvolution is a mathematical operation widely used in 
large number of disciplines when researchers need an algorithm that performs well in severe 
noisy environments. The data were collected grouping and comparing several sources of 
information while shadowing physicians in a trauma center.  Afterwards these data were 
reviewed by a physician before it was entered into the model, which validates the process 
utilized by the investigator to acquire the data. The review of the data was done from the moment 
of the initial contact with the patient to the moment of the transfer of the patient out of the 




Trauma Center Physicians: The Adaptive Decision Maker 
5.1 Introduction 
Personal experience has proven to be a critical part of why seasoned physicians arrive at 
more accurate diagnoses that reflect the best available evidence for a particular patient‘s needs. 
Two questions about this decision-making process permeate the medical literature, “How do 
physicians make decisions?‖ and ―How well do physicians make decisions?‖ The conceptually 
separable questions of ―how‖ physicians make judgments and decisions and ―how well‖ they 
make them have both become of greater interest to a wide range of people. The goal of this 
chapter is to elucidate  ―how‖ decisions and medical judgments are made under the stress of 
handling a trauma case , leaving aside the political, economic, ethical, legal, and sociological 
structural variations within which physicians and patients think and behave during complex 
events. The chapter was designed through a series of conversations with those emergency 
medicine attending physicians (EMAP) the author shadowed in the trauma center.  
It has been said that it is difficult for one to understand another culture without 
understanding the language of the people in that culture. The medical profession has a very 
unique language and how successful one is in comprehending the intricate terms and metaphors 
of medical language might navigate well this challenging and demanding domain. The study 
interest is in how decisions and medical judgments are made in TCs. Through discussions with 
several EMAPs, an understanding of the subtle ways in which physicians practice medicine as 
well as what influences them to change course in any given medical situation is discussed in the 
following sections.    
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The research was conducted by observing (―shadowing‖) several EMAPs in the domain 
of a trauma center (TC) during several eight-hour shifts for 15 days during a period of two 
months. During the period of observation, the emergency team was constantly busy: Lower-level 
physicians and staff were continually getting instructions from senior physicians, and 
procedures, the operation of complex equipment and incoming radio and telephone calls—and 
treating patients—were all occurring, often simultaneously. It was not possible to observe 
everything. This is due to the fact that the human observer cannot record everything that is going 
on in any given scenario. Humans are not movie cameras, and even a movie camera, with its 
limited field of vision, needs to be pointed in the right direction (Patton, 1987). To overcome 
some of the limitations of collecting data through observation, open-ended questions were asked 
of the participating EMAPs that not only helped in explaining some of the activities and actions 
that occurred within the TC, they also helped to provide a sense of the respondents‘ frame of 
mind, experiences, thoughts, and backgrounds regarding emergency medicine. The questions 
focused on understanding the work of the physicians being observed, thus attempting to bring the 
physicians closer to the research being conducted while simultaneously allowing for the 
researcher to see and experience the physician‘s perspective. The net result was a more holistic 
understanding of trauma care, with the caveat, nevertheless that interviewees are always 
reporting perceptions, and, for that matter, they are often highly selective perceptions (Patton, 
1987).      
There are in the United States 64 medical specialties; the physicians in this study chose 
Emergency Medicine (EM). For many, working in emergency medicine (EM) was valued as an 
opportunity to work with cutting-edge healthcare technology, make difficult decisions at a 
moment‘s notice, and accept the challenges of a dynamic, complex, and fast-moving adaptive 
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system.  In addition, according to one of the physicians shadowed, emergency medicine is about 
having the knowledge base and the skill base to do things when presented with people who are 
really sick, regardless of what is causing the sickness. To some of these doctors, as was the case 
with EMAP-2, they found that the initial resuscitation and stabilization of a patient in distress 
was more interesting than overseeing that patient‘s long term care. To these EMAPs, a TC is a 
field of rich and complex medical problems, full of unpredictable outcomes that can only be 
understood by experiencing it. It is an environment where analytical and numerical solutions 
alone cannot solve every problem. They went into EM because of the knowledge that there 
would be a lot of varied and high-acuity, maybe even high-stress situations, and that their work 
might provide a template for research studies. They often had the ambition of reconfiguring 
knowledge gained from textbooks, from socially interacting with other expert physicians, and 
from their own experiences and using that cumulative knowledge to provide effective medical 
care to dynamic and complex living organisms.  EM was something that was not a regular 
―office space to do the same thing every day‖ type of job. It was a place where one could work 
out of the hospital with ambulance services, police, and many others, on a wide variety of case 
scenarios. As EMAP-1 said, ―Working in an Emergency Department is just not the normal job.‖     
5.2 Predicting Outcomes  
Recently, while discussing an article entitled ―Trauma Intensive Care Unit Survival: How 
Good Is an Educated Guess?‖ (Goettler, Waibel, Goodwin, Watkins, Toschlog, Sagraves, 
Schenarts, Bard, Newell, & Rotondo, 2010, pp. 1279-128), Dr. Thomas Scalea, an EM 
physician, raised the following significant and pertinent questions regarding trauma care: 
 ―Why are we so bad in predicting outcome?‖  
 ―Is it inherently that difficult?‖  
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 ―Are the scoring systems and predictive models just that bad, or are we simply incapable 
of being objective?‖ (Scalea, 2010, p. 1287) 
These questions were presented to the ―shadowed‖ attending physicians in this study. 
Their responses and comments were very similar to answers from Dr. Goettler given in response 
to Dr. Scalea. The main reason for the difficulty in predicting outcome, he said, is that there are 
so many variables that are intangible and that cannot be quantified. It is possible to see an extra 
set of vital signs, and the patient‘s appearance also gives clues about their physical condition. 
But often physicians do not have a very good idea of what is going on and what needs to be 
done.  Each patient is so different and there are so many variables that are unknowable that no 
one can really predict outcome very well.    
EMAP-2: It‘s not so much difficult to predict that someone may have a bad outcome. 
The scoring systems I think work fairly well. It‘s just that anything can happen to 
anybody at any point in time, so it‘s hard to be 100% sure because not every model, not 
every person, is 100% accurate. If you were to come in from a [vehicle] crash and you 
had these four injuries, we could say ―Yeah, he‘s probably going to do fairly well.‖ Well, 
we can‘t predict if you‘re going to have a blood clot—throw that and die of a blood clot.  
I think it‘s also not wanting to give up hope.  If somebody comes in and they‘re badly 
injured, you want to do everything you can for them. Obviously you know that they may 
have a bad outcome, but you want to do everything as much as you can for them. To the 
point where you know that it‘s futile. And that may be in the first 5 minutes, or you may 
not know that until four or five days later. 
EMAP-3: It is difficult to predict the outcome for trauma patients because there are so 
many ways in which their bodies can get damaged and those things only manifest 
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themselves in a few areas that we can easily measure. Especially when the trauma patient 
first arrives to the hospital, all you really have are vital signs and usually a pretty limited 
physical exam. And so a lot of these scores try to take those things and the history of the 
injury and try to extrapolate that into a predicted survival. But that does not account for 
effects of the injury which may not be seen for a couple of hours but will turn out to be 
very significant.  
EMAP-4: There are probably so many variables in each [trauma] case that it is hard to 
develop a rule, or a standard measure, that fits everybody. So, it may pertain to 92%, but 
that 8% are the ones that you miss or that require some gestalt.   
There are many examples of health concerns that only become obvious with time 
following a traumatic injury. For instance, lung injury might not show up for hours. The 
downstream effects of ischemia and organ damage from hypotension will not be seen for hours. 
Even though the patient is ill, their injury severity score index at presentation might not be very 
bad. However, with time patients may get progressively worse because of these downstream 
effects. The patient who is transferred from another hospital where they initially presented with 
their trauma might arrive at the new TC much sicker simply because of these delayed 
developments, not necessarily because they were mismanaged at the first center.  Because of 
these variables, physicians feel that diagnostic and predictive models are helpful but definitely do 
not completely describe what they find with patients after trauma. Trauma cases are always more 
than the sum of their parts. It is seldom that a single part of the trauma completely determines the 
nature of the whole. In short, trauma physicians are so bad in predicting outcomes because there 
is not enough data to make better predictions. More importantly, there are inherent physiological 
differences between individuals that may influence outcome.  This inherent difference ―will 
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likely require genetic profiles to assess in the future‖ (Goettler et al., 2010). The number of 
variables that change from patient to patient, the inability to quantify them, and the non-linearity 
of the problems faced in the TC often makes each case very complex. 
Sometimes, however, trauma cases are more well-defined.  Unlike with less severe 
trauma, in very serious cases that are likely to result in death within 24 hours, the medical team 
generally has a good idea about the long-term outlook. But, from an ethical perspective, if no one 
from the family is present to give permission to stop treatment, the team must keep treating the 
patient.  
For the most part, the question of the difficulty of diagnosis and outcome goes back to the 
problem of data collection. Intrinsically, in a trauma case the problem is that it is not known how 
difficult the case will be; thus, no one knows all the information that needs to be collected. 
According to EMAP-1, it is very hard to collect all the data that is needed in any given trauma 
case. To make matters more difficult, he also does not think that physicians know the data that 
need to be collected. EMAP-1 believes that there are many things that physicians do not know 
that ―we don‘t even know we don‘t know.‖ Many times medical decisions are made based on 
what is thought to be the path of physiology of a disease, with the expectation that the medicine 
will fit into the framework. However, the reality is that when physicians test the medicine to see 
if it works, a lot of times it does not because ―we don‘t understand the disease as well as we 
think we do‖ (EMAP-1). Maybe one day physicians will be able to understand the reasons for 
this and find a solution.  
Dr. Scalea‘s third question—―Are the scoring systems and predictive models just that 
bad, or are we simply incapable of being objective?‖— has the answer within itself. If physicians 
have to try to be objective to give answers about most likely outcomes, then physicians are not 
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naturally given to making decisions based on data. Decisions are made based as much on 
instincts and assumptions—what physicians think is going on—as upon pure data. In other 
words, physicians are using their skills and experiences. Predicting outcomes in trauma cases and 
trying to change them in favor of survival and health is inherently a human enterprise, however 
strong the scientific overlay might be. If this is true, Dr. Scalea‘s question is almost rhetorical.   
5.3 Physicians and Pattern Recognition  
The literature shows that physicians do rely on intuition and judgment, but by how much 
is still unknown. Dr. Atul Gawande discusses the fact that there is science in what physicians do; 
however, there is also habit, intuition, and the use of plain old guessing. He claims that there is a 
gap between what physicians know and what physicians aim for. As this gap persists, it 
complicates everything physicians do in TCs (Gawande, 2002). Several of the attending 
physicians who contributed to this study were asked to explain this ―gap.‖  
According to EMAP-3, the gap is the gap between what physicians would like to have 
happen and what physicians know that they can do. He explains that physicians would like to be 
able to look at a patient and know exactly what‘s going on, what will happen to them, and, with 
some certainty, how much care they are going to need when they go home. For the same reasons, 
physicians talk about not being able to know how sick patients are when they arrive at the 
hospital; physicians just don‘t know. There is not enough science currently available to 
determine the prognosis of patients in detail when they present at the hospital. Perhaps in the 
future such precision will be possible, but for today, it is only a dream. There is science in 
abundance and the medical world knows a lot more things today than in years past. As EMAP-3 
admonished, ―But, also it is very true in medicine that as we go along, we find out that things we 
used to think were true and scientifically justified turn out not to be exactly the way we thought 
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they were.‖ That is where the intuition and experience come in. That is where the art of medicine 
is located: in knowing that the science says one thing, but the science may not apply in exactly 
the way physicians think it should to this particular patient. There is always the potential that 
something else is going on with the patient. That is the unpredictability of the system.  
EMAP-3: I had a great case today where a patient was admitted to our observation unit 
for a urinary tract infection, and we looked through their stuff and were really suspicious 
of that diagnosis. It turned out that the patient had pneumonia. And that was just a matter 
of having a gut intuition that this diagnosis was incorrect, and examining the patient and 
deciding that it wasn‘t quite right, and then making a different diagnosis. 
Physicians use a systems approach in order not to miss anything, but they do step out of that 
system when something unusual is found in order to make a critical judgment. Once something 
triggers this, physicians review the situation and try to put the entire picture together in an 
alternative way. That may be the reason why some of the physicians‘ work is not always 
systematically done.  It is by putting it all together that they arrive at a critical decision.  
EMAP-2: In trauma resuscitation, the team is looking for exam findings. That‘s all that 
team is doing. The two people at the end of the bed are the ones making the judgment 
calls based on what they‘re hearing. So, you do trust the persons that are doing these 
things—that are finding what they‘re finding. For example, respiratory technicians are 
not MDs but, their expertise is airways and ventilators. That‘s all they do all day. So, if 
they tell me that this person has high airway pressures on the ventilator, I have to listen to 
them. And then I have to go figure out why. So, we rely on everyone to make good calls 
in terms of exams, and bring up findings that they‘re finding to the people who are 
actually making the final decision. 
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There was a physician who would say that physicians were supposed to be evidence-
based and to rely on data and studies to make every decision. Formally, evidence-based medicine 
is defined as ―the practice of making medical decisions through the judicious identification, 
evaluation, and application of the most relevant information‖ (Friedland, 1998, p. 3). However, it 
is not the reality in every case or situation. It is difficult to imagine physicians performing Bayes 
classification or some other type of symbolically complex analytical calculation every time a 
solution is sought to determine the best therapeutic option. Physicians react on intuition and at 
the gut level; consequently, often times their decisions are based on anecdote as much as on 
evidence. ―Physicians rely on intuition a significant amount but also lean on experience,‖ says 
EMAP-4. Physicians approach every situation in a similar manner, thinking about similar 
situations in which something bad happened while treating a patient in a new case.  
Physicians tend to act on the knowledge they have gained from the worst-case scenarios 
they have had that were similar to the case scenario in which they are presently involved. 
Therefore, past experience and the current situation influence intuition and outcome 
significantly. The best example is seeing someone who has done trauma medicine for years and 
in the process he/she sees a lot of the outliers, a lot of abnormal cases. These physicians develop 
a different intuition than someone who has not done it for a long time. As a result, physicians are 
going to play it safe because they are going to think, ―Okay, of all the patients I‘ve had, which 
one was the worst?  Okay, I don‘t want to have that happen,‖ commented EMAP-1. It is possible 
that physicians are cognizant of the shortcomings of their own experiences in terms of that 
limited cohort of patients that they see in trauma centers. Physicians then are going to be risk 
averse and order many tests . Indeed, with traumas there are systematic ways of going through 
with resuscitation, finding injuries, and treating those injuries. However, even though trauma 
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care has set protocols that need to be followed, it still requires lots of physician experience to 
discover the underlying cause of a problem, what has to be done, and how to design the next 
step. Physicians are big believers in script theory, which means to learn the way that the trauma 
or illness presents—the signs and symptoms—and once these signs and symptoms are 
recognized, they trigger the diagnosis. Pattern recognition plays a big part in coming up with a 
diagnosis and a diagnostic course of action. 
In the best-case scenario, one can sit and think about all the knowledge and evidence one 
has or that is available about a situation. As one physician explained: 
EMAP-1: In most scenarios the physician doesn‘t have time to think that much. Most of 
what I do in Emergency Medicine I feel is pattern-based recognition. Every patient I see 
will fit into some pattern I already have in my head. And if they don‘t fit into a pattern, 
that‘s when I take a step back and start over and do more diagnostic testing. I get worried 
when they don‘t fit into my standard patterns.  
Inductive thought plays an important role in the decision-making process. Inductively, 
recognizable events illuminate appropriately efficient paths of action, the knowledge of which 
stems from past experiences with positive and negative outcomes. This is one of the 
characteristics of complex adaptive systems that emphasize learning and innovation through 
adaptation. Learning is the process of recognizing these patterns, sorting through them, and 
deciding which one best fits the problem and, simultaneously, developing new patterns of 
recognition based on innovative judgment. Recognizing patterns brings to the physician‘s mind 
at once previous patterns of treatment or diagnostic courses of action that may be relevant to the 
trauma case at hand. Also, coming into play are x-rays, electrocardiograms, 
electroencephalograms, CT-scans and other laboratory tests that create a pool of information 
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which support physician‘s patterns and potentially lead to the correct solutions or schemas. 
Trauma centers are modeled as networks of cognitive agents (physicians) seeking regularities in 
the form of schemas—the equivalent of mental models (Stacey, 2007). These agents store those 
schemas or representations as readily recognized patterns—in the form of rules—and then they 
act on the basis of those rules. Such pattern recognition is not static, however.  The process of 
pattern recognition is complex but allows decision makers to unconsciously estimate required 
actions and fill in gaps based on their experiences to produce an understanding (Finkelstein, 
Whitehead, & Campbell, 2008).  In essence, it allows decision makers to function with 
incomplete or limited information. The integration of novel information into established patterns 
gives rise to the emergence of novel patterns, new forms.  
New patterns also emerge as a result of physicians using situational awareness, which 
clearly characterizes their experience of the dynamic changes in the TC environment. Situation 
awareness is defined as ―the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in their 
near future‖ (Endsley, 1995, pp. 143).  As EMAP-1 said, he gets worried when the pattern he 
sees does not fit into one of his library of patterns. He commits to an intervention when 
absolutely necessary to do so, but at the same time he remains open to the possibility that it is the 
wrong intervention.  
There may be inherent flaws in the pattern recognition process because physicians may 
think that a patient is in a set pattern to start with, when the patient is really not; this is a potential 
source of errors. Additionally, in complex systems there are difficult-to-perform predictions due 
to ambiguities and novelties. However, using pattern recognition still makes it much easier for 
physicians to make decisions and make decisions much faster. Emergency physicians who have 
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been doing this a long time have more numerous and more varied patterns in their heads to 
which to fit patient scenarios.  As experts in their fields, physicians have a rich repertoire of 
mental representations and cognitive processes from which to draw possible solutions. Their 
performance measures do not usually retain the flavor of diagnoses and treatment plans based on 
the more time-invariant characteristics of cases. This is because any given trauma case does not 
require a specific time—indeed, it cannot have time limitations for its completion.  Additionally, 
trauma cases are not dealt with so easily because there are no if-then rules for physicians in these 
situations; instead, there are structured mental models (pattern recognitions) that provide the 
framework for action. The complexity of these types of medical interventions may range from 
linear to very non-linear or that translates into a diagnosis and a method of treatment.   
Trauma cases are characterized by complexities that depend on human heuristics 
permeated by habits, memorized behaviors, and cognitive strains for real-life solutions.   These 
features are also an inherent weakness, because if the patterns are false and bias the physician to 
overestimate the prior probability of a disease or injury, then incorrect diagnoses and solutions 
could be chosen. Additionally, there might be an overloading of information and cues emanating 
from the trauma case that may exceed the physician‘s available mental resources for solving the 
problem at hand. The first encounter with the trauma patient signified that an unnerving gulf lay 
in front of the trauma team. The physician then assumed the dominant roles in solving problems 
during these trauma cases in which environments (i.e., humans, technologies) and constraints 
(i.e., patients‘ physical conditions) were dynamic. Through the trauma case, the physician has to 
deal with the effects of information overload due to the increasing complexity of the trauma. 
Therefore, this balance allows the EMAP team leader to ascertain the degree of uncertainty 
existing in the mind of team members at the time they have to make decisions in treating the 
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patient.   
Pattern recognition has become increasingly recognized as a pivotal factor in the process 
of using analytical techniques for decision making because it is a basic attribute of human beings 
(Tou & Gonzalez, 1974). It has been the subject of inquiry in many disciplines, including 
engineering and of course, medicine. As a facet of decision-making in these disciplines, this 
unique ability of humans to recognize recurrent themes and processes helps to set human beings 
apart as an exceptional instrument for analysis and action. When patterns are recognized, they 
not only allow physicians to update their initial model of the nature and severity of the patient‘s 
primary predicament but they also improve elicitation and communication of quantitative 
probabilities (Fischhoff, 2000).    
5.4 Physician Decision Making 
The latter part of the last century was marked by intense globalization in response to far-
reaching political, economic, technological, environmental, and social changes, all of which had 
a strong impact on health care. In the United Kingdom, a report was written on the effect of 
globalization on health. The authors of this report (Murray & Dopson, 2000) stated that 
physicians have traditionally held medical judgment and decision-making in high regard and 
have been suspicious of attempts to explore them systematically with a view to making explicit 
their precise character. There has been in recent years a noticeable increase of attention on 
decision-making and medical judgment, not just from inside the discipline but also from outside 
of the medical profession. Why do physicians shy away from exploring medical judgment and 
decision-making systematically?  
EMAP-1: There‘s so much that we don‘t know that we don‘t know. And I think many 
people come in and try to study the [clinical] decision making; but it‘s so complex and 
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there‘s so many intangibles that it is a very difficult thing to quantify and look at from a 
quality-type basis. It‘s hard to methodize so many things that we do, or how we do it, or 
how we make our decisions [emphasis added]. 
EMAP-3: I think that they do. I think it‘s not true that they don‘t. I would say that 
everyone is rather protective of their own decision-making. No one likes to be told that 
the way that they make decisions is suspect, but we know that a lot of the ways we make 
decisions is suspect. There are a lot of cognitive errors in medical decision-making. That 
is a sub-area of interest for me, and so I am perhaps more familiar with them than other 
physicians. And so, we know that there are a lot of shortcuts we take with medical 
decision-making which lead to errors. But traditionally, the individual physician‘s 
judgment is held kind of sacrosanct. There was mystery in it and kind of you defer to that 
expert‘s opinion about the conclusion they came to. And short of some egregious 
violation of custom or something like that, typically physicians are allowed to decide 
whatever they want to decide. 
Hamm and his associates did extensive work in this area of ―how‖ and ―how well‖ physicians 
make decisions and concluded that the question of what physicians actually do is obviously a 
matter for research yet to be determined because of the need to take account of the complex 
scripts which guide physicians‘ decision-making. These researchers have also concluded that 
more research is needed in the area of ―accurate description of physicians’ decision-making 
processes‖ [emphasis added] (Hamm et al., 2000). However, it is difficult to over-state the need 
for ways of evaluating alternative strategies for improving medical judgments and not just focus 
on the study of vignettes.  
Emergency medicine is not the same as running a business that is highly structured 
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around computer models. Such models allow for the evaluation of possible alternatives, where 
lists of the possible values of the various parameters are collected, the dimensions of the 
objective functions are created, and a series of analytical runs are performed using these 
collected values. For many of these business situations, interactions would not be needed 
because the majority of the problems encountered in daily transactions can be easily identified 
through previously specified reports. In the domain of emergency health care the problems are 
more often unstructured, ill-defined, unique to each patient, and complex in that the agents (i.e., 
physicians, nurses, technicians, and technologies) are dealing with living organisms whose 
pathophysiologies differ immensely one from the other. There is so much to know and so much 
to learn about a living organism. For so many decades, computers have been used to simulate 
and analyze physical processes rather accurately. However, there are so many systems of crucial 
interest to medicine that have so far defied any type of simulation because of the ―many 
intangibles‖ and unknowns faced by the medical profession.  
According to EMAP-1, researchers try to study decision-making in health care and are 
faced with a multitude of variables, many uncorrelated, and a level of complexity that is beyond 
full understanding by today‘s mathematics. Because the problems encountered in a TC are ill-
defined and increasingly complex, they cannot be handled effectively through a computer-
interactive problem-solving process. Unquestionably, computers have been used very 
successfully to simulate physical processes. However, physicians manipulating equations at 
computers, adaptively exploring space and time in an attempt to find the best possible solution or 
best diagnostic course of action for their patients is not the best approach to solving a problem 
when faced with a seriously sick or multiply injured human being. Instead, these medical 
professionals rely ―on a very sophisticated information system‖ available to humanity, the brain, 
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―partly because it possesses a superior pattern recognition capability‖ (Tou, & Gonzalez, 1974, 
pp. 6) for discovering and acting on the stressful demands of the situation. Another reason to 
avoid computer models is because physicians feel that such a systematic approach removes the 
cognitive and individual element of the decision-making process. Researchers in health care have 
surmised that the fundamental architecture of medical decision-making related to clinical 
diagnosis is a crucial element that has yet to be fully understood. Faced with time constraints and 
a lack of objective data, physicians default to previous experience or the most conservative path, 
even in the more serious emergency cases: 
EMAP-4: [In a trauma case,] a decision has to be made in the next two minutes, what do 
we do? Just do everything. I don‘t have the time to come back in an hour and reassess 
and gather more data because we are time-constrained and resource-constrained. Just do 
it now. It‘s all or nothing. It‘s a very binary decision. You either do it all right now, or 
you don‘t do anything right now. And that‘s somewhat how the decision is made.   
Emergency physicians are constantly making judgments that require both technical skill 
and expertise and artful, nuanced intuition. The ultimate process cannot be entirely systematic. If 
a system could do it, then a robot could do it. Anybody could do it. Nevertheless, there are many 
ways in trauma care that the system is set up to remove a lot of the lower-level decision-making, 
in order that the physician does not have to deal with those things. Often trauma cases go wrong 
when those low-level decisions become high-level decisions that the physician is not used to 
making. They may get flustered because they are presented with things that they do not usually 
have to worry about, and then things go off the rails. When that happens, healthcare providers 
participate in mortality and morbidity conferences to review cases after the fact and see where 
things went wrong. Yet even in those cases, the medical profession typically does not criticize 
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the judgment of the physicians who were embroiled in the case at that time unless it is felt that 
there was some obvious error that occurred. The mortality and morbidity conference becomes a 
tool for evaluating processes and outcomes at both the level of the individual physician and at the 
level of the trauma team, ideally leading to improvement in decision-making and processes.     
Given time constraints and the lack of comprehensive data, physicians usually try to 
place their patients into a group of patients who were similar—a group that the physician has 
dealt with before. Once this placement has occurred, physicians will then pick treatments that 
seemed to have worked for those other patients and that they suspect will also work for the 
presented patient. If physicians are aware of any science that applies to the presented case, they 
will also typically try to apply that science, moving the selected treatment in one direction or 
another. A good example, provided by EMAP-3, would be a hypothetical case of a patient with 
massive hemorrhage. That patient would be very sick and there would not be a whole lot of time 
to get history or other data. The physician would be presented with a patient who is bleeding out 
and has weak vital signs, and he/she would be treating those things on the patient. But how each 
one might go about treating this patient could differ. The case might present a brand new set of 
data, suggesting that the patient might need whole blood transfusions, which in the United States 
means getting different blood components from the blood bank and then giving them back to 
approximate whole blood.  ―Historically, physicians would have just transfused a whole lot of 
red blood cells‖ says EMAP-3, because the patient needs a lot of blood. However, today the 
physician might order a whole blood mix and treat the patient as he/she would all patients who 
are massively hemorrhaging. However, as more data are gathered, the physician might need to 
adjust that treatment plan. During the ongoing process of data-gathering, new information might 
emerge that the patient is on anticoagulants.  This would cause the physician to change the 
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therapy to reverse the effects of the patient‘s anticoagulants. If other co-morbid things were 
discovered, the treatment would need to address those things as well.  
According to EMAP-3, ―Pattern recognition is a lot of what medicine is.‖ That is one 
way physicians remove a lot of the low-level decision-making, by reasoning that ―this patient has 
this which is like a lot of those other patients who had this.‖ Hence, the treatment will be to do 
those things that are usually done for that known group of patients. Such an approach, however, 
leaves open the possibility that the patient is not like the known group, thus introducing a chance 
for error in the treatment. This brings us back to the patient initially diagnosed with kidney 
infection, which turned out to be pneumonia. This patient had symptoms that appeared to 
indicate pyelonephritis kidney infection and, as EMAP-3 pointed out, ―quite frankly did not 
seem a lot like pneumonia, which it turned out to be.‖ However, pneumonia can be like that 
sometimes, and there were a couple of pieces of data in the case that really should have made the 
physicians more curious about whether it was indeed a kidney infection (namely that the urine 
did not seem to be very infected). Despite this lack of fit between the expected pattern and the 
patient, the physicians categorized the patient into ―fever, maybe urinary symptoms, seems kind 
of like urinary infection, didn‘t really seem like a lot else.‖ As result, the book was more or less 
closed on that kidney infection diagnosis and the patient was started on the treatment that would 
correct that problem. On the following day the physician, upon seen the patient again, realized 
that the kidney infection diagnosis was perhaps not quite right, and pneumonia emerged as the 
correct diagnosis.    
5.5 Unfamiliarity of Task Content: Analysis versus Intuition  
Hammonds‘ Cognitive Continuum Theory considers the nature of, and the implications 
of, intuitive and analytical processes in decision-making. It states that the unfamiliarity of task 
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content may lead to forms of reasoning that induce intuition in an attempt to place perception and 
deductive thinking in higher levels of decision-making. Intuition and analysis have been depicted 
in the literature of psychology as dichotomous rivals, where some eulogized one and criticized 
the other, diminishing the scientific value of these two concepts (Connolly et al., 2000; 
Goldstein, & Hogarth, 1997; Hammond, 2000).  Highly analytical processes were posited at one 
extreme; at the other were highly intuitive processes. At the middle point of the continuum, there 
was an approximation of rational decision-making. Given this schema, the question is whether 
medical doctors are more likely to use analysis or intuition when they are unfamiliar with a task 
and whether the quality of a physician‘s reasoning depends on his/her use of analysis or of 
intuition (medical judgment).  
Generally, said EMAP-1, all physicians trust their gut to a certain degree.  The first 
decision physicians have to make is whether the patient is sick or not. It was observed during the 
―shadowing‖ of the physicians that unspoken decisions and diagnosis were made at every 
encounter with a patient. In a simple ―Hello, how do you feel?‖ two or three decisions and a 
diagnosis were made. If the patient presented as overtly sick, then physicians divided their 
assessments into ―We know what‘s making them sick‖ or ―We don‘t know what‘s making them 
sick.‖ Either way, if the patient was in the sick category, physicians were very careful and did a 
lot of analysis in order to figure out what was going on, according to EMAP-1. 
If physicians look at a patient and do not think they are that sick, then the patient is 
mentally put into one of two categories. If the category is, ―They‘re not sick, and I know what‘s 
going on,‖ then physicians just get them out the door.  If the category is, ―They‘re not sick and 
I‘m not sure what‘s going on,‖ physicians will work them up and use a little more analysis.  
However, they will not devote as much attention to fact-gathering and analysis in these cases as 
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they would if they thought there was a true pathological situation. As was explained during the 
shadowing:  
EMAP-3: Because of time pressure, they‘re [physicians] probably going to be more 
likely to use intuition. As for me personally, if I walk into a situation I am unfamiliar 
with, I am probably going to start by intuiting my way through it. And if I have time, I 
will probably start to look for science that applies to it. I may try to buy myself a little 
time with intuition and then go back to my desk and start to look up stuff to give me more 
direction on whatever we‘re going to do. But, I think most physicians rely on intuition 
initially because of the time pressure.   
EMAP-4: When there is objective data [like] vital signs, laboratory data, objective data 
becomes an analytical process. In the absence of those, it‘s an intuitive process. I think 
you would default first to analytical. Meaning looking for objective data, the EMS‘s 
story, the vital signs upon arrival—your objective data you can gather. If those are 
lacking, then it becomes intuitive.  
Intuition and judgment are the first types of decision-making used when a patient is initially 
seen, leading to a decision about whether there is sickness or not. Once the patient‘s health status 
has been determined, then analytical and rational decision-making processes are used to figure 
out what is going on with the patient. In any situations encountered by emergency physicians, 
analytical processes (using quantitative data) are the first choice if data are available. As 
expressed by EMAP-1, ―To ignore data in order to use intuition is not a good idea.‖  
However, there are certain ―gray area‖ cases where intuitive reasoning will trump 
whatever analytical reasoning says. That would be in the case about necrotizing facilities, in 
which every analytical tool said that everything was normal and there was no need to do 
88 
anything extraordinary.  Fortunately, there was some intuitive part of the physician‘s reasoning 
power that trumped the analytical part. All cases that confront emergency physicians probably 
fall on a continuum.  On one end, the situation is obvious and the decision is easy. It is below the 
critical threshold for whatever decision-making is necessary. As emphasized by EMAP-4, ―The 
blood pressure (BP) is low; patients need to go to the operating room. Heart rate (HR) or pulse is 
going down, the patients are dying.‖  In this sense, decision-making is straightforward. Then 
there are situations that fall on the opposite end of the spectrum, where physicians look at the 
data and it does not take any intuition to know that the patient is fine, there is no injury, and there 
is nothing wrong. It is the middle portion of the spectrum, where the data has not yet approached 
any thresholds that trigger the need for a decision, forcing the physician to interpret trends in BP, 
trends in HR, trends in mental status, and seek out those extraneous other bits of information, 
such as mechanism of injury and EMS reports.   
It is in this middle area of the decision spectrum where the need for intuitive judgment 
comes in—when the data are seriously incomplete or fail to match what the medical team is 
seeing. Often when physicians order a test, they expect to know the result. The test is a 
confirmation of their analytical reasoning about the case. If there is some discordance between 
what was expected and what the test shows, intuitive reasoning must be brought to bear. Either 
the physician‘s assumption was wrong or the data is wrong. It is at this point that a physician 
must say, ―I‘m looking in the wrong place, or my differential diagnosis needs to be broader 
because I am missing something.‖ Failure to do so creates situations in which major signs get 
missed and cases are in danger of winding up being the subject of that week‘s M&M conference.    
The question of whether the quality of physicians‘ reasoning depends upon their use of 
analysis or intuition depends on their experience. Physicians with significantly more experience 
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have been demonstrated to possess greater intuitive reasoning skills. Intuition depends mostly on 
experience; inexperienced physicians, lacking the base for well-honed intuitive reasoning, 
typically misapply science-based reasoning. These novice physicians may not realize that they 
are applying certain kinds of scientific knowledge to patients for whom that information was not 
intended. Or, they simply do not understand the nuances involved in applying the analytical 
information they know and have been trained to use. As far as whether the analytical or the 
intuitive approach is inherently better, it is hard for a non-medical observer to know because it 
seems to never happen in a dichotomous way. Physicians never really apply intuition without 
also having used their analytical skills. By the time he/she becomes a physician, there is a 
significant amount of analytical information that novice physicians know and have acquired from 
both school and practice; this information is always informing their nascent intuitive approach.    
EMAP-3: It‘s kind of hard to establish that. I think it has more to do with experience 
than it has to do with the one approach over the other. Because I don‘t think it ever 
happens that way. There‘s never really a mostly intuitive moment, or a significantly 
mostly analytical moment. It‘s rare to encounter a patient to whom the scientific literature 
applies perfectly such that you feel comfortable that your decision is made really 
rationally in the absence of your own personal biases or intuition.   
Physicians believe that decisions that turn out to be primarily intuitive are much better the 
more experienced a physician is. As expected, senior medical doctors make better decisions than 
junior medical doctors. Trauma surgeons compared to emergency physicians generally may 
make better decisions just because these highly specialized physicians have to deal with trauma 
cases in a more longitudinal fashion. Experience definitely plays a role in medical judgment, and 
it can be said that, generally speaking, intuitive decisions are much better with more experience 
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(Klein, 2004). However, the reverse is probably also true: Analytical decisions are probably 
better with experience because an experienced physician can recognize when an intuition does 
not really apply to the patient or the ways in which the science may or may not apply to a 
particular patient.  
Compared to senior physicians, medical student trainees often get confused about science 
as it applies to patients, and they usually need some guidance from expert doctors in applying it 
appropriately. Sometimes these novices score major successes; sometimes they do recognize 
when the science applies.  But many times they start to head down a path of doing things based 
on what the scientific literature says that really is not appropriate for patients because they fail 
intuitively to recognize that the patient does not really belong in the same category of patients to 
which the science applies. In commenting on an article published in the Society for Academic 
Medicine by an intern who wrote about his struggle with a patient‘s diagnosis, Dr. Karen Cosby 
from Cook County Hospital stated, ―Unlike the clean, straightforward descriptions in textbooks, 
real patients come packaged with all sorts of challenges‖ (Cosby, 2011). Dr. Cosby further 
commented on the resident‘s excellent example of reflective writing with thorough details of his 
decisions and thoughts during the difficult trauma case. However, according to Dr. Cosby, the 
resident‘s analysis revealed how precarious the diagnostic process can be and how 
uncomfortable the process can become for physicians (Cosby, 2011). In the resident‘s article, he 
revealed all the decision complexity so familiar to trauma physicians, how he grappled with 
indecision, uncertainty, temporary loss of a sense of control, cognitive strain, his adaptation in 
and evolvement with a changing environment, and interactions with experts (Cosby, 2011; 
Caraballo, 2011). It was the struggles of dealing with political, rational, medical judgment, and 
91 
chaotic decision-making processes all in one trauma case that produced the confusion and 
uncertainty in the event.  
Looking at those four parameters (political, rational, judgment, or chaos) according to 
what the physicians are processing in their minds, there are certain situations where the 
physicians know there is very little or nothing that can be done to save a patient, but they are still 
going to work as hard as humanly possible because physicians focusing on Level 1 trauma 
patients know that is their responsibility. When patients show up in Level 1 trauma in the care of 
the EMS, they come in already defined by a limited set of information such as, this is a head 
trauma or a gunshot wound.  The entire decision-making apparatus does not exist at that point. 
All that is observable are resource allocations given to the case (treatment bays, personnel, 
equipment, etc.) and what physicians are doing to focus on one outcome: to save the patient‘s 
life.  
In an environment where there are new interns that have little or no experience and only 
rote familiarity with the kind of pattern recognition that can support his or her decision-making 
processes. Hence, the decision to hand a case over to an intern is a political decision by the 
EMAP supervising the shift, because any decision made by the intern might be fundamentally 
questionable due to lack of clinical experience. Another layer of the politics of decision-making 
arises when the EMAP must decide whether the intern‘s decisions stand or whether to step in 
with superior experience to change the decision. All of it falls in together in that triple helix that 
explains the physician‘s mental processes. The maturing of an intern is another entire study in 
itself and not the subject of this study.  
Immediately the physician goes from intuitive decision-making to rational decision 
making. For instance, the patient seen by the physician presents with an obvious illness. The 
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question, ―Is it or is it not an illness that I have seen before,‖ is intuitive. The patient who 
presents bleeding from the nose and from the ears is obviously sick. The physician did not have 
to make any decision to determine that. Rationally, the patient is sick. At this point, pattern 
recognition becomes important. For example, if the patient presented having a swelling of the 
abdomen and low blood pressure, the patient most likely has internal bleeding. This kind of 
presentation is obvious even to a novice who has little clinical experience. Once the pattern 
―internal bleeding‖ is recognized, it becomes rational decision-making process (RDMP), because 
then the physician proceeds to discuss which tests to order, which action is more appropriate, or 
which decision needs to be made. It is a rational process because there is a protocol—a list of 
tests that are appropriate and available for each situation.   
The decision-making processes that are happening are completely independent of the 
source of trauma. The physician goes through the process with one of the first questions, when 
he asks whether this person is sick or not. This is intuitive decision-making, but political 
decision-making is also folded into that. Every way a physician turns, somebody is watching 
over his/her shoulder, and everything that is done is recorded. Everything is recorded, somebody 
is watching, the supervisors are there, and these days everybody is reviewing security 
surveillance cameras, too. All this recorded information is getting reviewed. So, no matter the 
direction of any case, that physician is responsible for and will be held accountable for whatever 
happens. The political decision becomes a part of the overall decision-making process. The 
political gets folded into every decision.  
Resource allocation does rarely come into play, at which point physicians can make the 
more finite idea of chaos come into play. But as the physician walks into a situation, he/she can 
immediately commence the intuitive or rational decision-making processes.  If the physician is 
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not asking these questions, then he/she has gone straight into RDMP because the evidence from 
what he walks in and sees is so straightforward. However, at the moment he/she asks the patient, 
―What is going on, today?‖ this is the hallmark of intuitive thinking, and it is clear that 
intuitively certain things have been decided. Based on these decisions, the pattern emerges in the 
mind of the physician.    
5.6 Information Overload  
In emergency medicine, especially where trauma is concerned, information overload can 
quickly become a crucial part of the physician‘s daily management of work. The dynamic 
environment of a TC requires the handling of many issues simultaneously. For example, during 
one of the observed shifts, EMAP#2 had one EMS case on the phone, another EMS case on the 
radio, an intern seeking help with a patient, and another attending physician handing over a case 
as his shift was over. All these situations were handled, almost simultaneously, in a space of less 
than two minutes. There was little time to combine information from many sources to estimate 
the value of a procedure in any given case. Many times if physicians are trying to do a procedure, 
it makes a simple procedure very complicated if they have to start over every time someone 
interrupts their train of thought. It requires rethinking of the problem, reformulation of their 
plans, as the train of thought vanishes, even if momentarily. Sometimes they forget to restart the 
process and what would have been a simple procedure becomes more complicated because it 
gets delayed and something else has happened to make the situation now more complex. 
EMAP-1: I think sometimes you just have to start over and re-verify what you were 
doing. I‘ve been in situations in the past where you start a procedure and you start over 
because you‘re delayed, and then things evolve and the patient changes. And, now that 
things have changed, the procedure is no longer necessary. That has happened before. 
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It is not usually that difficult for physicians to combine information from many sources to 
estimate the value of a procedure, mostly because of experience. Having done it many times, 
physicians learn what is important and what is not important to the case. However, one physician 
felt that it is not always that easy.   
EMAP-4: I would say very difficult. I think that‘s why there is sort of an algorithmic 
approach to it, a checklist approach. We are not capable of keeping all these things in our 
minds; we have to have a checklist. I think that is sort of what the decision-making is: If 
you cross a certain threshold for a trauma patient, (i.e., they had a rollover MVA), they 
are going to get all the CT-scans. So, I would say difficult. 
Physicians are looking for those thresholds of decision-making. As one of those decision-
making thresholds is crossed, everything else ceases to matter, whether it is airway, breathing, 
circulation, or any other threshold. In the physician‘s mind, many questions are asked and 
answered: Can this patient go home? Can this patient stay? How sick are they?  These data, cues, 
and information are all distilled down into a threshold. The decision-making process then turns 
into a binary decision-making mode, yes or no. CT scan: yes or no, OR: yes or no, ICU: yes or 
no. In reality, there are many other variables that physicians are looking for while treating the 
patient that may trump this seemingly simple process. But in the search for a diagnosis, when 
any of those thresholds are crossed, a decision is made. In a trauma case, if the BP is low, if they 
have significant abdominal pain, if they are not breathing, if their mental status is altered—each 
of those is a branch point binary decision.  
For example, consider a trauma patient who was one of the observed real-time cases 
during the shadowing: a motorcycle accident. The patient‘s BP was low; he had a critical 
mechanism of injury and had severe abdominal pain. Based on these three variables (BP, 
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mechanism of injury, and abdominal pain) the patient was immediately sent to OR. It did not 
matter what else the physicians would find afterwards, the decision had already been made and 
even if the patient‘s BP had come back up, the decision to send him to OR would have remained. 
There were no other data that were going to sway the trauma team from that final decision. 
Hence, there was no reason to look, no reason to even spend any mental energy processing other 
data, because the critical decision had already been made.  
The nature of a physician‘s job is that they are always interrupted with large numbers of 
things all the time. They are often dealing with many different kinds of patients; all in a single 
work shift, and in the case of a teaching hospital, such as the site of this study, there are medical 
trainees to manage as well.  Therefore, it becomes part of a physician‘s work load to just get 
habituated to frequent short interruptions to whatever they are working on at that moment; but 
they also learn to mentally return to their task as quickly as possible. In the setting of trauma, it is 
set up to usually batch those things. Hence, physicians can expect information to come at certain 
times, and they know what kind of information they are going to get at certain times.  
When things go off the rails it is usually because the information does not arrive when it 
is needed, or it is not coming at the time it is supposed to come, or it comes once and then it 
comes again and it is really different information compared to the first time. Consequently, no 
information was obtained, because now physicians have two really different pieces of 
information. When information (i.e., x-rays, CT scans, laboratory reports and so on) comes when 
it is supposed to, things go really well, and it is not hard to integrate all of it into the trauma 
event. But when the timing of that information is incorrect, it can throw the entire team out of 
balance, forcing physicians to do more mental work to put things back together into the trauma 
picture.  
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EMAP-3: In one way in trauma centers this [information overload, incorrect information, 
untimely information] is almost a failing or a weakness. It‘s a significant weakness of the 
trauma center model that things are so structured that when the structure fails, medical 
decision-making can fail because the MDs have significantly increased stress, and they 
start to misapply or misinterpret or fail to recognize that they don‘t have appropriate 
information. Then they start to make bad decisions.   
There are almost an infinite number of things that can go perfectly right or can go just as 
perfectly wrong. For instance, a physician has a patient that needs to get a CT scan; however, the 
patient has to be held back because the scanner is already being used. Perhaps there are two 
trauma patients, and they both need a CT scan. Typically, physicians do not have to make the 
decision of which patient goes first, because there are not always two trauma events at the same 
time. But when there are, it adds another decision that must be made, because resources (the CT 
scanner) are scarce, which creates higher margins for errors. The physician might pick the wrong 
patient to go first to the CT-scan laboratory.   
Another area where things can go very right or very wrong would be things that should 
be and are routinely easy, that almost always get done, but that sometimes do not get done. 
During this physician-shadowing process, a trauma patient was observed that did not have 
intravenous (IV) access established. Usually EMS paramedics can get at least one IV access into 
the patient, but sometimes paramedics cannot establish access. In this case, not even the trauma 
team could get an IV access once the patient arrived at the trauma center. This can be construed 
as a significant breakdown of the normal trauma process; to not be able to have IV access within 
a couple of minutes really throws medical decision-making, because at that point the Level 1 
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resuscitation unit is moving on to the primary survey. The team knows at that point that it needs 
to stop and get IV access. However, as physician commented,  
EMAP-3: The trauma resident physician is often thrown by that and they‘re trying to still 
go, but they‘re not sure if they should go along with the rest of the exam because we‘re 
still waiting for IV access.   
That is why there are senior emergency attending physicians there, to keep the team together 
until the much-needed IV medication access is in place.  
Physicians feel that trauma events per se are not very complex, but humans are complex; 
therefore, what happen in a trauma case is unpredictable because of the human factor. It takes 
very little to cause consternation, as in the IV case. These are cases that do not follow the normal 
model that physicians try to make them fit into. Physicians then find themselves dropping back 
into the intuitive decision-making mode, trying to categorize the patient according to other, 
similar patients and then applying therapies that seemed to work for those patients. 
Simultaneously, they are trying to resolve everything that is keeping the patient from fitting into 
the normal trauma role and to get the patient back on track to do the normal trauma-center things 
while taking care of whatever critical issue he or she has presented with.  
The pattern recognition models that medicine in general and certainly emergency 
medicine follows help greatly with reducing the stress that is introduced by those complexities. 
As EMAP-3 explained, that is why novice trauma physicians often find these situations to be 
really stressful, because they just have not seen enough patients yet to have a mental library of 
people batched into these mental models. As a result, they get very uncomfortable when things 
do not go the way they are ideally supposed to go.  They simply do not have anything to fall 
back upon for decision-making. It can be concluded that it is really something that can only be 
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appreciated and understood by physicians who have been in practice for several years to realize 
how much one relies on this pattern recognition approach to medical decision-making.   
5.7 Cognitive Demands  
There has been increased recognition that real-world problems place extraordinary 
demands on decision-makers. More specifically, a Level 1 trauma resuscitation case places 
heavy cognitive demands on physicians. Classic models of decision-making processes generally 
assume static problem domains, rational analysis, and suboptimal human decision-making 
(Cannon-Bowers, 1998). These qualities are not characteristic of a trauma center, where problem 
domains are in constant flux, rational analysis is just one cognitive mode of operation, and 
human decision-making is expected to be optimal. Leading attending physicians are constantly 
making efforts to improve the decision-making effectiveness of medical teams and to discover 
the patterns of cognition at work— how the strategies and behaviors of physicians and other 
team members are adapted to the constraints and demands of the trauma case at hand—while 
under the stress of a Level 1 trauma case. 
This research was conducted at a Level 1 trauma center in a teaching hospital of a 
medical school that maintains a faculty body of high-level trauma and emergency medicine 
physicians. These high-caliber professionals make up the Level 1 Trauma Resuscitation Unit 
(LITRU) of the hospital, and they all work side by side with the interns. Therefore, this LITRU 
may differ somewhat in its actions from other hospitals where a trauma patient is presented for 
care. The unit is activated at the time the EMAP makes the decision to consider the incoming 
patient as a Level 1 or Level 2 trauma (also referred to as Code 1 or Code 2), according to the set 
of criteria outlined by the hospital (refer to Appendix A). Before the patient arrives at the trauma 
center, the activated LITRU is positioned in place inside the Level 1 trauma bay, with each 
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member of the team having his/her designated place according to their specialties and 
responsibilities.  A hospital must have at least 16 kinds of medical specialists readily available 
for trauma care in order to be considered a Level 1 trauma hospital (See Table 1.1 of Chapter 1). 
There are two attending physicians who are generally the supervisors for the day‘s shift, one of 
which made the decision to classify the injured patient as a Level 1 trauma case.    
The role of the two attending physicians is, in many ways, to not be a part of the trauma 
case.  It is to stand back and look at the whole trauma event, look at all of the team members and 
what they are supposed to do versus what is actually happening. The attending physician 
concentrates on the patient not so much as a person but as a discrete variable in this system, and 
he/she attentively scans the system, searching for the spots where the system is breaking down 
and directing others to fix them before they become a problem. This distancing is useful, because 
the biggest chance for errors by those leading the code occurs when the physician becomes 
personally involved in managing the patient, putting their hands on the patient. There are other 
people to do that.  Because there is so much information emanating from the event, the attending 
physician who is ultimately in charge of the trauma has to be outside of the event. This ―hands 
off‖ procedure is true even for severe medical situations like those requiring CPR, intubation, 
cricothyroidotomy and similar procedures. The living organism is a system with parts that 
interact and interrelate with each other, resulting in one injured organ affecting a non-injured 
organ. Systems have functional requirements (FR) that help capture the behavior of the system. 
The attending physician is always aware of those requirements and is attentive to the behavior of 
the system as expressed by the ABCDEs functions, which the system is required to perform. 
Distancing enables the attending physician to take in the necessary information about the system 
piece by piece and feed it out again as the team needs it to make decisions instead of all members 
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of the team having all of the information thrown at them all at once. This type of engagement 
with the trauma case enables the attending physician to distinguish between the baseline 
functionality requirement necessary for the system to survive the trauma and the features that 
differentiate the conditions of the presented system with those past experiences.  
This trauma team approach recognizes that there are other, junior physicians to do the 
actual work of touching the patient to perform procedures or tests, and they relay information to 
the EMAP who is integrating it all and directing the trauma case. The process lets that EMAP be 
less distracted by each individual finding, whether normal or abnormal, and permits him/her to 
integrate all the pieces of information into a more complete picture of the patient. It has been 
documented that when the EMAP or the team leader becomes involved in the hands-on care of 
the patient, they easily get distracted or sidetracked into one aspect of the system. For instance, 
an EMAP who gets drawn into putting an IV into a patient is not functioning optimally as the 
case manager.  If something else develops that is important to know, they may not realize it 
because their attention is directed elsewhere. Hence, to direct trauma cases, EMAPs have to be 
outside of the action, just like the director of an orchestra: in front of the events, looking at 
everything, and telling people what to do, including the nursing staff, so that things get done. 
This cognitive orchestration of putting all the pieces of the puzzle together underlies their 
decision-making process under stress.  
An example of the kind of breakdown that can occur was given by this physician: 
EMAP-3: There was a trauma [case] not too long after you were there [shadowing the 
physicians] where all the trauma MDs, including the attending [physician] and myself, 
got dragged into the room because the patient was very sick and actually there were a lot 
of breakdowns in the system for that patient that probably contributed to a bad outcome 
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for them because there was not anyone out there looking at what was happening and 
seeing the breakdowns as they were occurring. Everyone was in the room with their own 
little problems, and there were other, bigger system problems that no one really 
recognized because they weren‘t outside of the room.  
These types of breakdowns in communications are resolved by assigning each team member a 
responsibility and then each team member strictly adhering to their assignment.  
EMAP-4: So I think that one important thing is communication of each team member‘s 
responsibilities. The person at the head of the bed is doing the airway, the surgery 
resident is doing the primary and secondary assessment. This nurse knows she‘s doing 
the IV, the other nurse knows she‘s getting a BP. Designated communication of 
responsibilities. If my job is airway, I know all I have to focus on is breathing. I don‘t 
have to take in all the other data, all that confusing stuff. I have a finite realm that I‘m 
thinking in. Just the data that affects my decision to intubate [airway] or not is all I‘m 
concerned about at that point.   
For each trauma code, there is a person assigned to each of these critical areas prior to patient 
arrival. There‘s a person handling BP and a person getting IV access. If CPR is required, there is 
a person already designated to perform it. They all are pre-assigned prior to arrival of the patient.  
The main thing the lead physician can do is to make sure each member of the team has 
the same goal and is working toward the same goal. However, during most trauma situations, 
things are very convoluted and very dynamic, and each member of the team cannot just keep 
doing their one task and not have to change that task.    
EMAP-1: If we‘re doing resuscitation and I suddenly decide that I‘m not sure if this 
patient still has a pulse anymore. Now, I have to raise my voice, not yell, but raise my 
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voice and reorient everyone and say ―Listen, I want a pulse check before we do anything 
else.‖ And then, based on that pulse check, everyone will either continue what they‘re 
doing or completely reorient.  
These are decisions in real-world settings. The framework for studying decision-making 
in TC is based on the theories of complex adaptive systems, where interaction, evolution, and 
novelty are ever-present within a constantly changing environment. Expert physicians 
periodically reorganize their knowledge base in order to accommodate much more information.  
This new, expanded knowledge base is the foundation for conceptualizing new recognizable 
patterns, as previously discussed. Expert physicians will store and retrieve information 
differently than novices do and use the information for fast decision-making as required by 
evolving situations. Simultaneously, they go through a conscious analytical process of exploring 
their existing mental models to match or determine which pattern is most appropriate to the 
situation at hand and determine a diagnostic course of action. After doing so, physicians as 
decision-makers can then see how it plays out in action.   
The environment that physicians and their team members face consists not only of the 
patient placed in front of them, but rather what they all do as a team.  Their interrelations and 
interactions are not static aggregations, but dynamic systems. Therefore, there cannot be just a 
single reaction to a single, given environment; rather, an expert team both reacts to and enacts 
the environment. Once enacted, the team can then break down that environment into separate 
events that can be easily explored and matched to each of the team members‘ pattern 
recognitions available in their mental models. As the team goes through the initial patient 
assessment, the available enacted environment may be a score of undifferentiated variables.  
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Sometimes, what is observed does not match any of the team members‘ patterns, and this can 
bring everything to a standstill: 
EMAP-1: There is a teacher from whom I‘ve listened to many lectures and the famous 
quote he has is ―Don‘t just do something, stand there!‖  Sometimes you have to let things 
develop and let things take their own course instead of intervening, because any 
intervention you may do might just make things worse. 
That is a level of uncertainty physicians need to learn how to deal with throughout most of their 
professional careers. Indeed, in virtually all phases of their professional careers, physicians have 
lived with irreducible uncertainty in diagnosis, prognosis and therapy.  But once a physician 
observes and collects all the information or cues and organizes them into a coherent set of 
variables, he is then more able to make the inference that some of these variables co-vary with 
other variables in ways that may be predictive.  The physician then infers a connection among 
the variables during those seconds ―standing there,‖ simply observing. Physicians then become 
part of this complex environment, moving through this complex path, and actively learning 
complex tasks that take total focused attention and an extraordinary amount of cognitive effort. 
This information gathering about one‘s surround and about oneself and one‘s own behavior is 
what makes the trauma center and its cases a complex adaptive system (Gell-Mann, 1999).  
5.8 Trauma Complexity  
Many things were observed in the ED while shadowing attending physicians during their 
shifts. Three of those observations were: (1) Physicians adapt to constraints, pressures, and the 
complexities of the trauma case at hand; (2) Rational analysis cannot yield optimal solutions 
when the problem is ill-defined, information is ambiguous, and the situation is dynamic. (3) In 
complex situations, such as a Level 1 or Level 2 trauma event, the size of the input does not 
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correlate with its output in a predictable manner. A very small action or observation by a 
physician may entirely transform the assessment and management of a patient‘s problem. 
Similarly, a large input may have very little effect. A question then emerges regarding the 
physician‘s response or mental schemas in these situations when faced with problems that are 
very complex. One physician recalled: 
EMAP-1: We‘re taught to step back to three main priorities in very complex situations, 
for instance a patient resuscitation, [and] to keep it very simple. It‘s Airway:  make sure 
the patient can breathe. Heart Beat: make sure they have a good pulse. Blood Pressure: 
make sure they have a good blood pressure. You do your best to make a complex 
situation into three simple priorities. It doesn‘t always work; but often times when 
something is very dynamic and very fluid and things are changing rapidly, you have to 
step back to very simple priorities to be able to deal with a very complex situation.   
Sometimes the complexity and the incongruity of certain situations may change the way 
physicians perceive the situation or act in solving a problem, making it possible for cutting-edge 
solutions to emerge. Trauma centers provide unique environments to interns as well as more 
experienced physicians for learning processes in complex skill acquisition. TCs provide a 
complex, shifting and emergent task environment. The emergent task environment is the 
consequence of a high level of local interaction between agents. For most physicians and 
especially for trauma physicians, one of their roles is to try to make sense out of the chaos of 
such environments. During a complex resuscitation procedure, all factors collected during the 
primary assessment are of a very critical nature and are to be dealt with swiftly, requiring 
immediate attention to correct major deviations from the norm and to avoid slipping into chaos.    
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Making sense out of chaos goes back to the simple and the complex: physicians have to 
try to fit very complex situations into very simple priorities. However, physicians‘ notions of the 
meaning of complexity and its opposite, simplicity, are not easily defined. As Gell-Mann 
postulated, it would take a number of quantities, differently defined, to cover all our intuitive 
notions of the meaning of these two concepts, as each quantity would be somewhat context-
dependent (Gell-Mann, 1996). Simple priorities in the context of trauma include getting patients‘ 
airways, their breathing and their circulation stabilized, and if chest tubes are needed, providing 
them, giving patients fluids if needed, and trying to get a CT scan if patients become stable 
enough for the procedure. The essence of complexity is the way these priority patterns change 
with each patient and become vastly more complex, which takes physicians back to the pattern 
recognition concept. What are being prioritized are the A, B, and Cs, which stand for airway, 
breathing, and circulation; and trying to fit very complex situations into patterns that have been 
seen before, which, when it can be done, can really help simplify very chaotic situations. 
EMAP-1: It really calls for a lot of subjective thought, unfortunately, because it‘s not an 
objective method. Your personal biases could easily obscure your abilities to fit it into the 
appropriate pattern. That‘s one thing we have to be careful about.  
What physicians, then, are trying to accomplish is to take these complex boundaries 
between orderly and chaotic behavior of the human body (system) and understand the factors 
that control its behavior during those short minutes of the golden hour from the point of the 
initial trauma. This tests physicians‘ empirical knowledge to its limits.  
Typically, physicians in complex situations rely upon pattern recognition discussed in the 
previous sections, looking at the patient and interpreting all the available information in light of 
the kind of patient that they think they have in front of them. At the onset of the trauma code, 
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physicians do a quick run-through of the data as the patient arrives. In looking at the patient, the 
physician mentally places him/her in a bin of the kind of patient that he/she is, then mentally 
steps back a little from the action to see the results. The problem is when things start to go 
wrong, problems emerge, and physicians fail to repeat that pattern recognition process and 
question whether the patient was put into the correct bin. Often when this happens, the data of 
the situation have changed but the physicians are involved in something else and have not 
recognized that changes occurred. In this regard one physician said,  
EMAP-3: That can be really stressful, if you don‘t realize that‘s happening and you 
recognize that the situation is going bad and you aren‘t really sure why. Because the 
patient seemed like this kind of person who should be better now because of the things 
that you did because they were [categorized as] this kind of patient. And so really, I think 
you just try to again pattern-recognition batch them so that you hope your intuitive 
decisions will be more appropriate and what kind of bin you put them into is kind of 
more of the scientific evidence based and experience based. That‘s where that applies 
initially. As you get more data you may apply more of an analytic approach to that 
patient, but mostly it‘s just intuitive.   
One important observation made while shadowing the attending physicians was that it is 
unusual for leading trauma physicians to be far from agreement because one person is generally 
firmly in charge of the team. Unless the lead physician recommends a medical procedure that the 
team members think is really crazy, the team will usually go along. Typically, if the attending 
physician in charge does run into something that has the potential for disagreement, their training 
and experience allow them to take a minute to lay out the situation and get team members‘ input. 
Therefore, the leading trauma physician can usually move forward in a direction in which people 
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have at least relatively significant agreement. Trauma physicians typically in chaotic situations 
move again into an intuitive model in which they are going to make decisions based on what is 
going to be good for that patient based on the kind of patients they are categorized as being.  
The thing that helps trauma physicians the most is the experience of having dealt with a 
lot of really sick patients and complex situations where the diagnosis is not certain and the data is 
not certain. The attending physician provided the following comment:  
EMAP-3:  Really the only way to do that is [1] experience in one way or another through 
[2] simulation or actually [3] seeing patients. In our model of medical education, we 
usually deal with actually seeing patients in a supervised setting. Where things get really 
difficult is when a patient never falls into a pattern and all you have is data that you can‘t 
model into some pattern and those are really stressful just because you have to deal with 
each piece of data without any structure and that is hard.   
In this complex adaptive process of dealing with ill-structured problems that quickly 
move to the edge of chaos before the problem is solved, everything can also go back to the 
thresholds of decision-making already discussed. If the physician looks up and sees the patient‘s 
BP at 60 mmHg, regardless of the resources available the decision to send the patient to OR is 
immediate. There are certain critical thresholds that, when crossed, rise to the top so forcefully 
that nothing else matters. Trauma physicians then default to a habit/algorithm/stepwise approach 
to remove some of the thinking from the situation (i.e., ABCDEs, checklist). Having a checklist 
in place prior to encountering a patient removes any ad hoc decision-making. Physicians practice 
these decision checklists during their training in order to be able to default to them in stressful 
situations. Thus, what helps physicians in this complex environment in order to avoid chaotic 
situations are the checklists and some degree of experience in applying them. However, 
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physicians are not certain what the mix of those two are or should be. The closer one gets to 
chaos, the more experience comes into play, because at that point things are moving outside the 
realm of what the checklist covers. Obviously, it would not be chaos if the decision-making 
checklist covered it. If there were a checklist available to cover the situation, it would still be 
falling under rational or analytical decision-making.  
5.9 Determining Patients’ Priorities  
Emergency physicians are constantly involved in making decisions: whether to order a 
lab report, an x-ray, an EKG, or ordering one procedure versus others as a strong possible 
solution to the problem at hand. The European Journal of Trauma reported a case of a car 
accident where the occupant of the car broke the right clavicle and the tenth and eleventh ribs on 
the same side. The patient was admitted to the hospital, kept for 24 hours for observation, and 
sent home shortly after that. Two days later the patient was back in the ED with generalized 
abdominal pain associated with nausea and vomiting, which kept the patient in the hospital for 
five days. Initial ultrasound and CT scan did not result in discovering the problems, but 
subsequent CT scans and other tests revealed the problems: duodenal hematoma and blunt 
abdominal trauma.  A more appropriate diagnostic course of action was then planned for the 
patient (Barry, 2006).  
The prioritization of tests to determine the extent of injuries and detect them all is a 
constant in a trauma physician‘s life. Basically, any time a patient is a Level 1 or 2 trauma codes, 
based on trauma ―rules‖ these patients are always going to get a CT of the chest, abdomen, and 
pelvis. The chest/abdomen CT administered in the above case would probably have detected the 
duodenal hematoma and blunt abdominal trauma the first time around. Perhaps not with 100% 
certainty, but with high probability. Physicians at the site of this study take virtually any patient 
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who has received any type of severe injury (this case probably would have classified with a 
clavicle and two rib fractures) and practically without thinking get a CT of the chest, abdomen 
and pelvis. These types of injuries require following the protocols for getting all the tests. It is an 
effort to take complex situations and subject them to the same routine every time in order not to 
miss things like this. 
There are situations wherein certain preliminary information directs a physician down 
one path of suspicion versus another diagnostically. It is a matter of medical judgment where 
physicians mentally categorize and count on prior decision-making schemas. In the presence of 
further data from the trauma event, the schema can supply descriptions of certain aspects of the 
real world, predictions of events that are likely to happen in the real world, and prescriptions for 
behavior of the complex adaptive system. By looking at two broken ribs and a broken right 
clavicle, deductively or intuitively it will be assumed that this patient could potentially be sick; 
therefore, this patient will get a lot of tests because this patient is significantly injured.  Trauma 
physicians do not think about it, especially when dealing with a car crash as the mechanism of 
injury; they just do it. The human body in car crashes tends to sustain injuries not only directly 
from the impact but also from the combination of acceleration and deceleration forces on his or 
her body.  Despite very little external evidence of injury, internally there might be serious 
damage and stress to tissues that will complicate the entire scenario.   
These are the kinds of things trauma physicians must deal with when trauma cases first 
arrive. Sometimes it does not sound like a particular patient would need to be considered a 
trauma code. These patients are some of the many people who are in auto accidents yet who are 
nevertheless not trauma codes. In such cases, it is the mechanism of injury that becomes the main 
variable.  It answers the question of how bad the catastrophe was that caused the injury. 
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Mechanism of injury is always regarded as one of the main variables to consider in trauma 
codes. Biomechanics plays an important role in injury mechanisms, especially in motor vehicle 
crashes. Physician understanding of the biomechanics of injury is considered of utmost 
importance in evaluating and treating trauma codes. According to the ATLS manual, the details 
of the injury event can provide clues to identifying 90% of a patient‘s injuries (Fildes, 2008). 
Any patient that had no abdominal tenderness and no external abdominal signs of trauma would 
not have had a CT-scan, which would be the test that would diagnose such injuries. According to 
EMAP-3, patients with broken clavicles and ribs are particularly known to be difficult to 
diagnose, but they are also relatively rare, so the case reported by the European Journal of 
Trauma is not really an unusual outcome.  
This goes to the question of how much testing is appropriate for trauma patients, which 
was the initial question. Trauma physicians have to go with pattern recognition and previous 
experience to be able to recognize the exceptions to the rule. Patients that do not look very 
injured do not get a lot of tests. Yet many times there are conditions that the physician intuitively 
knows are exceptions to the rule, and more tests are requested for those patients. In all these 
decisions, physicians also need to weigh the potential harms of over-testing people by making 
diagnoses of conditions which are not important but for which they are going to receive a lot of 
extra tests. Consider for instance the following case:  
EMAP-3: I had a patient that other day, who a specialist had ordered a CT scan of the 
neck, which I thought was relatively unnecessary. And there was an incidental finding 
which was unimportant but probably led to a lot of extra testing to diagnose [something] 
that in fact is not important. That was a case in which the test probably was not necessary 
and the outcome of the test was not good for the patient. And, then there is the actual 
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expense of extra testing, which is not insignificant. We, as custodians of the health care 
system, have to realize that. And then the harms, potential physical harms of the tests—
which most of these are radiation-based studies, and many of them involve contrast dye, 
which is potentially bad for your kidneys.  So it‘s not a small thing to decide to do them.   
In a trauma center, especially for Level 1 and 2 trauma codes, a lot of those decisions 
have been decided before-hand for the trauma physician. A Level 1 trauma code is always going 
to get these kinds of laboratory studies and then extra ones if, in the physicians‘ judgment, the 
extra tests are needed. For the trauma center environment, the usefulness of these tests has 
already been decided by the medical profession, as represented by government agencies, the 
American College of Surgeons, the Medical Association, and the physicians as a group. 
Physicians may decide to make exceptions, but generally speaking those tests are going to 
happen. It is decision-making involving discordance between what physicians are seeing, what 
physicians expect to find, and what is actually found that triggers the physicians to go down a 
different diagnostic path.  
5.10 Trauma Gestalt 
An Emergency Department (ED) in a healthcare system also houses trauma centers (TC), 
with all of their ramifications for staffing and care. It has to have physicians and nurses who are 
trained to work in an emergency department and to take care of sick patients with any type of 
illness and any age group.  Therefore, EM physicians cannot be an expert on only one kind of 
medicine, such as pediatrics, orthopedics, or any of the other 63 specialties. These physicians 
have to be able to deal with all types of problems, at least enough to get patients stabilized, do an 
initial or secondary assessment and get the initial diagnostic process going. The ED also has to 
maintain that infrastructure in readiness 24 hours a day; it cannot just be part of the day. It must 
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also have enough ancillary resources to allow the physician to do the appropriate diagnostic 
testing, and physicians (not just emergency physicians) who are willing to come in on call and 
see a trauma patient 24 hours a day. The healthcare organization must maintain on the premises 
or on call a surgeon and a fully equipped operating room to take care of those patients.  
The main factors that make an ED program with its trauma centers very successful are 
money and other resources. It is of utmost importance to have the CT scanners, x-ray equipment 
(both portable and non-portable), well trained RNs and an educational infrastructure to teach the 
nurses and the physicians.  It is necessary to have the ability to reimburse physicians well enough 
that they want to stay up in the middle of the night seeing very sick patients. And there has to be 
the whole hospital infrastructure to support all of that. Trauma centers, then, require a lot of 
training and resources—and serious commitment from their leadership.   
At the site of this research, the organization and support was visible in every aspect of the 
ED. The major strength was that the hospital puts a lot of resources into the trauma system. 
There are a lot of committed people, and there is a lot of really good training for all the medical 
personnel. The weakness is that the whole health care system is changing so quickly that it is 
uncertain whether the present amount of resources is still going to be available to put into the 
system and continue to make it function well enough to respond to future demands. The ability to 
keep up with the present volume of sick patients that are seeking services is in balance at the 
moment; but, hard times are anticipated if the present level of services will be required into the 
future. The whole process of health care reform, changes in the healthcare economy, and the 
stability of the global economy are going to dictate the direction trauma care will take.    
To compound the problem of caring for the injured, there are the malingering patients 
consuming ED resources. It is hard to tell who that patient is who is malingering. He might be 
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malingering; he might be someone who is really sick. There have been mistakes made before 
where the medical team determined someone was malingering but they turned out to be sick and 
the outcome was not good. The alternative is to take everyone seriously, regardless of 
appearances, no matter what the problems or complaints, which is one of the hard parts of 
medicine. The ED personnel have to assume they are sick.  
Generally, the program affects everybody in a positive way. It gives physicians, nurses, 
technicians and staff immediate feedback on their failings as well as encouragement for jobs 
done well. It provides constant training and a system to fit into.  The members of the program are 
respected because the results achieved are not coming out solely from the physicians or trauma 
surgeons or the nurses or the x-ray technicians. The results are achieved by everyone working 
together in the trauma system.  Going back to the initial paragraph as to why these professionals 
chose EM as career, the biggest reason they work in a trauma ED is that they get to work with a 
team of very highly educated people—highly educated nurses and doctors. In contrast, in a clinic 
they would be working by themselves in a lot of ways, instead of working as they are now with a 
large team of very smart, assertive people. 
One of the most significant problems in trauma medicine is that a lot of trauma 
management has become non-operative. In other words, for many trauma patients an operation is 
not needed. ―For a lot of abdominal injuries and chest injuries that currently we manage through 
other methods, you used to have surgery,‖ says EMAP-3. Yet the current trauma center model 
relies on the immediate availability of surgeons. One of the problems created by this expectation 
of surgical management is that there are significant rural areas that do not have immediate 
availability of trauma surgeons, so those patients need to be transported to a trauma center in a 
timely manner. This involves either helicopter transport or ground ambulance transport. In any 
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case, the movement to a treatment center from outlying areas is prolonged. EMAP-3 pointed out 
that, ―There is a need to kind of decide better how to decide when surgeons are needed and also 
if there is a better way to move patients to trauma centers, or to move trauma centers to the 
patient.‖ Three questions of crucial interest emerged:  
1. Is it more appropriate to really make an effort to have trauma surgeons in outlying 
areas that may not have every other resource available but could do initial surgical 
trauma management?  
2. Do surgeons have to be in tertiary centers with every subspecialty available?  
3. Is that really what a trauma center has to be?  
These are questions of crucial interest for future research in trauma medicine.  
The trauma center and the ED where the shadowing and discussions with all physicians 
took place have a commitment to high-quality clinical medicine and teaching. The hospital 
school works hard to make sure the physician residents are the best all around, teaching 
professionalism and clinical competence as ED residents as well as hospital residents. The 
volume of patients, which exceeds 3,600 trauma cases and more than 100,000 emergency cases 
yearly, makes these physicians truly excellent professionals. The ED takes lots of referrals from 
neighboring states, ―so we see lots of weird things,‖ says EMAP-3. It is just natural in the 
development of cognitive processes that when one sees ―lots of weird things,‖ the pattern 
recognition repertoire gets bigger. Another important strength of this ED is that it has high-
quality ancillary staff (i.e., nurses and technicians). For instance, the ED maintains true, fully 
trained charge nurse positions. The charge nurse is in charge of trauma codes, working side by 
side with the attending physician who is heading the ED for the shift. The triage nurses group is 
made up of the more experienced nurses who are specifically trained to triage. EMAP-3  
115 
explained the importance of the triage, ―You want those nurses to be experienced because, again, 
they are also going to make intuitive decisions about patients that may not necessarily be 
supported by the data about how sick that patient is.‖ It is crucial for these triage nurses to have 
an informed patterned recognition buffer to make those at-the-edge decisions.   
The study site is a fairly typical, traditional ED in that there is a significant amount of 
ambulance-based traffic and a significant amount of walk-in traffic. This is also an academic ED 
in that there are resident trainees who see the vast majority of these patients under the 
supervision of the attending physicians. The emergency medicine attending physician (EMAP) 
almost always does a more limited evaluation then they would do if they were in private practice. 
This is acceptable and necessary for the training of the residents. While from the patient‘s 
perspective, it would be ideal to see just one physician at the level of an attending physician, 
every EMAP sees to it that patients get that level of care, even when they see the resident first.  
5.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter covered a very large number of topics that are crucial to decision-making in 
an environment where decision makers are under stress. It covered a wide range of topics, 
ranging from pattern recognition, clinical judgment, and exploring decision-making 
systematically to information overload, cognitive demands, and the complexity of trauma events 
from the standpoint of complex adaptive systems. Observations, shadowing, and open-ended 
questions were the tools used to understand how physicians make decisions in the stressful 
environment of trauma centers. These tools provided a unique way to understand medical 
decision-making processes and how physicians approach the very difficult task of saving 
someone‘s life when only little or partial knowledge is available at the onset of the trauma event. 
These EMAPs demonstrated the ability to make broad but fundamental decisions regarding a 
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sick or multiply injured human being. Trauma physicians know what they want to achieve and 
how to focus their knowledge and experience on the event at hand.  
Physicians, as expert decision-makers in their fields, are predisposed to make clinical 
judgments implicitly as well as being inclined to make decisions and clinical judgments on a 
more intuitive basis. Of paramount importance is pattern recognition, which helps physicians in 
solving difficult problems when all that is available are data that cannot be easily modeled, 
making the situation truly stressful. Physicians store those patterns in the form of precepts and 
they act on the basis of those precepts by somehow forming inner mental representations of outer 
reality, then acting on the basis of those representations. Thus, experience helps physicians in 
this complex environment to avoid chaotic situations. The closer physicians get to chaos, the 
more experience plays a role in problem-solving. In making sense out of chaos, a trauma team 
goes back to the simple and the complex by fitting very complex situations into very simple 
priorities, such as the ABCDEs. A Level 1 trauma resuscitation case places heavy cognitive 
demands on physicians because TCs are complex, shifting and emergent task environments. An 
increasing emphasis is placed on physicians‘ performance in complex situations, requiring 
improved communications, teamwork and coordination. The unpredictability of trauma systems 
and the difficulty of collecting needed data were stressed because there are so many tangible and 
intangible, known and unknown variables. Physicians in trauma centers exercise great leadership 
because they care about emergency medicine very deeply. In the process of caring for the very 
sick or seriously injured, these physicians exploit many types of information processing for 
effective strategies to come up with plausible decision-making solutions for the patient‘s 




Results and Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
In this study, data was collected for a total of 17 trauma cases; five of these cases were 
excluded due to insufficient performance data. Of the twelve cases chosen, data from ten of these 
cases were used to be used in the model for ―Decision-Making Process Under Stress‖ for a 
training process. Two of the cases were used for the actual classification for the likelihood that 
an observation belongs to one decision-making class or another. The resulting output was the 
generation of a confusion matrix (CM) by means of the Bayesian classifier and a process graph 
using a deconvolution operator. Both were derived with parameters that modeled the cognitive 
performance of the physicians‘ decision-making processes.  
The two trauma cases were selected and used in the model ―Decision-Making Process 
Under Stress‖ (DMPUS) for achieving the greatest understanding of how physicians make 
decisions under stress. The cases were discussed for verification of the results with a physician at 
the trauma center site. The results align very close to how physicians think during trauma events, 
giving a better insight into how physicians make decisions.     
1. Case 1: The patient arrived at the trauma center transported by EMS, with multiple 
gunshot wounds to the lower extremity. The trauma team was around the patient at 
the bedside, simultaneously evaluating to determine the type and extent of injury 
and subsequent management of the region of the body that was injured, the organs 
in the path of the penetrating bullet, and the velocity of the bullet. Technicians with 
portable X-ray machines were called in for x-rays.  
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2. Case 2: The patient arrived at the trauma center with chest stab wounds with an 
unknown size of knife. It was not possible to immediately assess how deep the 
wounds were and whether vital organs had been punctured. Although the patient‘s 
condition initially showed marginal improvement, when reassessed by the 
emergency physician the impression was that the patient was not improving.  
Further history was taken and after more trauma center care, the patient was 
transferred to the operating room to be cared for by trauma surgeons. 
During the study period, physicians were observed while attending to critically injured or 
extremely sick patients in the trauma center. As patients arrived, physicians were formulating 
decisions and plans of action. Throughout Case 1 events, gunshot wounds, many decisions were 
made in split seconds. Some decisions inherent to traumas like Case 1 must be made rapidly and 
executed promptly. These decisions, which must be made in the midst of immediate stressors, 
may be outlined as follows:  
1. Mechanism of injury – bullet entrance and exit sites 
2. Bullet caliber and velocity of the projectile 
a. High-velocity wounds may cause increased damage lateral to the track of the 
projectile due to temporary cavitation 
b. Care must be taken not to underestimate the amount of energy delivered in high-
velocity wounds. 
c. Appropriate actions must be taken to prevent missed injuries. 
3. Internal bleeding 
a. Must take blood pressure very often 
b. Attention to patient‘s abdomen as to whether it becomes taut 
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c. Attentive to temporary cavitation 
4. Additional injuries based upon 
a. The length of the projectile‘s path 
b. The greater kinetic energy 
c. Linear or nonlinear trajectory of the bullet between entrance and exit 
d. The possibility of ricochet off of bony structures 
e. Possible fragmentation of bones creating secondary projectiles 
f. Vascular problems 
5. Patient‘s medical history 
a. Importantly, is patient on some type of blood thinner? 
6. Visually identify sites of major external bleeding. 
7. Continuously visually assess the extremities for color and perfusion, other wounds, 
deformity, swelling and discoloration or bruising.   
8. Assess four important body organs/systems 
a. Skin 
b. Neuromuscular function 
c. Circulatory status 
d. Skeletal and ligaments integrity 
9. Review for other musculoskeletal injuries 
10. Examine for limb-threatening injuries 
a. Possible major arterial vascular injury 
b. Need for immediate consultation with a surgeon  
11. Securing blood from blood bank if needed 
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12. Is the shooter in custody?  
a. Should ED be locked up? 
b. Is the medical team safe? 
c. Should hospital security or the police be called? 
These are many of the decisions made during a trauma event of this type, because the type of 
surgical procedure that may follow is definitely influenced by these decisions. There are many 
types of medical and other decisions taking place at these times, and, depending on the patient‘s 
physical condition, stage of illness or age, there might be a set of different decisions.  This 
differential decision-making process is the substance of developing trauma codes. 
In Case 2, a series of decisions were formulated by physicians that included many of the 
same decisions as those necessary for gunshot wounds, as well as some decisions inherent to 
penetrating knife wounds to the chest. Physicians were making decisions on how to stop the 
bleeding, as in Case 1. However, they were also engaged in how to ascertain that internal organs 
were not affected and, if they were affected, what line of action might be taken to correct or 
minimize the problem. Among these decisions are: 
1. To seek the account of EMS or witnesses who can provide details of the incident, 
because this information helps in predicting injury patterns 
2. Developing an unusual index of suspicion about what affects the patient 
3. Determining whether the patient has any hemodynamic abnormalities 
4. Early and immediate surgical exploration (laparotomy) 
5. To see whether there was puncture of the pleura 
6. Lung puncture 
7. Whether to bring in respiratory technicians 
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8. Determine whether a CT-scan or X-ray is needed. Will they be revealing in this 
particular trauma case? 
9. Whether to do more evaluations or transfer the patient to a more appropriate level 
of care for severe injuries that have already been identified 
There are also many other decisions which are common to both cases that can or seem to 
be procedural and almost automatic, but they are not. These are decisions regarding when to 
record vital signs, such as blood pressure, level of oxygenation, heartbeat, respiratory rates, body 
temperature and environmental temperature, as well as who will collect this data, and the 
assignment of a CPR expert to be present throughout the assessment period, among several 
others. At the least, these seemingly merely procedural decisions will increase the noise of the 
environment, causing physicians to have to deal with a lot more distraction and information. In 
addition to the procedural domain, physicians in trauma centers also have to deal with the 
affective domain, that is, all of the emotions emanating from medical staff, patients and relatives 
of the patients. These are environmental noises that convolute decision-making processes; they 
can easily blur the physicians‘ minds. 
In terms of simulation output, the two cases were different in the manner in which the 
physicians handled each case. The physician‘s course of action initially can be easily followed 
because it is very procedural: x-rays are ordered, wounds are cleaned, first and second 
assessment as required in trauma codes are performed—and all with clockwork precision. These 
procedural actions are automatic, ―tangible, well defined, and teachable‖ (Croskerry, 2000) and 
seem to be achievable without much thought, relying chiefly on training, experience, and prior 
authentic rehearsal of textbook techniques.  
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This study, however, was trying to make sense of the decisions as being rational, 
political, judgmental or intuitive – as defined in Chapter 3. While technicians was taking and 
developing x-rays and bringing the resulting reports to the physician for analysis, the physicians 
were making many decisions for the patient in the meantime, which might fall into any of these 
four decision categories. The process never stops because it cannot stop until the patient either is 
stabilized or has expired. Dr. Patrick Croskerry, a scientist and an emergency medicine medical 
doctor, wrote about three domains of expertise in emergency medicine that are required for 
effective performance in trauma situations, referring to these domains as procedural, affective 
and cognitive. His writings about decision-making in emergency medicine draw a sharp 
distinction between the three and attention to the fact that it may appear to outside observers, ―as 
well as to many within the medical profession,‖ that the procedural is the most important of the 
three domains. However, his assertion is that most of the emergency physician‘s time is engaged 
in ―cognitive behavior‖ through actions and interactions with other medical personnel 
(Croskerry, 2000). The assertion in this study is that these cognitive behaviors define physicians‘ 
decision-making processes as being intuitive, judgmental or political. 
6.2 Results 
The model ―Decision-Making Process Under Stress‖ generated a confusion matrix and a 
deconvolution graph for each of two different study conditions applied to each of the two trauma 
codes.  There were a total number of 101 of four decision-making types in Case 1, of which 61 
were classified as rational, eight political, five judgment, and four intuitive decisions made. It 
resulted in 75.09% accuracy for all decisions made during the trauma case. In Case 2, the results 
were similar in that there were 68 rational, 7 political, 1 judgment, and 4 intuitive decisions 
made.  The resultant numbers from the CM that used data from the eight variables have been 
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summarized according to Case 1 and Case 2. Table 6.1 gives an outline of the time sequence of 
events for ―Case 1‖ and ―Case 2‖ regarding each ―decision-time-interval‖ (DTI). 
Table 6.1 
Sequence of Events of Trauma Cases 1 and 2 
Decision-Time-Intervals 
Case 1 Case 2 
Gunshot Wound Knife Stab 
Time DTI Time DTI 
04:39 DTI-1 03:10 DTI-1 
04:44 DTI-2 03:14 DTI-2 
05:01 DTI-3 03:18 DTI-3 
05:06 DTI-4 03:20 DTI-4 
05:37 DTI-5 03:24 DTI-5 
  03:28 DTI-6 
6.2.1 Trauma Case 1 – Study Condition 1.   The first study condition used sample data 
collected for the eight variables on a ―moment-per-moment‖ basis in trauma Case 1, referred to 
as ―decision-time-interval‖ (DTI). For each DTI, the data was run through the Matlab program 
model. During Case 1, there were five moment-per-moment decision time intervals, each 
referred to as DTI-1 through DTI-5 (see Table 6.1.)  For the first study condition of Case 1, 
Figure 6.1 provides the results of all five confusion matrices (CMs) that include the percentage 
of accuracy of all decisions made by the physician during the golden hour of the trauma code.  
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Figure 6.1. Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 1. 
These CMs are based on the Bayesian classifier which gives fairly accurate probabilities 
of likelihood that a decision was correctly made, assuming relevant variable inputs are known. In 
other words, it allows researchers (physicians) to combine new information, or data, from the 
noisy environment with their existing knowledge or expertise, which in turn provides a better 
approach to problem solving and better decision-making.  
Figure 6.2 gives the deconvolution graphing output for each DTI for the first study 
condition of Case 1, describing physicians‘ cognitive behavior during a trauma from a cognitive 
engineering approach. These graphs represent the evolution of the physician‘s thinking process 
for each moment of the trauma code, which is an approach to developing and evaluating a 
physician performance measurement system that leads to effective decision-making outcomes. 
Variations in the physician‘s decisions are conspicuous on the deconvolution graphs and are 
determined by experiences, preferences, choices, influences and a number of other human and 
non-human factors dictated by certain mechanisms such as emotions, environmental noises, 
physical condition of patients, and so on.  The graphs of Figures 6.2d and 6.2e show that the 
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medical team experienced a period of relative stability in which the next actions could be 
reasonably predicted, with perhaps little from the environment influencing the medical team‘s 
actions. It was only when environmental noise and increased information changed at a pace 
greater than the physician‘s decision-making threshold that the team encountered critical points 
that forced decision-making accuracy to be reduced.  
These graphs represent the variation in the physician‘s thought processes via the upward 
and downward movements of the graph lines, which establish its erratic nature as decisions 
proved to be stable or unstable. This was caused by the fact that trauma physicians do not have 
time to look for all relevant information and weigh every bit of information to decide on a course 
of action when every split second counts toward saving patients‘ lives. Moreover, these 
variations in essence illustrate the stressful moments of the trauma code; as the graph lines show, 
stress is never completely eliminated. The complexity of the system brought about by the team 
members‘ interactions and relationships were compounded by the team members‘ individual and 
collective behaviors that changed as a result of their involvement with the environment, created 
critical moments during which decision processes slowed down, even if just for fractions of 
seconds. Trauma physicians do not face a problem domain that is clearly bounded because 
human patients are individual systems that react differently one from another; therefore, each 
trauma case is unique and even ill-structured presenting a series of novel problems. 
Figure 6.2a illustrates that the incidence of the percentage of correct decisions at the 
onset of the trauma was 69%, which with some variations reached a peak of 77%, finally 
stabilizing at between 75% and 76% when the physicians de-blurred and made different 
decisions. Throughout Case 1, in the remaining graphs of Figure 6.2 (b, c, d, and e) decisions run 























Figure 6.2. Deconvolution graphs, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 2. 
In the first CM of Figure 6.1, the actual physician‘s decisions show 64 rational decisions 
that were correctly classified as rational decisions, two rational decisions that were incorrectly 
classified as political, one rational decision incorrectly labeled as judgment, and four rational 
    













































































































































































decisions incorrectly marked as intuitive decisions. The next row of the same CM shows three 
actual political decisions correctly classified as political, six political decisions incorrectly 
marked as rational, two political decisions incorrectly marked as judgment, and one political 
decision incorrectly labeled as intuitive. The third row of this CM shows four judgment decisions 
that were correctly classified as judgment, one judgment decision incorrectly labeled as rational, 
zero judgment decisions incorrectly labeled as political, and zero judgment decisions incorrectly 
labeled as intuitive. In the last row there were six intuitive decisions correctly classified as 
intuitive, six intuitive decisions marked as rational, one intuitive decision marked as political, 
and zero intuitive decisions that were marked as judgment. Consequently, in Figure 6.1, the CM 
system correctly predicted 64 rational decisions, three political, four judgment, and six intuitive 
decisions, for 74.0% accuracy. Following the same reasoning outlined above, the remaining four 
CMs of Figure 6.1 show 76.0%, 71.2%, 76.0%, and 77.9% accuracy. The rise in accuracy is due 
to physicians de-blurring their thought processes and making different decisions, bringing the 
percentage up to 77.9% from the previous lower level. These results have been graphically 
summarized in Figure 6.3.  
In this summary of the five confusion matrices for Case 1 reflected in Figure 6.3, each 
bar of the graph depicts the percentage of accurate decisions made by the physician during the 
trauma case and correctly classified by the Bayesian classifier. In decision-time interval one 
(DTI 1), the percentage of accuracy was 74%, and this accuracy increased to 76% during DTI 2, 
just to hit a critical decision-making point in DTI 3, as shown by the decrease in the accuracy 
rate of almost five percentage points, down to 71.2%.  As physicians de-noised their thought 




Figure 6.3. Summary of confusion matrices, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 1. 
Accompanying the summary of confusion matrices in Figure 6.3 are the deconvolution 
graphs presented in Figure 6.2, in which each of the five line graphs represents the physician‘s 
thought process for a moment during the trauma to arrive at a decision. Figure 6.2a shows a 
process that is unstable. This graph shows variations throughout the 15 iterations; but, it also 
shows that the deconvolution process reached an optimum at 77% of de-noising development 
during the first five iterations. However, the process stabilized at iteration ten, where it reached 
an optimum of 75% of de-noising. In Figure 6.2b, the results are perceptible as physicians 
approached the next moments of the trauma code with the first four iterations showing de-
noising results of 79%. Again, the process reached a critical decision-making point and 
environmental noise brought the process to a lower level of understanding that reached 75% at 
11 iterations and 74% at 15 iterations. The results of Study 1 helped in developing a more 
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comprehensive understanding of the complexities underlying decision-making by trauma 
physicians. 
6.2.2 Trauma Case 1 – Study Condition 2.   The same procedure was followed for 
Study 2 of Case 1, but, the data used were ―moment-upon-moment,‖ meaning that the data for 
DTI-1 and DTI-2 were entered together in Matlab to create both the confusion matrix and the 
deconvolution graph for those two decision time intervals. Next, it was the DTI-1 with DTI-2 
and DTI-3 sample data which were entered together in Matlab. It was continued in this manner 
to the end of the golden hour of the trauma case, always adding one more moment-per-moment 
(DTI) of the sample data to the end of Case 1. The resulting confusion matrices are shown in 
Figure 6.4, and the deconvolution graph outputs are shown in Figures 6.5a thru d.  
 
Figure 6.4. Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 2. 
Figure 6.5d is a graphical representation of the entire trauma event (DTI-1 through DTI-
5), at which point the physician had full knowledge of the entire case. It can be compared to 





















Figure 6.5. Deconvolution graphs, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 2. 
In this study, two of Case 1‘s participants, the CMs reported in Figure 6.4, have been 
summarized in Figure 6.6, where the accuracy rates were graphically compared to achieve a 
greater understanding of the decision maker‘s cognitive processes.  
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Figure 6.6. Summary of confusion matrices, Trauma Case 1, Study Condition 2. 
As shown in Figure 6.6, the accuracy of decisions made changed from 75% at the 
beginning of the trauma code to 73.1% mid-way stabilizing in the end at 75% accuracy. This 
75% accuracy can be compared to the deconvolution graph of Figure 6.5a in which the 
percentage of correct decisions reached a peak of 78%. It is evident that the decision makers 
encountered critical points, forcing their thinking processes to slow down in order to manage de-
blurring and an opportunity to make different decisions. The physician reached a slow moment 
in the decision-making process creating convolution at what seems to have been a critical point, 
while entering the next moments of the trauma, as shown in DTI 1-3 of Figure 6.5b. Critical 
points are serious indications of a time of struggle and differences of opinion, and they may 
indicate periods of cognitive disagreements among the medical team members (Goldstein, 2010). 
 However, critical points offer the medical team unique opportunities for successful 
transformation of the event through complex interactions, relationships and innovations that help 
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to define strategies for dealing with novel situations. This critical point caused a reduction in the 
percentage of correct decisions to 73.1%. The convolution could have been the result of higher 
environmental noise that required the physician to heavily focus attention under stress, perhaps 
because of novel knowledge characterized by the development of new patterns. Critical moments 
such as these often happen in trauma situations as the pace of events and the nature of the trauma 
require physicians to interrupt any on-going cognitive activity in order to address a more critical 
developing situation. Performance was markedly impaired for a few iterations, showing a steady 
decline to continue into the DTI 1-4 of Figure 6.5c before deconvolution took place. In 
addressing this new state, the deconvolution or de-noising during DTI 1-5 reached an optimum 
of 75% to allow physicians to make decisions with clear minds as observed in the last CM of 
Figure 6.4. The last two deconvolution graphs, (c) and (d) of Figure 6.5, provide clear evidence 
of thinking process improvements and the physicians‘ ability to achieve higher performances 
while under stress. This higher performance is shown in the significant results of Figure 6.5d, in 
which the entire trauma event (DTI-1 through DTI-5) is depicted to represent the physician‘s full 
knowledge of the entire case as the medical team reached its optimum. In this period of time, 
there was steady de-blurring and variations on the decision process occurring throughout the 15 
iterations, always, however, improving decisions and experiencing steadily upward stabilizing 
adjustments. 
The accuracy of a decision is compared to the physician‘s thresholds for that procedure, 
decision-making action, a particular disease, or an injury of the patient. An accuracy percentage 
that is a good approximation of the physician‘s threshold for the situation takes the process to the 
DMUS final result (refer to Figure 4.1 of Chapter 4). This is the physician‘s initial guess as to the 
diagnostic course of action. Assuming the resulting percentage of accuracy is reasonably within 
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the physician‘s threshold, the decision process is completed and the physician has reached the 
decision under stress. 
The important points observed for Condition 1 of Case 1were in the results of the 
deconvolution graphs.  As shown in Figure 6.5a, the percentage of correct decisions went from 
65% to 78% in five iterations and reduced to around 71% in four more iterations, stabilizing 
itself at 76% after four more iterations.  In other words, there was a critical moment in which the 
medical team came in contact with some critical information that blurred the physician‘s thought 
process, causing the decision-making process to slow down or be too noisy to decide the course 
of action, and this lasted for six iterations.  
Additionally, the graphs of Figures 6.5a, c, and d show similar reactions where decisions 
went up from 67% to 76% with some variations that brought correct decisions down to 73% 
before springing up and stabilizing again at 78% after the physician‘s de-blurring. Something 
happened that raised the physician‘s decision process to a different level. When little or no 
variation is observed in the graph lines, it means that the decision of the physician has reached its 
optimum because there is little variation between the physician‘s decision and the Bayesian 
classifier. Physician decision-makers have been trained in specific construct systems that enable 
them to view in many dimensions the problem or situation which their medical team is facing. It 
is important is that these constructs are adaptive and not static, since trauma physicians are part 
of a complex adaptive system that must be able to adapt in and evolve with a changing 
environment. As discussed in the previous sections, these constructs are, for the most part, 
confirmed by a pattern recognition process that matches the situation at hand with those in the 
physician‘s mental library of pattern recognition.  
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The confusion matrices of Figure 6.4 were summarized in Figure 6.6 for an easier 
interpretation of the decision-making process for Study 2 of Case 1. Evidence regarding the 
decision-making activities of these physicians is indicated by the percentage of accuracy 
achieved throughout the trauma. 
6.2.3 Trauma Case 2 – Study Condition 1.   The second trauma case was several 
minutes longer in duration. The same procedure outlined for Case 1 was applied for Study 1 and 
Study 2 of Case 2. The results for Case 2 were six CMs for Study 1 and five CMs for Study 2. 
This is illustrated in Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.10, respectively. Further, the resulting 
deconvolution graphs for Study 1 and Study 2 of Case 2 are shown in Figures 6.8 and 6.11, 
respectively. This combination of CMs and deconvolution graphs is important for making sense 
of the physician‘s thinking processes, because it is a strong way to visually depict the decision-
making process. It allows for rapid comparison of the physician‘s mental models with the reality 
of the trauma situation.  In Figure 6.7 of Study 1, note the robust results of all six CMs. At the 
start of the trauma code, the physician‘s accuracy was 75% in the first ―decision-time-interval‖ 
(DTI-1). The accuracy improved as the trauma code gained momentum, reaching 77.9% during 
the next DTI-2, and improving once more to 82.7% in DTI-3. Physicians encountered some 
critical moments during the next two intervals as accuracy dropped 7.7% to 75%. However, 
accuracy went up to 78.8% in the last CM. These CMs for Study 1 of Case 2 have been 
graphically summarized in Figure 6.8.  The deconvolution graphs of Figure 6.9 demonstrates the 
ability of the trauma medical team to approach complex situations, raise new questions, use 
proximity, time, and perceive the consequences of actions taken.  
135 
 
Figure 6.7. Confusion matrices, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 1. 
 

















Figure 6.9. Deconvolution graphs, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 1. 
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The deconvolution graphs of Figure 6.9 show a much more stable process. However, 
these graphs still show that stress permeated the physician‘s mental schemas at each moment of 
the trauma code, as demonstrated by the variations in the graph lines, corresponding to the most 
critical moments. The improvements are clear at each of the iterations. The graphs show erratic 
behavior due to stress and environmental noises, but, results always improved as time progressed 
from DTI-1 to DTI-6.  All six graphs of Figure 6.9 show that the physician had a strong sense of 
his/her ability to position cognitive resources optimally and to remain task oriented in spite of the 
critical moments that were present in all iterations. These difficulties were the source of the 
stress encountered during the performance of the trauma procedures. The percentage of correct 
decisions oscillated from a low of 64% to a high of 86%, finally settling at 80% at the end of the 
golden hour.  The last deconvolution graph, Figure 6.9d, shows the de-blurring that brought 
decisions from 77% down to 73% at what seemed a critical moment in the trauma. It should be 
noted that once again physicians de-blurred their decision-making processes and made new 
decisions and judgments to determine a new course of action, causing the percentage of correct 
decisions to go up and stabilize at 82%. Intriguingly, understanding the critical moments in 
trauma cases is probably one of the major considerations for the physician, making his or her 
mental process at those times the most valuable asset in forming their diagnostic impressions and 
impelling the actions of the entire trauma team.  
6.2.4 Trauma Case 2 – Study Condition 2.   The results of the CMs in Figure 6.10 
show that at the start of trauma Case 2 decisions had slowed down, having an accuracy at both 
DTI 1-2 and DTI 1-3 of 76.9%. Results were improved in DTI 1-5, reaching 79.8% accuracy and 
regressed in DTI 1-6 to 76.9% just as at the beginning of the trauma case.  These CMs have been 
summarized in Figure 6.11, which gives a better visualization of the entire accuracy level of this 
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case. In the CM for DTI-5, in which the percentage dropped to 76.9%, the decrease can be 
attributed to a critical moment.  At this very instant, as observed, the medical team must have 
received some critical information that blurred the physician‘s thought processes, causing his 
decision-making process to slow down or be too noisy. These are the moments where intuition 
and pattern recognition approaches take first seat in decision-making. However, physicians are 
careful about the over-use of pattern recognition because, despite the fact that often it provides 
the correct answer, ―it occasionally fails, sometimes catastrophically‖ (Croskerry, 2009).  The 
characteristics and capacities of the medical team members influence the strategies that should 
be examined or decisions made by the medical team while at the edge of a critical event.    
  




Figure 6.11. Summary confusion matrices, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 2. 
Referring to the deconvolution graphs (a through e) of Figure 6.12, each offers the 
possibility of a clinically plausible series of stressful moments which caused many variations. 
The third deconvolution graph, labeled ―(d) Case 2 Study 2 DTI 1-4,‖ shows significant 
variations with constant de-blurring, but always trending upward improvement, achieving 81% 
before settling at the level of 79%. The knowledge required to derive an appropriate decision is 
not quite straightforward in trauma events because sometimes the fast pace and graphical nature 
of the occurrence affects information retrieval. However, there is an intuitive appeal in thinking 
that the physician‘s cognitive processes can significantly affect performance and lead to 
strategies that result in correct decisions. The final decision for this case was to transfer the 




















Figure 6.12. Deconvolution graphs, Trauma Case 2, Study Condition 2. 
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6.3 Discussion  
In presenting the philosophy of science while considering the methodological questions 
that arise in the context of observation, Wartofsky (1968) argued that:  
“Any descriptive utterance, any observation statement, is already a hypothesis; and 
further, that every such hypothesis already carries with it a matrix of relevance which guides us 
to engage in those tests of experience which we take to support or to fail to support this 
hypothesis.”  
The overarching objective of this research was to understand the manner in which 
physicians make decisions under the stress of trauma situations and to help explain their thought 
processes. Physicians must rely on more than technical skill or textbook knowledge to get 
through the golden hour of a trauma event. Most of the situations faced by physicians in trauma 
cases cannot be decided on an empirical basis alone. Ultimately, they require having an 
understanding of the complexities of the case, an appreciation of the fact that individual humans 
react to injuries and sickness in different ways, and an awareness that affective emotions can 
sometimes run high.  
Emotional reactions often have the potential to interfere in the trauma team‘s abilities to 
function at full capacity. As was observed and perceived during the observation period, there 
were children, young adults, older adults and elderly patients with serious injuries and sickness 
that included a broken cranium, heart failure and even gunshot wounds, all of which caused the 
emergency department to be locked up. All these events not only affected the trauma team‘s 
ability to function, because these medical professionals are feeling human beings, themselves, 
but also threatened the trauma team‘s safety. The various systems physicians use to go about 
caring for the severely injured or sick are generally not the basis upon which they make 
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decisions. Instead, good decisions are made when a good balance has been achieved between the 
information acquired during the trauma case and an appropriate methodology used to assess it.  
Looking at the statistics arising from the deconvolution graphs gives some insight as to 
why, in trauma codes, no one can expect decision-making to follow any given known parameter. 
This combination of CM and deconvolution graph is a clear way to visually represent the 
decision-making process. It allows for rapid comparison of the physician‘s cognitive process, the 
reality of the case and the utilization of a number of information processing strategies in order to 
decide on a course of action. This type of decision-making in such environments is by its very 
nature complex, in spite of physicians‘ knowledge of the human organism‘s life-growth-self 
reproduction-self regulation-death cycle. The knowledge of this cycle tends to somewhat reduce 
the complexity. However, each member of the trauma team‘s physical experiences of the case, 
such as sight, touch, hearing and smell, generate a phenomenal range of decision-making 
assumptions that might be radically different from those of the other members. Therefore, 
evolvement and adaptation are truly fundamental processes within some theoretical framework 
in a decision-making process. As the deconvolution graph line variations illustrate, physicians 
are acting spontaneously and trusting each other‘s intuition, knowledge and judgment in making 
decisions under stress. 
Rational decision-making in environments such as trauma centers is far from being 
perfectly deductively rational, and physicians admit that there is some level of uncertainty. 
Pattern recognition, among many other important tools, was discussed in Chapter 5 as one of the 
models that emergency physicians have relied upon to deal with uncertainty and make decisions 
about situations encountered in trauma. These emergency physicians throughout their careers 
increase their capacity to recognize unfamiliar situations as familiar ones, as well as increase 
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their abilities to decide on courses of actions for present situations by recognizing patterns that fit 
the present emergency. It is that ability of expert physicians to see things using their vast library 
of knowledge that inexperienced decision-makers cannot see which makes these decision makers 
exceptional. But, in trauma codes, these physicians are working in teams, and as the case 
unfolds, the pattern recognition may change for each member of the team. Each member sees the 
picture from a different angle, and one ―must distinguish between the continuous seeing and the 
dawning of an aspect‖ (Wittgenstein, 1953 p. 193-194). Ultimately, each team member reports 
their perception of what they believe to be the actual problem at hand, and this sharing 
contributes to changing their perceptions and de-blurring their mental models. Wittgenstein 
points out that different concepts touch at a single point and coincide over a stretch and ―seeing-
as‖ is altogether a process of seeing and thinking, in which ambiguity escapes the agent 
altogether (Wittgenstein, 1953 p. 194-195). 
Croskerry (2000) recognized that an emergency physician‘s thinking while making 
clinical decisions is of the inductive type, and its nature and limitations need to be understood. It 
is possible for a patient to arrive at an ED with certain symptoms and be diagnosed with an 
ailment, and the next arriving patient with the same symptoms may be similarly diagnosed while 
a more serious condition may be missed. The results of the model suggest that physicians in EDs 
were more likely, in the face of novelty during trauma events, to incrementally revise and modify 
their thinking strategies in order to optimize performance and avoid the kind of situation just 
described. Therefore, it shows the natural adaptability and evolution of the system in creating 
opportunities for physicians to de-blur their thinking processes and produce a more seamless 
transition in structuring their decisions.  
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On the other hand, physicians often have only fragmentary data or information cues about 
trauma patients upon their arrival at a trauma center. Still they try, for the most part successfully, 
to arrive at an internal schema, a mental model of the problem and its solutions. It was referred to 
above and in the previous section as ―optimizing performance‖ and as decisions that have 
―reached an optimum.‖ Most trauma cases are blurred with fragmented data. In this real 
environment of trauma medicine blurred with fragmented data, the options are almost unlimited 
in a given instance in which all events occur and small errors can be proved catastrophic. There 
is no way a physician can find an optimum or even recognize it in the face of incomplete data 
and such a chaotic and fast-changing environment. In such environments, measurement can 
never be as perfect as in textbooks. However, it can be seen from the deconvolution graphs that 
physicians‘ mental models reach an optimum equilibrium after arising, sometimes overshooting 
variations on a straight line, upward or downward in a zigzag manner before either stabilizing at 
a certain percentage of accurate decisions or reaching the border of chaos. The paradox here is 
that just because one physician knows, understands or is quite well-versed in some procedure, no 
one can expect that it will go well when a similar situation presents itself.  
Emergency physicians get into these situations often, insofar as they see a lot of patients 
in a given period of time, but during the following period of time, in spite of the fact that the new 
patient arrivals have similar conditions, they may have very different reactions to those 
conditions as compared to the previous patients. The deconvolution graph line variations show 
decision makers during trauma events incrementally and persistently revising and modifying 
their strategies to optimize results. This constant revision causes physicians to select and use the 
cognitive strategy of asking questions of knowledgeable other people, and their answers trigger 
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metacognitive experiences about how the endeavor is faring, activating as result a deliberate, 






Contributions and Future Work 
7.1 Research Summary 
It has been argued that “From the standpoint of clinical reasoning, it is disconcerting 
that clinicians often are unaware of, or have little insight into, their thinking processes” 
(Croskerry & Norman, 2008, p. s24-s29).  
Emergency physicians are trained to integrate medical knowledge acquired through years 
of experience with everyday novel situations. The novel situations that present in a trauma center 
(TC) are especially likely to occur in situations that require and stimulate a lot of careful, highly 
conscious thinking and cognitive input together with a strong medical knowledge base for 
clinical decision-making. These situations help us to develop a richer understanding of trauma 
medical teams during the actual performance of their functions in a trauma center. The medical 
team itself might end up having to be characterized not only by a narrow time frame (the golden 
hour period) but also by the manner in which these teams respond to each event, because from 
one night to the next, the team might look very different in terms of who is working, how they all 
work together and what leadership styles exist. 
The trauma medical team is in a real struggle to save someone‘s life, and there are 
medical procedure skills acquired through years of training, in addition to algorithms provided 
by the healthcare system, that teams have learned to apply to each trauma situation. With high 
levels of experience, these skills become almost automatic. But the fact remains that in this 
struggle for life or death, formal procedures are in most cases not sufficient or adequate to 
solving ambiguous and uncertain problems. It is the difference between formal structure and 
informal structure. Trauma centers may be considered informal as they are composed of 
147 
specialists (i.e., physicians) who, for the most part, are autonomous agents of the hospital who 
are trying to make sense of what is going on around them. There are continuously decisions 
being made that feed into this trauma system. The key is to understand that these decisions are 
driven by intrinsic rational, intuitive, clinical judgment and sometimes political decision-making 
processes, and then there is the unknown and the complex that factor into the event—the 
uncertainty piece. Additionally, there is that crucial need to understand that in every way, in 
every case, real-world problems, such as living systems in trauma codes, place heavy cognitive 
demands on decision-makers for rapid and reflexive orienting, allowing his or her adaptive 
processes to take over to deal with the situation effectively.  
Emergency physicians assertively demonstrate the ability to make wide-ranging and far-
reaching decisions regarding sick or multiply injured human beings in short periods of time. This 
ability is only possible because emergency physicians know what they want to achieve and have 
been trained in how to focus their knowledge and experience on the event at hand to reduce the 
uncontrolled environment that exists at the beginning of trauma codes. Furthermore, emergency 
physicians have clear goals about the roles they play in acute injury care, in spite of the fact that 
the events to be faced will typically be unpredictable. It was observed in the TC that there is no 
lack of clarity about the role of an emergency physician.  
These decision-makers apply the knowledge of pattern recognition frameworks that must 
be adapted in solving difficult problems wherein all that is available are data that cannot be 
easily modeled to fit the reality of the trauma. By virtue of the great number of trauma codes that 
show up at their door steps, emergency physicians tend to build large mental libraries of these 
patterns that become important to planning their actions. Thus, experience helps physicians to 
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sharpen their thinking processes in this complex environment to avoid chaotic situations and to 
focus their energies on increasing the quality of patient care.  
This dissertation showed that for the most part trauma physicians are dealing with 
voluminous and difficult-to-handle information. Thus, it is in part experience that plays an 
important role in trauma decision-making by facilitating the gathering of information and the 
development of alternative paths to problem-solving action during trauma events. Because the 
study was conducted at an academic environment, the role of each of these emergency 
physicians also included building up the cognitive style of resident physicians and ascertaining 
that they did not get so little information that they became bored nor so much information that it 
risked leading to overload and burn-out as repeated situations reached the edges of chaos. It is a 
complex environment in which performance criteria change with each case at hand. Therefore, 
this study also discussed the fact that trauma centers provide unique environments not only for 
interns but for more experienced physicians, as well, for learning processes in complex skill 
acquisition. Physicians talk about not being able to know how sick patients are when they arrive 
at the hospital. Because of the inherent complexity of the human body, which is compounded by 
serious injuries or sickness, there is not enough science currently available for physicians to 
determine the prognosis of patients in detail when they present at the hospital.  Initially, 
physicians‘ ways of speaking do not describe the facts as they really are. However, physicians 
tend to see the situation as comparable to making an experiment in which only time will tell 





The model DMPUS presented here to explain the physicians‘ decision-making thought 
processes offers a way of understanding how decision-makers approach stressful problems. The 
most immediate result of the model was to be able to capture physicians‘ cognitive tasks as they 
play an important role in trauma events. The model was aimed at providing physicians trauma 
events with the capability to learn more about their own behaviors and those of the environment.  
The combination of Bayesian classifier and deconvolution operators in a model was 
designed to mimic the information processing of decision-makers under stress. Deconvolution is 
widely used in many branches of science. Communication engineers, for example, use (in real 
time) convolution and deconvolution models extensively in communication systems such as the 
telephone to un-do distorted messages that have become garbled by the telephone system. This 
kind of study is important for high-pressure environments in which human decision-makers and 
high technologies coexist. This study attempted to understand the process of metacognition 
experiences, the understanding of physicians‘ cognitive processes through which strategies are 
developed to decide under pressure the course of action for a trauma code situation.  
The resulting benefits of this study are important information about how physicians think 
during decision-making processes in emergency situations, which carries potential benefit to 
society. Aspects of complexity concepts were emphasized to provide a better understanding of 
critical situations often encountered by decision-makers in difficult task environments. A key 
contribution is that it traces the major determinants and pervasive effects of decision-making 
occurrences for a deeper understanding as to why expert decision-makers tend to make 
judgments without assigning numerical values. Physicians as decision-makers play an important 
role in adapting to flows of knowledge based upon fragmentary data about the system presented 
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in trauma centers. Humans generally have the predisposition to selectively perceive information 
that is consistent with their existing views. A better understanding of how physicians think will 
most likely generate an increase in new sets of tools to assist in strategic decision-making.  
One significant fact observed during this study was the explosion of information that 
accompanies all the technologies that trauma centers utilize in the care of trauma patients. A 
good portion of a physician‘s training has to be allocated to learning each technology apparatus, 
and this learning must be updated with each new apparatus that is acquired. But emergency 
physicians also rely heavily upon their own experience, attitudes and efficacy in trying to affect 
trauma outcomes.  All of these factors play important roles in complex relationship with one 
another, leading emergency physicians to be able to predict events and trigger actions. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that much is known about the performance of the different medical 
specialties which compose a trauma center medical team. Invariably, the factors that limit the 
performance of each of the members of the team is not the abundance of new technologies; it is 
the scarcity of research that explores how physicians think in ways that will give them an edge 
while caring for a complex system such as a human being in trauma.  
By exploiting the Bayesian classifier and the deconvolution model, and understanding the 
existing convolution at the onset of each trauma code, it is possible to extract the much-needed 
knowledge that helps physicians to focus on a potential diagnosis. The study suggests that all the 
medical specialties composing a trauma team are more than capable of contributing strong 
observations and interpretations as to how they see the situation and how to proceed to find a 
solution or solutions. Whether those observations are right or wrong matters not, because they 
are hypothesizing about the diagnosis, which, when followed by actions, returns feedback. Here 
physicians are engaging in cognitive strategies at work that are harder to describe or measure.  
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7.3 Research Limitations 
As with most research, this study had some natural limitations. One of the limitations of 
this research is mostly related to the collection of data and the difficulties of translating 
physicians‘ thoughts into a mathematical exercise to be solved by analytical reasoning. The data 
collected was from a very limited number of trauma case scenarios; though the scenarios were 
observed in real-time, suggesting a small body of evidence. While this difficulty is common in 
the healthcare sciences due to the sensitive nature of patients‘ information and the complexity of 
securing IRB approval for these kinds of real-time research, its potential limitations warrant 
reflection. The researcher, as non-medical personnel, was limited in his knowledge of the areas 
of medical terminology, physiology, human anatomy and medical procedures during the 
observation of an ongoing-under-stress trauma code. The observation of a physician in action is 
always limited by the difficulty of understanding what physicians are actually doing, thinking 
and saying.  
Physicians in trauma centers‘ domains have the pressures of dealing with a wide range of 
emotions originating from the environment, patients, patients‘ families and medical personnel 
surrounding the trauma case, which causes a highly charged emotional situation. The leading 
physician of a Level 1 trauma resuscitation unit knows the team he/she is working with, and, as 
such, communication among the team members was observed to be at times silent, with only 
exchanged eyes contact and suggestive glances. Because the researcher‘s observations could 
raise concerns, given that they were intended to measure and explain physicians‘ thinking 
processes in their decision-making actions, EMAP-1 was asked to review the collected data to 
mitigate this concern by verifying that information acquired was correct. This limitation, the 
difficulty of obtaining sufficient patients‘ medical records, precluded the ability to give more 
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validity to the decision-making model. It only considered a few trauma cases. The narrow range 
of trauma cases limits the generalization and scalability of the research findings to complex 
adaptive systems in general. It will be useful to replicate the findings in other trauma center 
domains and in larger scale, to include the medical records of trauma cases that have occurred 
during the full period of a year. At the site of this research, more than 3,200 trauma cases are 
seen yearly, which provides good opportunity to further validate the model. Admittedly, this 
study suggests that more research needs to be carried out pertaining to decision-making 
processes in trauma centers using a sufficient number of cases. The healthcare industry has 
distinguished itself by the importance and support it gives to research in the areas of patient care 
and training of its medical personnel.  
The second limitation pertains to the fact that the study was conducted at an academic 
setting. It is known that the medical profession is based upon an apprentice-like model of 
medical training, which is more closely observed in the academic setting. Attending physicians, 
while still watching over their apprentices like a hawk for the entire procedure, take a step back 
to allow for medical residents to take over the event in order to learn, placing an onus on the 
attending physician. Physicians‘ residents, because of their highly inquisitive minds, suffer 
significant pressure as well to acquire competence in many areas within a short time. Because of 
this academic setting, the decision-making process was sometimes distributed amongst team 
members in order to maximize the acquisition of clinical acumen, wisdom and good medical 
judgment.   
7.4 Conclusions 
This study begins to clarify whether a specific understanding of physicians‘ decision-
making processes can be gained in a trauma center setting, where they are confronted with 
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complex, stressful and rapidly changing situations. The main goal of this study was to explain 
physicians‘ decision-making processes while under the stress of treating a traumatized (injured 
or very sick) human being. It has explored the processes by which physicians make decisions 
during a trauma occurrence. Emergency and trauma physicians are performing rapid 
resuscitation and damage control while in the golden hour of a trauma event. The survival of a 
Level 1 trauma patient is given the highest priority in trauma physicians‘ mental processes. The 
study shows that the setting of trauma medicine and emergency medicine requires a different 
way of approaching problem solving.  
More than three decades ago researchers expressed concerns that no attention had been 
given to the principles that underlie clinical decision making, researches in the cognitive aspects 
of medical decision-making had diminished, and a comprehensive theory of diagnostic thinking 
and problem solving was not yet available (Croskerry, 2000; Kassirer, 1976; Kassirer, 1995). 
Trauma and emergency medicine are not the usual models of organizations with which scholars 
tend to be familiar. Trauma centers‘ models of decision making are a mixture of formal and 
informal actions and the spontaneity of its participant agents who are facing novel problems and 
developing new ideas. Many times this study mentioned the complexity involved in each and 
every trauma case presented due to the human body being a complex system. Besides dealing 
with decisions pertaining to the immediate problem of caring for the patient injuries or sickness, 
physicians are also overloaded with the problem of resource allocation management. Resource 
allocation management is a complex problem in and of itself (Ntuen, & Park, 1995). The 
attending emergency physician is always aware of the case requirements and is attentive to the 
behavior of the system. While planning in time and space, physicians‘ capacities for decision-
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making and judgment become the dominant traits that allow them to take in the necessary 
information about the system and decide upon problem-solving actions.  
7.5 Implications for Future Research Studies 
Since 2009, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States have been 
pushing strongly towards assessment, evaluation and dissolution of barriers and obstacles to 
conducting acute injury care research. The opportunities for research in emergency medicine 
abound, as the numbers of research studies conducted to date in this area have been modest. The 
CDC is aware that human performance measurement in complex environments such as those in 
trauma centers is a multifaceted problem that will require interdisciplinary research efforts. 
Future studies in this marginally explored field of how physicians think during decision-making 
processes are needed in trauma medicine.  
The following suggestions are proposed for further research that will have meaningful 
implications and direct consequences towards understanding the decision-making processes in 
trauma centers. These include (a) voice recognition for gathering physicians‘ performance data, 
(b) developing a greater understanding of the role metacognition plays in physicians‘ 
communication, comprehension and problem-solving skills that helps physicians monitor their 
decision-making processes, (c) developing principles to help understand physicians‘ thinking 
processes to make them more visible processes, (d) the development of a conceptual framework 
for the minimization of cognitive errors in trauma centers and (e) replication of the study by 
looking at all or most trauma cases recorded for a particular trauma center for an entire year, with 
the collaboration of emergency physicians who have an interest in decision-making processes 
and in how physicians think during actual trauma codes. 
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It seems that by large, there is far too little rather than more-than-enough information 
available about physicians‘ thinking processes while making decisions in trauma-related events. 
It is difficult to discern what physicians are thinking, because it is part of their culture. 
Researchers studying medical doctors have brought to light the critical importance of decision-
making in all disciplines of medicine and the need for collaborative efforts of multidisciplinary 
research teams involving physicians, engineers, medical decision-making researchers and many 
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Level 1 and Level 2 Trauma Code Criteria 
Level 1 
Traumatic cardiac arrest 
 Hypotension or Shock (includes systolic blood pressure < 90 mmHg) 
(It includes field intubation, inability to incubate, or assisted ventilations) 
 Glasgow Coma Scale < 8 
 Gun Shot Wound of neck or torso (chest, back, abdomen, or groin) 
 Receiving blood transfusion to maintain vital signs  
Level 2 
 Heart rate < 50 or > 125 
 Respiratory rate < 10 or > 29 
 History of hypotension but normal blood pressure at present 
 Glasgow Coma Scale 8 – 10  
 Stab to torso 
 Gun Shot Wound to the head 
 Gun Shot Wound proximal to knee or elbow 
 Paralysis/suspect spinal cord injury 
 Amputation proximal to wrist or ankle 
 Neurovascular compromise in an extremity 
 Intubation at an outside hospital 
 Multisystem trauma on outside imaging 
 Significant neurologic injury (Glasgow Coma Scale < 10) 
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 Flail chest 
 Crush injury to pelvis 
  Auto versus pedestrian 
 Ejection from vehicle 
 Two or more long bone fractures 
Burn Criteria Level 1 
 Any burn with Hypotension or Shock (systolic Blood Pressure < 90mmHG) 
 Any burn with threatened airway patency 
Burn Criteria Level 2 
 15% total body surface area 
 10% total body surface area, age < 10 or >60 
 Burn patient incubated prior to arrival 





1.      Allergy 38.  Pediatrics Gastroenterology 
2.      Anesthesiology 39.  Pediatric Hematology 
3.      Cardiology 40.  Pediatric Oncology 
4.      Critical care  41.  Pediatric Infectious Disease 
5.      Dermatology 42.  Pediatrics Nephrology 
6.      Emergency Pediatrics 43.  Pediatrics Pulmonologist 
7.      Emergency Toxicology 44.  Physical Medicine and Rehab 
8.      Emergency Medicine 45.  Psychiatry 
9.      Endocrinology 46.  Pulmonologist 
10.  Family Medicine 47.  Radiology 
11.  Gastroenterology 48.  Radiology Interventional 
12.  Geriatrics 49.  Radiology Nuclear Medicine 
13.  Hematology 50.  Radiology Pediatric 
14.  Hospice Palliative Care 51.  Rheumatology 
15.  Hospitalist 52.  Surgery colon Recta; 
16.  Infectious Diseases 53.  Surgery General 
17.  Internal Medicine 54.  Surgery Plastic 
18.  Neurology 55.  Surgery Oncological 
19.  Neurosurgery 56.  Surgery Thoracic 
20.  OBGYN 57.  Surgery Transplant 
21.  OBGYN Gynecologic Oncology 58.  Surgery Vascular 
22.  OBGYN Maternal and Fetus Medicine 59.  Urology 
23.  OBGYN Reproductive Medicine 60.  Urology Pediatric 
24.  Oncology Hematology 61.  Women's Health 
25.  Oncology Radiation 
26.  Ophthalmology 
27.  Orthopedics 
28.  Orthopedics Hand Medicine 
29.  Orthopedics Sports Medicine 
30.  Otolaryngology 
31.  Otolaryngology Pediatrics 
32.  Pain Medicine 
33.  Pathology 
34.  Pediatrics Adolescent 
35.  Pediatric Cardiology 
36.  Pediatrics Critical Care 








Details of Trauma Cases 
Table C.1  









































































































15:06 Patient arrives at ED transported by EMS - CPR in 
progress 
     3 1 Patient arrived at ED 
transported by EMS - 
CPR in progress. 
Trauma team places 
collection of vital signs 
on hold in order to 
revive patient without 
success. CPR continued 
until patient expired. 
Patient sent to morgue. 
15:10 CPR still in progress      3 1 
15:12 Patient dies - Patient sent to morgue      0 1 
18:30 Family and Police arrived        
         
         
         
         










Table C.2  





















4:39 110/80 84 18 2 96 3/3 15 1 Gunshot wound to the 
lower extremity. 4:44 135/72 78 18 2 98 3/3 15 4 
5:01 131/70 89 15 2 93 3/3 15 4 
5:06 125/70 83 18 2 96 3/3 15 3 
5:37 126/89 90 20 2 93 3/3 15 2 
 
Table C.3  





















15:09 122/82 68 16 2 100 2/2 15 4 Multiple gunshot 
wounds. 15:11 111/72 71 16 2 100 2/2 15 4 
15:25 130/64 72 16 2 100 2/2 15 1 
15:30 111/83 65 16 2 100 2/2 15 1 
15:40 111/94 67 14 2 100 2/2 15 1 
15:45 132/88 70 14 2 99 2/2 15 3 
16:00 142/69 82 20 2 99 2/2 15 2 
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21:28 132/100 106 14 1 97 3/3 15 3 Vehicle crash. Patient 
badly hurt. Patient was 
very alert but very 
uncooperative and 
screaming at medical 
staff. 
21:33 151/89 113 24 1 98 3/3 15 3 
21:48 154/89 109 21 1 98 3/3 15 1 
21:55 144/86 104 20 1 98 3/3 15 1 
22:10 155/106 123 21 1 95 3/3 15 1 
22:20 147/110 112 21 1 98 3/3 15 4 
22:33 152/83 103 16 1 99 3/3 15 4 
22:45 149/70 111 24 1 100 3/3 15 1 
23:18 146/84 106 26 1 98 3/3 15 1 
23:01 133/60 101 20 1 98 3/3 15 2 
0:06 164/77 106 23 1 99 3/3 15 2 
0:50 135/73 91 22 1 97 3/3 15 2 
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18:49 190/78 106 20 3 99 4/4 15 1 Patient transferred to WFU 
from another hospital for a 
higher level trauma center 
facility. Severe knife stab 
to the chest. Primary and 
secondary assessments 
conducted. Bleeding was 
controlled. Patient sent to 
the operating room for 
surgery after being 
stabilized. 
18:55 160/78 110 20 3 99 4/4 15 4 
19:10 132/78 118 19 3 99 4/4 15 3 
19:14 110/81 120 16 3 99 4/4 15 3 
19:18 100/67 110 16 3 100 4/4 15 1 
         
         
         
         
         
         
Table C.6  





















3:10 160/98 108 15 3 98 3/3 15 3 Chest wounds due to 
multiple knife stabs. 3:14 161/99 106 15 3 94 3/3 15 4 
3:18 171/109 90 16 3 98 3/3 15 4 
3:20 144/109 92 18 3 98 3/3 15 1 
3:24 139/102 107 18 3 98 3/3 15 1 
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3:09 103/85 91 20 1 99 4/4 8 3 Patient involved in a 
vehicle crash. After 
arrival at ED, patient 
was stabilized, X-rays, 
and sent to CT-scan 
laboratory on the 
stretcher in which the 
patient arrived. Patient 
mildly agitated. 
3:15 103/85 94 16 1 98 4/4 8 3 
3:20 123/87 91 20 1 98 4/4 8 4 
3:25 126/65 94 16 1 94 4/4 9 4 
3:40 126/62 94 16 1 99 4/4 9 4 
3:50 135/63 98 16 1 108 4/4 10 1 
3:58 145/70 101 20 1 100 4/4 10 1 
4:01 98/93 82 20 1 100 4/4 10 1 
4:03 98/93 69 17 1 100 4/4 9 2 
4:07 107/42 74 15 1 95 4/4 15 2 
4:12 101/43 64 16 1 95 4/4 15 1 






























16:00 142/68 124 24 1 96 2/2 9 1 Patient brought in by 
EMS due to vehicle 
crash. Possible spine 
problems. Primary and 
secondary assessments 
at bedside conducted. 
X-ray and CT-scan 
were ordered by the 
trauma team. Patient 
arrived intubated. 
Patient was extubated 
and tolerated 
procedure well. 
16:12 130/76 101 19 1 100 2/2 9 1 
16:20 133/102 112 13 1 98 2/2 9 1 
16:27 133/74 101 13 1 100 2/2 9 3 
16:29 145/70 101 15 1 98 2/2 9 3 
16:33 121/72 105 13 1 99 2/2 9 4 
16:36 139/88 100 13 1 99 2/2 8 4 
16:40 111/72 93 16 1 100 2/2 8 3 
16:44 115/70 79 16 1 99 2/2 15 3 
16:49 114/71 80 18 1 100 2/2 15 2 
17:00 100/61 78 18 1 100 2/2 15 3 
17:23 111/62 80 20 1 98 2/2 15 3 
17:31 108/71 91 20 1 99 2/2 15 4 






























2:05 148/98 88 20 2 93  11 3 Gun Shot Wound 
2:09 160/56 85 20 2 95  11 1 
2:12 139/62 86 16 2 90  12 1 
2:18 132/87 88 16 2 95  11 1 
2:20 140/73 87 20 2 96  11 3 
2:50 124/82 70 18 2 94  12 4 
3:00 154/78 70 17 2 95  13 4 
3:05 152/98 89 18 2 95  15 3 
3:09 124/71 88 18 2 94  15 3 
3:15 142/91 86 17 2 94  15 4 






























19:10 130/70 97 18 4 96 3/3 15 3 Burned Patient. 
Patient was working 
on equipment that 
caught fire, severely 
burned patient. Patient 
was first seen by 
another hospital and 
then transferred to a 
higher level trauma 
center at WFU. 
Primary and secondary 
assessments 
performed again on 
patient. 
19:15 123/75 101 13 4 96 3/3 15 4 
19:20 125/73 101 15 4 96 3/3 15 4 
19:23 116/73 99 18 4 96 3/3 15 3 
19:28 120/79 98 18 4 97 3/3 15 1 
19:38 126/79 98 17 4 97 3/3 15 3 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         






























3:35 150/95 102 20 4 96 3/3 15 3 Patient transferred 
from a lower level 
trauma center for 
higher care. Trauma 
team suturing wounds. 
Chest wounds.   
3:45 126/100 93 16 4 96 3/3 15 1 
4:00 156/80 96 16 4 100 3/3 15 1 
4:06 147/82 93 16 4 98 3/3 15 1 
4:10 129/66 82 16 4 98 3/3 15 4 
4:16 130/87 85 16 4 99 3/3 15 3 
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21:51 122/48 106 16 1 96 3/3 15 1 Trauma team at 
bedside conducted 
primary and secondary 
assessments. The 
mechanism of injury 
was a vehicle crash. 
21:52 109/90 104 17 1 96 3/3 15 1 
21:58 121/70 101 18 1 96 3/3 15 3 
22:05 124/54 107 19 1 97 3/3 15 3 
22:09 124/79 106 20 1 97 3/3 15 3 
22:10 130/74 98 16 1 100 3/3 15 4 






























22:32 134/102 102 19 1 94 3/3 8 1 Patient arrived by 
EMS. Trauma team in 
place at bedside. 
Primary and secondary 
assessments 
conducted. Patient was 
stabilized.   
22:37 140/83 103 16 1 96 3/3 8 4 
22:43 140/90 102 14 1 96 3/3 9 3 
22:48 138/87 92 13 1 98 3/3 9 3 
22:53 140/83 98 19 1 97 3/3 10 3 
22:56 132/84 95 20 1 98 3/3 12 4 
22:59 142/92 106 16 1 98 3/3 12 3 
23:01 130/100 98 18 1 95 3/3 12 2 
23:10 124/79 94 15 1 95 3/3 12 2 
23:20 133/76 89 13 1 96 3/3 12 1 
23:25 135/89 93 20 1 95 3/3 13 1 
23:30 111/89 93 22 1 94 3/3 15 1 
23:40 122/81 93 18 1 95 3/3 15 3 






























7:44        1 Patient arrived at ED 
via EMS with CPR in 
progress. All Vital 
Signs collection was 
placed on hold in 
order to revive patient. 
Trauma team had no 
success in reviving 
patient. Patient 
expired at 07:54 AM, 
ten minutes after 
arrival in trauma 
center. 
7:45        1 
7:46        1 
7:47        1 
7:48        1 
7:49        1 
7:50        1 
7:51        1 
7:52        1 
7:53        1 
7:54 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 1 
         
         
 
 
 
